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Abstract
To begin the analysis of Japanese regulation, Part I looks closely at the structure and imple-
mentation of the Large Scale Retail Stores Law (“LSRSL”) by the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry (“MITI”). The LSRSL and its implementation are representative of Japanese agency
practice, and their detailed description can aid in forming preliminary generalizations about the
legal nature and explanations for the delegation of power to private parties that this Article argues
comprises Japanese regulatory style. To confirm the representative nature of administrative prac-
tice under the LSRSL and to provide additional breadth to the analysis, Part II looks at instances
of delegation in several other areas of bureaucratic practice from MITI supervision of structural
adjustment under declining industries statutes to the granting of broadcast licenses by the Min-
istry of Posts and Telecommunications (“MPT”). In order to get a sense of the preconditions and
limitations of this style of regulation, Part II also examines the less successful use of similar regu-
latory techniques in both economic regulation and by local governments interested in controlling
land use within their jurisdictions. Part III draws on U.S. administrative law norms and European
regulatory theory to refine the model of privatized regulation that emerges from Parts I and II. The
Conclusion assesses the likelihood that recent legal and political changes in Japan and growing
international pressures for transparency in domestic administrative processes will lead to changes
in Japanese regulatory style in the near future.
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INTRODUCTION
Central to any discussion of the nature of the Japanese bu-
reaucracy is the role of the economic ministries. How one evalu-
ates the ministries' performance will influence how one de-
scribes the Japanese economy, the nature of capitalism, the ori-
gin and nature of Japan's trade surplus, and much more. Seen
by some as at the center of a web of influence that extends to the
far reaches of the economy and as deserving much of the credit
for economic growth up to the 1980s,1 the best that others can
1. See generally CHALMERSJOH-NSON, MITI AND THEJAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWrH
OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY, 1925-1975 35-82 (1982) (discussing role of economic bureau-
cracy in growth and development of Japanese economy).
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say about the economic bureaucracies is that they have been too
weak to ruin the economy by having any influence over it.2
How one feels about these divergent claims depends on how
one analyzes the regulatory role. Advocates of the bureaucracy's
power point to its omnipresence in the Japanese economy and
assume that presence equates to influence. Critics stress most
ministries' general lack of legal power and conclude that private
economic actors follow bureaucratic guidance only when it suits
their own interests.
The key to both interpretations lies in their attention to the
phenomenon of administrative guidance.3 Defined variously,
administrative guidance is essentially the tendency of all Japa-
nese bureaucracies, and arguably of all bureaucracies every-
where, to prefer informal means of policy implementation to
formal ones. It includes the practice of an agency to instruct
private parties to take action that the agency does not have the
legal power to compel.4 In the economic context, this means a
ministry's efforts to extend its regulatory influence beyond its
formal statutory power and to influence firm behavior to achieve
economic results that are not supported by compulsory enforce-
ment power.
That the scope, content, and nature of administrative gui-
dance are important to understanding Japanese regulation is a
2. See generallyJOHN 0. HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THEJAPANESE
PARADox 139-68 (1991); see also Muneyuki Shind6, Kanri sareta shijoky6so ni yoru keizaihat-
ten [Economic Development by Managed Market Competition], EKONOMISUTO, May 17, 1993,
at 124 (presenting both sides of argument in debate over role of economic bureaucra-
cies) [hereinafter Managed Market Competition]. This statement concerning the debate
regarding bureaucratic influence in the Japanese economy simplifies the discussion be-
cause it ignores the change in the bureaucracies' role over time.
3. See e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 242-74 (describing MITI's uses of administra-
tive guidance); MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND COMPETITION LAW IN
JAPAN 60 (1993) (discussing use of administrative guidance as central to role of eco-
nomic regulation); Gy6sei shid6: Dokushi seisaku to sangy6 seisaku (Zadankai) [Administra-
tive Guidance: Competition Policy and Industrial Policy (Symposium)], 741 JURISUTo 15-36
(1981); Yoriaki Narita, Gy6sei shid6 no kin6 to k6zai [ The Function and Merit of Administra-
tive Guidance], 741 JURISUTO 39-44 (1981); see also MUNEVUKI SHINDO, GYOSEI SHIDO [AD-
MINISTRATVE GUIDANCE] 1, 27-76 (1994) (discussing use of administrative guidance by
Japanese bureaucratic agencies).
4. The concept of administrative guidance actually covers a much wider field of
activities than instructing private parties on how to act. It includes purely promotional
activity and subsidies; information gathering, processing, and distribution; and intra-
and inter-ministerial communications; communications between the central govern-
ment and local entities; and much more. See MATSUSHITA, supra note 3, at 61-65 (dis-
cussing categories of administrative guidance).
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truism, but a focus on administrative guidance will miss much of
what is distinctive in Japanese regulatory style. In various forms
and under diverse rubrics, administrative guidance is repeated
in every capitalist economy. Furthermore, implicit in the focus
on administrative guidance per se is the assumption that the reg-
ulatory structure within which it operates is similar to that of the
United States, most fundamentally that there is a clear or at least
discernible line between the public sphere of the agencies and
the private sphere of the regulated. Under these assumptions,
administrative guidance plays basically the same role as legally
compulsory regulation in other capitalist legal systems. It is easy
then to conclude, if one begins with the assumption of the minis-
tries' power, that administrative guidance is remarkable because
it achieves results that are impossible in other systems without
binding legal power. Conversely, if one assumes bureaucratic
impotence, it is easy to dismiss administrative guidance as tooth-
less rhetoric.
The problem is that the structure within which regulation
operates often makes the debate on administrative guidance ir-
relevant. In fields as distinct as land use planning and broadcast
licensing, Japanese bureaucrats delegate their public power to
private parties and function not as direct implementers of regu-
latory policy, but, at most, as overseers of its private implementa-
tion. This pattern frequently extends to the formation of policy
as well as its implementation, and the bureaucratic role dimin-
ishes to intervention at moments of political crisis. At other
times, the agency plays an active monitoring and enforcement
role, but seldom does a Japanese agency play the role that one
would expect from the classic models of economic regulation.
This Article proposes a model of this style of Japanese eco-
nomic regulation. It argues that Japanese regulators delegate
part or most of their power to private parties to a degree and in a
manner unanticipated in the literature on either Japan or regu-
lation in general.5 It presents a detailed study of this mode of
5. Observers of Japanese regulation and government-business relations have de-
scribed this phenomenon variously. Richard Samuels' statement that the "Japanese bu-
reaucracy does not dominate, it negotiates" certainly captures much of what this Article
describes, as does John Haley when he uses the terms "regulation by cartel" and "con-
sensual governance." See RICHARD SAMUELS, THE BUSINESS OF THE JAPANESE STATE 260
(1987); HALE, supra note 2, at 139-68; CurtisJ. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. Miller, Coopera-
tion, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the jusen'Problem (unpub-
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regulation in the retailing industry and follows with briefer treat-
ments of regulation in several other sectors to determine the var-
iations and limitations of the model. Although this Article
makes no claim of universality for the model, the author believes
that the delegation of public power described herein, referred to
as privatized regulation, is not exclusive to these areas and that it
represents a common style of regulation in Japan.
This Article examines how and by whom Japan is governed.
It focuses is on the structure and legal nature of government
intervention in the market and on the relationship between the
formal legal system and the exercise of power by the Japanese
bureaucracy. It does not directly address the current debate be-
tween those who argue that the bureaucrats rule Japan and
those who argue that the bureaucrats are simply agents of Japa-
nese political parties.6 Whichever group ultimately calls the
shots, public power is exercised through the bureaucrats, and an
understanding of how they govern will deepen the understand-
ing of the nature of political power in Japan, regardless of
whether one considers privatized regulation as the product of an
independent bureaucratic will or as an illustration of principal-
agent theory.
Because of this domestic focus, the areas of inquiry are
more commonly thought of as domestic, rather than interna-
tional issues. To the extent that the model is accurate, however,
it should be of interest to anyone interested in a series of interre-
lated questions about the world economic and legal order. An
initial question concerns the nature of capitalism and whether
the pattern of delegation of public power described here is dis-
lished draft on file with author) (referring to financial regulation as "regulatory car-
tel"). This Article would go further, however, to argue that at times the bureaucracy
does not even negotiate; it simply steps back from all engagement and leaves the imple-
mentation of regulatory power to the private sector. Although this approach is un-
known to U.S. theories of regulation, it is closer to European models of government
regulation.
6. The two schools of thought are most commonly represented by ChalmersJohn-
son, in MITI and the Japanese Miracle, stressing the role of the bureaucrats in the creation
of whatJohnson describes as the developmental state, andJ. Mark Ramseyer and Fran-
ces McCall Rosenbluth, in Japan's Political Mai*etplace, stressing the role of the Liberal
Democratic Party ("LDP"). Ramseyer and Rosenbluth argue that the bureaucrats'
power was only as agents of the politicians. See John C. Campbell, Hedgehogs and Foxes:
The Divisive Rational Choice Debate in the Study of Japanese Politics, Soc. Sci. JAPAN, Jan.,
1997, at 36-38 (providing insightful comment on debate over role of bureaucrats in
Japan).
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tinctive in fundamental ways or is simply a variant of the bargain-
ing between public and private actors that characterizes all eco-
nomic regulation. ' A broader question concerns the existence
and nature of convergence, the argument that technological,
economic, and political factors are forcing the integration of na-
tional economies and a decline in the importance of nation
states as economic and social units.8 Advocates of convergence
theory point to the North American Free Trade Agreement
("NAFTA"), the European Union, the successful conclusion of
the Uruguay Round, and the creation of the World Trade Or-
ganization ("WT0") as representative of the increasing interde-
pendence and homogenization of advanced societies. To the ex-
tent that national regulatory styles remain distinct and particu-
laristic, however, they pose a challenge to the deep economic
integration and social convergence that many commentators
seem to assume are inevitable.
Although the Japanese practices described in this Article
may appear distinctive to U.S. observers, many are repeated in
similar contexts in the United States and elsewhere. The in-
volvement of organized private groups in the exercise of public
power is at the heart of corporatist and quasi-corporatist regula-
tory regimes in Europe and is not unknown in the United
States.9 What the author believes are distinctive about Japanese
regulation, however, are the degree of delegation and the legal
nature of the regulatory process. In many of the instances ex-
amined in this Article, the bureaucracies' delegation to private
actors is virtually total. In these extreme instances, a bureau-
cratic entity charged with implementing a statute does little
more than create a space within which regulated parties create
their own decision-making structure and allocate resources, in-
cluding the public resources represented by licenses and other
forms of public privilege, according to their own private criteria
without any principled bureaucratic oversight. The administra-
7. See Gerd Winter, Bartering Rationality in Regulation, 19 LAw & Soc'y REv. 219,
220, 230-32 (1985) (discussing bargaining between public and private parties in various
national regulatory regimes).
8. See generally NATIONAL DIvERsjTY AND GLOBAL CAPrrALISM 1 (Suzanne Berger &
Ronald Dore eds., 1996) (discussing convergence of national economies as result of
technological, political, and economic changes in global economy).
9. See generally PRIvATE IrNTxEsr GOVERNANCE 1 (Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe
Schmitter eds., 1985) (analyzing role of private interest groups in exercise of public
power in United States and Europe).
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tive agency may intervene during times of political crisis, but
rarely does so in the ordinary course of regulation, instead
choosing the cheap and safe course of delegation.1"
This degree of private involvement is possible because of
the legal nature of much of Japanese regulation. In many in-
stances, formal law is irrelevant. Unlike the quasi-public entities
of private interest governance in European corporatist regula-
tion, the private parties in Japanese privatized regulation are
often totally informal, without any legal identity whatsoever.
Even in those cases where the entities are created by statute, they
rarely operate in accordance with the statutory norms or carry
out the expected functions. Their decisions, therefore, are not
public acts in the eyes of the Japanese legal system and are diffi-
cult to attack directly. Similarly, an act of delegation by a gov-
ernment agency usually lacks the legal nature of an administra-
tive act cognizable by a court in judicial review. The agency's
choice to delegate its powers, therefore, effectively avoids legal
scrutiny because none of the public or private behavior is di-
rectly actionable in administrative litigation. The result is a sys-
tem of regulation that is both legally and politically opaque and
that often creates economic structures that are at best of ques-
tionable legality and at worst clearly illegal.
The system of privatized regulation, however, can operate
only under certain circumstances. The legal nature that allows it
to operate invisibly usually means that there are no direct legal
tools available to private parties to enforce their decisions. In
some cases, the delegating agency also lacks the compulsory
power to achieve its goals and even when it does have the power,
its formal exercise will automatically render the entire system le-
gally visible and politically vulnerable. As a result, privatized reg-
ulation relies on various forms of informal enforcement. These
means can be brutally effective in maintaining discipline in the
short run, but in the long run informal methods only work when
the parties are united either because they know that disunity will
lead to the unpredictable discipline of the market, what Japa-
nese call "excessive competition", or because privatized regula-
10. Delegation is cheap because it relieves an agency of its obligation to make deci-
sions that often require a great deal of procedural formality and technical expertise.
Delegation is safe because in most contexts in Japan it is less visible politically and le-
gally and, hence, less vulnerable to public criticism.
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tion created a stable and profitable cartel that makes the bene-
fits of going along much greater than those to be gained by go-
ing alone. It is not surprising, therefore, that privatized
regulation is most frequent and most effective, in sectors of the
economy where cartelization can create an expanded pie for car-
tel members and compensate them for the costs of regulation.
It is unclear how often these conditions exist within the Jap-
anese economy, but it is most likely that they exist in a smaller
number of sectors now than they did thirty years ago. The de-
clining formal power of the Japanese economic ministries, the
increasingly close scrutiny of Japan's domestic market by its trad-
ing partners, the enormous wealth and, hence, independence of
many Japanese companies, and a growing awareness within Ja-
pan of the costs of this regulatory style have presumably de-
creased the areas where privatized regulation can survive. This
Article will review some of these factors in Part II and in the
Conclusion, but it would be a mistake to believe that the forces
operating toward greater formality and openness in regulatory
practice have fully carried the day. The genius of privatized reg-
ulation includes its ability to reward its critics for going along
and to do so with the least political or legal notoriety. The na-
ture of privatized regulation is such that there is no quick way of
gauging its prevalence, growth, or decline. This Article, how-
ever, will at least help observers of Japan recognize and under-
stand privatized regulation when they encounter it.-
To begin the analysis of Japanese regulation, Part I looks
closely at the structure and implementation of the Large Scale
Retail Stores Law " ("LSRSL") by the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry ("MITI"). The LSRSL and its implementa-
tion are representative ofJapanese agency practice, and their de-
tailed description can aid in forming preliminary generalizations
about the legal nature and explanations for the delegation of
power to private parties that this Article argues comprises Japa-
nese regulatory style. To confirm the representative nature of
administrative practice under the LSRSL and to provide addi-
11. Daikib6 kouritenpo ni okeru kourigy6 nojigydkatsud6 no ch6sei ni kansuru h6ritsu [ The
Law Concerning the Adjustment of Retail Business Operations in Large Scale Retail Stores], Law
No. 109 of 1973 (Japan) [hereinafter LSRSL]; see Frank Upham, Privatizing Regulation:
The Implementation of the Large-Scale Retail Stores Law, in POLITICAL DYNAMICS IN CONTEM-
PORARYJAPAN 264-94 (Gary D. Allinson & Yasunori Sone eds., 1993) [hereinafter Priva-
tizing Regulation] (discussing LSRSL from perspective of Japanese interest politics).
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tional breadth to the analysis, Part II looks at instances of delega-
tion in several other areas of bureaucratic practice from MITI
supervision of structural adjustment under declining industries
statutes to the granting of broadcast licenses by the Ministry of
Posts and Telecommunications ("MPT"). In order to get a sense
of the preconditions and limitations of this style of regulation,
Part II also examines the less successful use of similar regulatory
techniques in both economic regulation and by local govern-
ments interested in controlling land use within their jurisdic-
tions. Part III draws on U.S. administrative law norms and Euro-
pean regulatory theory to refine the model of privatized regula-
tion that emerges from Parts I and II. The Conclusion assesses
the likelihood that recent legal and political changes in Japan
and growing international pressures for transparency in domes-
tic administrative processes will lead to changes in Japanese reg-
ulatory style in the near future.
I. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LARGE SCALE RETAIL
STORES LAW IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN
A detailed analysis of the structure and implementation of
the LSRSL illustrates the nature of economic regulation in con-
temporaryJapan. The initial focus of this analysis is on the struc-
ture and policy of the law, which in many ways is typical of post-
war Japanese regulatory statutes and not dissimilar to regulatory
statutes in Western Europe. 2 This Article then examines the
law's case by case application to specific circumstances by the
regional offices of the MITI in order to provide an understand-
ing of the actual practice of Japanese regulation.
A. The History and Structure of the LSRSL
The LSRSL story begins with the passage of the Department
Store Law13  ("DSL") in 1937. Enacted to protect small
merchants from department stores, the DSL was repealed dur-
ing the Allied Occupation and then re-enacted in 1956. For the
next decade, the DSL helped structure Japanese retailing in a
12. See, e.g., Loi Royer [Royer Law], Law No. 73-1193 of 1973 (France); see alsoJohn
T.S. Keeler, Corporatist Decentralization and Commercial Modernization in France: The Royer
Law's Impact on Shopkeepers, Supermarkets and the State, in SOCIALISM, THE STATE AND Pua-
LIC POLICY IN FRANCE 265, 265-74 (Philip G. Cerny & Martin A. Schew eds., 1985).
13. Hyakkatenhd [Department Store Law], Law No. 116 of 1956 (Japan) [hereinafter
DSL].
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way that served the interests of department stores and small re-
tailers alike. The permit system cartelized department stores by
restricting new entrants and guaranteeing the territory of ex-
isting branches. It simultaneously protected small merchants
outside of the established commercial centers from high volume
competitors.
The emergence of a new form of retailing known as the
suupaa, or superstores, began to break down the DSL system.
Superstores were mass merchandisers offering a product mix
similar to department stores but without the fashionable image.
Superstores expanded rapidly in the 197 0s by developing a new
corporate form designed to avoid the restrictions of the DSL and
enable the superstores to exploit the niche between department
stores and independent neighborhood retailers. By 1981, six of
the ten largest retailers in Japan were superstores,14 and by the
late 1960s both the department stores and small retailers were
lobbying for revision of the law. The result of the ensuing legis-
lative battle was the LSRSL of 1973.
There were three significant differences between the LSRSL
and the DSL. First, the LSRSL added the protection of con-
sumer interests and the rationalization of the retailing industry
to the purposes of the act.15 Second, it replaced the direct regu-
lation of the permit system with a notification and adjustment
system.1 6 Under the DSL, department stores could not operate
without explicit approval from an administrative agency. Under
the LSRSL, however, no such approval was necessary, although
large stores did have to notify MITI of their plans and might
have to participate in an adjustment process which could lead to
changes in their original plans. Third, the LSRSL shifted the
14. JETRO, Retailing in theJapanese Consumer Market, JETRO MARKETING SERIES No.
5 16, 25 (1985) [hereinafter JETRO MARKETING SERIES No. 5]. The remaining four
retailers were department stores. Id. The top six superstores in 1982 were Daiei, It-
y6kad6, Seiyu, Jusco, Nichii, and Unii. Id. They were still the top six, in the same
order, in 1988. Yureru Daitenu (Jd) [The Swaying Large Stores Law (1)], NIHON KEIZMA
SHINBUN, OCL 20, 1988, at 6. Superstore chains were able to build large stores in new
areas by exploiting a loophole in the DSL. The law defined department stores as single
units of more than 1500 square meters. A superstore, on the other hand, consisted of
several legal entities, each of less than 1500 square meters, operating under a common
corporate identity within a single building. JETRO is the quasi-governmental Japan
External Trade Organization, whose role it is to support trade with and investment in
Japan.
15. See LSRSL arts. 1, 11, Law No. 109 of 1973 (Japan).
16. Id. arts. 3-7.
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target of regulation from the type of store, such as department
stores, to the volume of retail activity. The LSRSL focuses on the
amount of retail floor space in a single building and disregards
the legal nature and corporate structure of the store or stores
within it.17
Passage of the LSRSL can best be explained as a political
compromise among department stores, small and medium retail-
ers, and superstores, but official MITI commentaries on the
LSRSL invariably cited strengthened consumer protection and
industry rationalization as statutory goals.' Besides guarantee-
ing small merchants an "enterprise opportunity," Articles 1 and
11 of the LSRSL specifically require due consideration to the
interests of consumers and to the well-being of the retail industry
as a whole. 9 Economists and large retailers gave a generally pos-
itive initial appraisal of the LSRSL because of such inclusion. °
While these goals were potentially contradictory, legal commen-
tators contemplated the bureaucratic creation of a set of criteria
that would balance these varied interests on a case by case ap-
proach.
Procedure under the LSRSL during the initial regulatory
period of the LSRSL can be usefully divided into three stages.
These stages were notification of the intention to build and op-
erate a store, the adjustment of the proposed commercial activi-
ties of the new store with those of the existing merchants in the
area, and enforcement of the result.21 The process began with
notification to a regional office of MITI of a store's plans, includ-
17. Id. art. 3(1).
18. See e.g., Jun Arima, Ima gy6sei wa rigai no tairitsu suru daitenhd ni d6torikunde iru
ka [How Will the Bureaucracy Deal with the Large Stores Law Now That It Is the Object of Interest
Conflict?], SHOCWOKAi [THEJOURNAL OF RETAILING], Apr. 1988, at 146. Arima was a MITI
official at the time involved in LSRSL policymaking.
19. LSRSL arts. 1, 11, Law No. 109 of 1973 (Japan).
20. Toshimasa Tsuruta, Kokusaikajidai no daitenh6 wa d6 arubekika [What Should the
LSRSL Be Like in the Age of Internationalization?], EKONOMISuTo, Dec. 13, 1988, at 47.
21. For much of the period under discussion, the LSRSL divided new stores into
two classes by size. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 271-72 n.20. The main differ-
ence in treatment of classes one and two is that the former come under the initial
jurisdiction of the regional office of MITI and the latter under the prefectural gover-
nor's office. Id. For purposes of simplicity, the following description deals primarily
with the construction and operation of a new class one retail outlet. The adjustment
process also applies to renovations of existing stores and changes in operating condi-
tions, including floor space, hours, and monthly and annual days of operation, that
bring the store's operations within the law's purview. Id.
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ing the opening date, floor space, and hours and days of opera-
tion. 2 MITI then forwarded the notifications to two tripartite
shingikai, or deliberative councils.23 The first shingikai was the
Commercial Activities Adjustment Board established within the
local chamber of commerce, followed by the Large Scale Retail
Stores Deliberative Council at the regional level.24 These coun-
cils, made up of merchants, consumers, and representatives of
the public interest, brought the sides together and determined
whether the plans should be adjusted to lessen the impact on
local merchants. The councils then submitted their opinion to
MITI, which made an independent judgment based not only on
the council's recommendations but also on the interests of con-
sumers and the retailing industry in general.2 5 If MITI con-
cluded that adjustment was necessary, it issued a kankoku, or rec-
ommendation, which listed the desired changes.2 6 A recommen-
dation had no legal force and a retailer could violate its terms
without incurring legal liability or being subject to MITI sanc-
tions. If a retailer did violate the terms of the recommendation,
however, MITI had the power to issue a meirei, or order, which
was compulsory.2 7 The statute contemplated that the entire pro-
cess from notification through enforcement would normally
take no more than eight months.28
B. Commercial Adjustment Under the LSRSL
Implementation under the LSRSL has generally had only a
loose relationship to its formal structure. The shift from the per-
mit system of the DSL to the notification system of the LSRSL
ostensibly meant that government intervention would be the ex-
22. LSRSL art. 5, Law No 109 of 1973 (Japan).
23. See Frank Schwartz, Of Fairy Cloaks and Familiar Talks: The Politics of Consulta-
tion, in POLITICAL DYNAMCS IN CONTEMPORARYJAPAN 217-41 (Gary D. Allinson & Yasu-
nori Sone eds., 1993) (providing general description of role of shingikai in Japan); see
also FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 168, 199 (1987)
(describing use of shingikai deliberation councils) [hereinafter LAw AND SocIAl.
CHANGE]; JOHNSON, supra note 1, at 47-48 (discussing shingikai in economic policy con-
text).
24. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 271.
25. LSRSL arts. 7-14(2), Law No. 109 of 1973 (Japan). These criteria established
the process of consultation. Article 11 specifically required the consideration of con-
sumer and general industry interests. See id. art. 11.
26. Pivatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 271.
27. Id.
28. ISRSL arts. 7-8, Law No. 109 of 1973 (Japan).
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ception rather than the rule and that an emphasis on free mar-
ket principles played a role in convincing large retailers and
others to support the law. At the same time that it was extolling
free market competition to the large retailers, however, MITI
and the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") were promising small
retailers that the notification system would operate "just like a
permit system. "29  In the subsequent decade and a half, MITI
more than fulfilled this promise and eventually created a system
that erected barriers to entry into the retail industry far surpass-
ing those of the DSL. °
In the first five years of operation, however, MITI allowed
nearly 1500 new large stores to open under the law, approxi-
mately doubling the number that existed prior to 1974.1 Many
chains, moreover, skirted the law altogether by opening stores of
just under 1500 square meters.3 2 The response of independent
retailers was to lobby for extended coverage and tighter restric-
tions on new entrants into the retailing industry.33 Local govern-
ments promulgated ordinances and administrative guidance to
restrict opening stores of less than 1500 square meters.34 By
1977, the Japanese Parliament, or Diet, had passed a resolution
urging action to protect small retailers and MITI had established
a series of study commissions on the "retail problem."' The
Diet extended the LSRSL's coverage in 1978 from stores of more
29. Gekishin ima, rytitsi2 ga kawaru [Severe Earthquake Now, Distribution Changes],
SHOKAN TO6O KEiza, Aug. 6, 1988, at 9. The Japanese phraseology is "kagirinaku ky-
okasei ni chikai todokedesei ni suru."
30. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 271-72.
31. Id. at 272.
32. Tsuruta, supra note 20, at 49.
33. MITI, SHIN DAIKIBO KOURI TENPOHO NO KAISETSU [EXPLANATION OF THE NEW
LSRSL] 3 (Tsfish6sangy6sh6 sangy6seisakukyoku, daikibo kouri tenpo ch6seikan [MITI
Industrial Policy Bureau, Large Scale Retail Stores Adjustment Office] ed., 1988) [here-
inafter MITI MATERIALS],
34. In Tokyo, for example, both the city and each ward have separate sets of ad-
ministrative guidance in addition to the LSRSL. See Toky6t6 kourish5gy6 chdsei ni kansuru
y6k6 [ Tokyo City Outline Guidance Concerning the Adjustment of Retailing], Apr. 22, 1985, in
Economic Planning Agency Materials (on file with author) [hereinafter EPA Materials];
Suginamiku chtakibo kouri tenpo shutten ni kansuru shid6ydkd [Suginami Ward Outline Gui-
dance Concerning the Opening of Medium Scale Retail Stores], July 1, 1986, in EPA Materials,
supra. The Nihon Keizai Shinbun estimates that over 60% of local entities have some
form of locally created restriction on the opening of medium scale retailers, which gen-
erally covers all stores of less than 500 square meters. Chtikiboten kisei hirogaru [Restric-
tions on Medium Scale Stores Spread], NIHON KEIZAi SHINBUN, Sept. 29, 1988, at 2 [herein-
after Restrictions Spread].
35. Restrictions Spread, supra note 34, at 2.
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than 1500 square meters to all stores of more than 500 square
meters. Small retailers began to call for the return to both the
permit approach under the DSL and regulating stores on the
basis of type as well as amount of floor space. The latter was
necessary to protect independent stores from yet another com-
petitive threat, the convenience store chains, which competed
not on the basis of size but on price and hours of operation.3 6
Any attempt to pass such protective legislation would have
elicited substantial opposition. Recourse to the Diet, however,
was unnecessary because MITI was able to restructure the regula-
tory scheme to meet the small retailers' demands without any
legislative action whatsoever. Beginning in 1979, MITI refused
to accept a retailer's statutory notification unless it appended a
document setting forth the terms under which local merchants
agreed to the new store's opening.17 At this stage, before any
formal steps had been taken under the law, the large store and
local merchants entered into negotiations on the conditions
under which the latter would agree to the opening of the new
store. Sometimes these negotiations were carried out by the
members of the formal Commercial Activities Adjustment
Board, but more frequently by local merchants themselves in the
form of a Large Store Countermeasures Taskforce or Large
Scale Retail Stores Policy Subcommittee or similarly named
group loosely affiliated with the local chamber of commerce.3 8
This distortion of the statutory procedure and the general
withdrawal of MITI from its statutory role of final decision maker
corrupted the implementation of the LSRSL. Instead of the
contemplated seven to eight months between initial notification
and opening, it became common for negotiations to take seven
to eight years and delays of ten years were not unheard of. The
resulting agreements also clearly reflected the veto power the lo-
cal merchants wielded. They covered not only the four statutory
items subject to adjustment39 but also frequently extended to
36. See Ken'ichi Miyazawa, Endaka keizaika de hen'y6 suru 7ytitst2 kik6 [ Changing Struc-
ture of Distribution Under the High-Yen Economy], EKONOMISUTO, Sept. 13, 1988, at 58-59;
Masanori Tamura, Chtishdgy6sha suitai saseta daitenh6 [Large Stores Law Causes Small Enter-
prises'Decline], NioN KEizA SHINBUN, Oct. 24, 1988, at 15.
37. See generally Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 264-94 (detailing account of
administrative steps leading to store opening procedures).
38. Id. at 274.
39. See LSRSL arts. 3-10, Law No. 109 of 1973 (Japan) (stipulating statutory periods
for opening date, floor space, daily hours, and annual days of operation).
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matters that were unrelated to the legitimate concerns of the
LSRSL and were a primafacie violation of the Anti-monopoly Law
("AML") .40
C. The Legal Nature of the Adjustment Process
Given the gap between the goals of LSRSL and its applica-
tion in practice, one might expect that an injured party would
have convinced the courts to force MITI to implement the stat-
ute in accord with its statutorily-defined content and intent. As
in the United States, if a plaintiff can show that a government act
violates the statute on which it is based, a court will nullify it. A
common way to demonstrate illegality is to show that the govern-
ment agency has used the wrong criteria or followed incorrect
procedures in making a decision. Under Japanese administra-
tive law, however, getting a court to review administrative action
presents a series of difficulties that are aptly illustrated by the
Etsurigo litigation stemming from the opening of a store in Ja-
pan's Iwate Prefecture.4'
In the Etsurigo litigation, the Etsurigo Shopping Center Co-
operative Co. notified MITI of its plan to build a three story
23,904 square meter shopping complex in Etsurigo Village on
40. SEIFU KISEI NADO TO KYOS(SEISAKU NI KANSURU KENKYOKAI [RESEARCH COMMITTEE
ON GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION AND COMPETITION POLICY], ISEIKANWA NO SUISHIN NI
TSUITE [REGARDING THE PROMOTION OF DEREGULATION] 1, 51-52 (1989) [hereinafter FTC
REPORT]. The Research Committee on Governmental Regulation and Competition Pol-
icy is a creation of the Fair Trade Commission ("FTC"). The report contains several
case studies of the operation of the LSRSL. See Tsuruta, supra note 20, at 49. Examples
of such matters sought by local merchants that were outside the legitimate concerns of
the LSRSL include requirements that the new store allow specified local merchants as
subtenants on favorable terms, make large donations to local merchants' groups, not
carry certain items or lines of products, and maintain prices or services at the same level
as surrounding merchants. FTC REPORT, supra, at 52. Exacerbating the inconsistencies
of the LSRSL itself were the panoply of actions by local governments that arose in the
1980s to restrict retail activities not covered by the statute. See Dokusen kinshih6 [Anti-
monopoly Law], Law No. 138 of 1947, as amended 1988 (Japan) [hereinafter AML].
41. See Tadashi Matsumoto, Meikaku ni sareta daitenhd no fubi [The Defects of the Big
Stores Law Made Clear], 463 HANREi TAIMUZU 71 (1982) (analyzing LSRSL in context of
litigation in Iwate Prefecture); see alsoJudgment of the Tokyo District Court of Mar. 16,
1982, 1035 HANREI JIHO 17; Judgment of the Tokyo High Court ofJune 24, 1985, 1156
HANREI JIH6 37. The abuse of the Adjustment Board to promote, rather than restrict,
the opening of large stores occurred more frequently between 1974 and 1979 than after
1979. That the informality of the process allows abuse in either direction became im-
portant when MITI was forced to increase the number of store openings in response to
U.S. pressure at the end of the 1980s.
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March 20, 1979.42 The superstore Jusco was to occupy 14,000
square meters and local merchants were to occupy 6000 square
meters. The Etsurigo Commercial Activities Adjustment Board
met six times between May 18 and July 23 and recommended
thatJusco's space be reduced to 7500 square meters and the lo-
cal tenants remain at 6000 square meters. Jusco accepted this
recommendation, and, on September 12, 1979, Jusco and the
prospective local tenants filed its second stage notification pur-
suant to the LSRSL.45
The Adjustment Board reconvened on October 19, 1979
and ten days later, at its eighth meeting, adopted a resolution
accepting the stores' notification and forwarded it to the re-
gional Tohoku Large Stores Council. This Council submitted its
opinion to MITI on November 27, 1979, recommending a fur-
ther fifteen percent reduction of total space. MITI then issued
and Jusco accepted a recommendation calling for the reduction
in space as well as certain reductions in operating hours.4' The
whole process took less than nine months.45
InJanuary, 1981, 117 local merchants sued for the nullifica-
tion of MITI's recommendation. The plaintiffs claimed that the
recommendation denied local small merchants the "enterprise
opportunity"4 that Article 1 of the LSRSL provided and the pro-
cess that formed the recommendation violated both the statute
and MITI's regulations stipulating how the adjustment process
was to be conducted. Specifically, the local merchants alleged
that President Takahashi of the Etsurigo Chamber of Com-
merce, whose son was the president of the Etsurigo Shopping
Center Cooperative, had a direct conflict of interest and had se-
lected members of the Adjustment Board solely on the basis of
their pro-shopping center views.47
42. Matsumoto, supra note 41, at 72.
43. Id.; see LSRSL art. 5, Law No. 109 of 1973 (japan) (requiring submission of
notification prior to opening store).
44. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 275.
45. Id.
46. Matsumoto, supra note 41, at 71; see LSRSL art. 1, Law No. 109 of 1973 (Japan).
The statute states its purpose as, "sono shtdhen no chtlsh6kouri&y no jigy6katsud6 no kikai o
tekisei ni kakuho shi. . . . " [appropriately preserve the enterprise opportunities of small
and medium merchants in the surrounding area .... ] Id.
47. Matsumoto, supra note 41, at 72; Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 276.
Supporting the allegation of conflict of interest was the fact that the spouses of three of
the members were to become tenants in the complex. Id. The local merchants argued
that the participation of these persons in the board's deliberations violated both Article
19971
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The plaintiffs further alleged that the board's investigation
and deliberations were insufficient. They argued that the board
had failed to consider the current condition of small scale retail
operations in the area, local retailers' prospects for moderniza-
tion, consumer convenience, and the extent of the detrimental
impact on existing retailers. The merchants argued, moreover,
that the Adjustment Board had not followed the detailed compu-
tation formulas provided in MITI's guidance and handbooks.48
Nor had the regional MITI bureau supervised the board's delib-
erations as required by MITI's rules. MITI's representative
failed to attend a single meeting despite repeated requests by
local merchants to investigate improprieties regarding the com-
position and activities of the board. The plaintiffs pointed to the
Diet debates on the LSRSL for proof of the importance of ade-
quate governmental supervision and argued that the failure of
the local MITI office to exercise such supervision rendered the
board's process unfair and illegal.49 The plaintiffs argued that
MITI's failure to conduct its own investigation and its uncritical
reliance on the board's findings constituted a further ground for
illegality.
Journalistic reports and practices elsewhere under the
LSRSL leave little doubt that the plaintiffs' factual claims were
largely accurate and that the facts amounted to a blatant conflict
of interest on the part of Takahashi and the board and a clear
abdication of statutory duties by MITI. Such procedural abuses
would probably have been enough to convince the courts to de-
clare the whole process illegal. Because the doctrines of Japa-
nese administrative law severely restrict judicial review of govern-
ment action, however, it made little difference what improprie-
ties the plaintiffs might have been able to prove. In the end, the
District and High Courts had little trouble either in rejecting the
local merchants as proper plaintiffs or in finding that the MITI
recommendation to Jusco was not the type of administrative act
1 of the LSRSL and MITI's own administrative guidance requiring the president of the
local chamber of commerce to appoint members who will "represent the views of all
local small-scale retailers." MITI, 90 nendai ni okeru iyattsti no kihon h5k6 ni tsuite (chtikan
t6shin) [Regarding the Fundamental Direction of Distribution in the 1990s (Interim Report), in
MITI INDUSTRIAL POLICY OFFICE, DAIKIBO KOURI TENPOHO H6KISH0 [THE LARGE-SCALE
RETAIL STORES LAW: COLLECTED LAWS AND REGULATIONS] 242 (1990).
48. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 276.
49. Matsumoto, supra note 41, at 73.
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that could be challenged in court. °
Under Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation LawM
("ACLL"), which governs judicial review of bureaucratic action
in Japan, a plaintiff must show that the allegedly illegal act is an
"administrative disposition or other exercise of public power."5 2
The Japanese Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted this con-
cept to include only "official conduct which forms rights and du-
ties in citizens or confirms their scope."55 To be actionable, the
effect of the bureaucratic action must be immediate and di-
rected at the plaintiff specifically and must either deny a citizen
a previously existing legal right or compel him to perform a new
legal duty. Actions that affect one's economic interests, as op-
posed to legal rights, are considered too informal to be judicially
cognizable.'M In Etsurigo, the challenged act was the MITI rec-
ommendation based on Article 7 of the LSRSL. The plaintiffs
argued that such a recommendation was in practice the
equivalent of a permit to operate under the stipulated condi-
tions and, as such, gave the shopping center a right that it did
50. Id. at 71-73. The district court opinion only directly answered the question of
whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring this action. It concluded that they did not,
so there was no need to inquire whether a plaintiff with standing could challenge a
recommendation. The High Court confirmed the district court's conclusion of no
standing but also decided that a recommendation was not in the nature of an adminis-
trative disposition and, therefore, could not be the subject of administrative litigation
under the Administrative Case Litigation Law ("ACLL"). See HIROSHI SHIONO, Gv-
OSEIHO [ADMINISTRATIvE LAw] 80-108 (1991) (providing general overview of standing
and administrative disposition); Id. at 107-08 n.3 (discussing interplay of standing and
administrative disposition doctrines); Frank K Upham, The Legal Framework of Japan's
Declining Industries Policy: The Problem of Transparency in Administrative Processes, 27 HAav.
INT'L L.J. 425-32 (1986) (analyzing doctrines of judicial review in Japan) [hereinafter
Legal Framework]; Robert W. Dziubla, The Impotent Sword ofJapanese Justice: The Doctrine of
Shobunsei as a Barrier to Administrative Litigation, 18 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 37-62 (1985) (dis-
cussing doctrines of standing and administrative dispositions in Japan); see also Frank K
Upham, After Minamata: Current Prospects and Problems in Japanese Environmental Litiga-
tion, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213 (1979) (discussing doctrines governing judicial review of ad-
ministrative action in Japan) [hereinafter After Minamata].
51. Gy6sei jiken soshdh6 [Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 of 1962
(Japan) [hereinafter ACLL].
52. Id. art. 3.
53. See Sasaki v. Atami City Agricultural Council, 9 MINSHO 217 (S. Ct. 1955) (Ja-
pan) (holding that notice from defendant did not constitute administrative disposi-
tion); see also Dziubla, supra note 50, at 45 (indicating "supervisory orders, permissions,
approvals, and regulations among agencies or within a single agency cannot be the
object of litigation because they do not directly create or form the rights and duties of
citizens.").
54. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 23, at 171-72.
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not previously have. Pursuant to the plaintiffs' claim, opening
the shopping center would infringe the rights of local merchants
to be protected from such competition unless proper proce-
dures were followed and a legally valid recommendation is-
sued.55
Japanese courts interpreting the ACLL, however, are gener-
ally uninterested in the substance of government actions or the
practical effect on citizens.5 6 They are centrally concerned with
the legal nature of the action, however, and the courts in Etsurigo
determined that the recommendation changed no one's legally
enforceable rights or duties. Unlike an order under Article 8 of
the LSRSL,Jusco had no legal duty to abide by the recommenda-
tion. The recommendation, moreover, gave Jusco no new rights
because Jusco was legally free to open the store without any ac-
tion by MITI whatsoever.
Even if the recommendation had created a right or duty in
Jusco, the courts' decision would have been the same because
the courts also found that the merchants did not have standing
to bring the action.58 Article 9 of the ACLL limits standing in
administrative actions to persons with a "legal interest" in the
administrative disposition. 9 Japanese courts have narrowly in-
terpreted this provision to mean:
Legal interests are created by provisions vesting an adminis-
trative agency with the duty of protecting some personal in-
terest. But where an agency is to act for the general public
interest, personal interests affected by the action are only re-
flex interests. A plaintiff with only a reflex interest does not
have standing to sue.6°
55. See Matsumoto, supra note 41, at 71-73.
56. LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 23, at 171-72.
57. Matsumoto, supra note 41, at 72.
58. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 277-78.
59. ACLL art. 9, Law No. 139 of 1962 (Japan).
60. Ichiro Ogawa, Judicial Review of Administative Actions in Japan, 43 WASH. L. REV.
1075, 1087 (1968); SHIONO, supra note 50, at 96-108. An interest affected by an admin-
istrative disposition is a reflex interest, or hanshatekirieki, when it is considered part of
the general public interest protected by the underlying statute, rather than an individ-
ual interest specifically protected by the statute. Shiono cites the interests of surround-
ing residents in the issuance of a building permit as an example of a "reflex interest and
thus not an object of judicial protection" in an administrative action under the ACLL.
Id. at 98. It is likely, therefore, that consumers attempting to sue under the LSRSL
would only have reflex interests. Id. at 104. The leading case is the Housewives Federa-
tion Juice Case. See Shufu Reng6kai v. K6sei Torihiki Iinkai [Federation of Housewives v.
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A legal interest, therefore, requires injury to an individualized
interest that the agency is specifically charged to protect under a
relevant statute.
The courts concluded in the Etsurigo opinions that the goal
of "enterprise opportunities" for local merchants set forth in Ar-
ticle 1 of the LSRSL was not enough to give any individual
merchant more than a reflex interest in the adjustment process.
Had consumers been suing MITI on the ground that the 6390
square meters allotted to Jusco in the recommendation was too
small to serve their interests, the result would have been the
same. Neither consumers nor merchants have the individual-
ized interest under the LSRSL sufficient to grant them standing
to challenge MITI's actions.6 '
UnderJapanese courts' interpretation ofjudicial review and
standing, the only potential plaintiff under the LSRSL would be
a prospective large retailer dissatisfied with the amount of space
given him through the adjustment process. The retailer could
not have sued on the basis of a MITI recommendation, however,
because it would not have had any legal obligation to follow the
recommendation.62 The retailer would have had to ignore the
recommendation, open the store according to its original plans,
and wait until MITI issued a legally binding order under Article
8 of the LSRSL.63 At that point, the retailer would have lost the
right to operate the store under any terms other than those of
the order and would have suffered the type of direct legal harm
necessary to challenge an administrative action.64
Fair Trade Commission], 882 HANREI JIHO 3 (S. Ct., Mar. 14, 1978) (Japan). The denial
of standing to competitors, however, is not so clear. SHIONO, supra note 50, at 102-03;
see The Public Bath Case, 16 MINSHO 57 (S. Ct.,Jan. 19, 1962) (Japan).
61. See Matsumoto, supra note 41, at 71; Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at
278.
62. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 277.
63. LSRSL art. 8, Law No. 109 of 1973 (japan) (providing authority to MITI to
issue legally binding order only after notifying large store has ignored MITI's recom-
mendation).
64. Such a suit would have posed no legal problems in terms of access to judicial
review. An Article 8 order would clearly be considered an administrative disposition
and the large retailer would have had standing. The substantive result, however, is
another matter. Given MITI's discretion under the statute, the plaintiff would likely
have lost unless it could show the kind of clear illegality present in Etsurigo. Such a loss,
furthermore, would leave the plaintiff much worse off than just acquiescing in the Arti-
cle 7 recommendation because the retailer would have had to invest in the floor space,
construction costs, equipment, and so forth, necessary to open in defiance of the rec-
ommendation. The relationship between the voluntary recommendation of Article 7
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MITI has never issued a formal order in the implementation
of the LSRSL.65 Large retailers invariably either reach a compro-
mise with local merchants or give up. Under the procedures in
effect during most of the 1980s, MITI did not even accept notifi-
cations from retailers without appended documentation of the
compromise agreement with local merchants. 66 Under these cir-
cumstances, MITI was never formally involved until the deal was
finalized, at which point there was no reason for MITI to issue a
recommendation, much less a binding order.67
D. The Structural Effect of the LSRSL
The absence of a plausible chance of judicial review meant
that MITI could manipulate the law to respond to political pres-
and the compulsory order of Article 8, therefore, established a substantial barrier to
litigation. It essentially forced a retailer to gamble a potentially large investment on
winning a suit that, absent clear malfeasance on MITI's part, it was likely to lose. It
would, of course, have been possible for a large retailer to create a situation where a test
case would have been inexpensive. To expect that to happen, however, is to ignore the
huge benefits that the LSRSL cartel conferred on the large as well as small retailers.
65. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 278. The author has not found a single
instance where MITI issued an Article 8 order under the LSRSL. In fact, during the
early 1980s even Article 7 recommendations became rare as the process became en-
tirely informal. See K6suke 6 yama, Cgatatenfuns6 ni okeru tstisansh6 * sh6kdkaigisho no
'ch6sei' kd6 [ The Practice of MlTI Chamber of Commerce in Adjusting Large Store Disputes], in
NIHONGATA SEISAKU KETTEI NO HENYO [THE CHANGE IN JAPANESE STYLE POLCYMAKING] 64
(Minoru Nakano ed., 1986).
66. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 278-79.
67. Id. at 278. Legally, a large retailer could have attempted to notify MITI with-
out appending the required agreement with local merchants and, when MITI refused
to accept the notification, sued to force MITI action. Id. The retailer's argument
would have been that requiring such an agreement with local merchants was an illegal
delegation of MITI's public duty to implement the statute to private parties and, there-
fore, that MITI had a legal obligation to act on a notification with or without an ap-
pended agreement. Id. There is precedent for such suits in transportation licensing,
land use, and affirmative actions contexts. See e.g., Higashi v. Oshima, (Osaka H. Ct.,
July 30, 1979) (Japan) (translation of opinion on file with author). Moreover, MITI
later admitted that its blanket refusal to accept notifications during the 1980s was ille-
gal, but victory at this stage would only have gotten the plaintiff the right to proceed
with the formal adjustment process as provided for in the statute. Privatizing Regulation,
supra note 11, at 278-79. While the formal process might have been more sympathetic
to the interests of the retailer and consumers, it would have been time consuming and,
given MITI's great discretion under the statute, would likely have resulted in an even-
tual order no better than what the retailer could get from the merchants directly. Id. at
279. If MITI eventually did issue an order, the retailer would finally be able to chal-
lenge it directly, but by that point any victory would have been pyrrhic indeed, espe-
cially because the litigation would have destroyed an informal arrangement that bene-
fited the large retailers as much as it did smaller retailers. Id. Most large retailers were
quite satisfied with the cartelization effect of MITI's implementation of the LSRSL.
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sure and to prevent specific commercial activity without utilizing
formal legal measures.' After independent merchants were suc-
cessful in convincing the Government to tighten restrictions on
new stores in the late 1970s, MITI was able to cut the number of
notifications by seventy-five percent and maintain such levels
through the 1980s. 69 When international pressure required lib-
eralization in the late 1980s, MITI was able to increase the
number of notifications several fold in the space of months,70
relying solely on administrative measures and negotiations with
leading retail chains.
Flexible response to the prevailing political winds was not
one of the statutory goals of the LSRSL, however, and arguably
the LSRSL was ineffective in doing anything more than that. It
clearly distorted the development of the retailing industry and
substantially raised prices for consumers. 71 Even from the per-
spective of the small merchants, the results were mixed. Cer-
tainly, those who were included as tenants in new retail com-
plexes or received direct payoffs benefited from the law. Those
small retailers in areas where new stores were excluded entirely
68. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 279. A review of the number of store
openings demonstrates MITI's ability to prevent specific commercial activity without
recourse to formal legal measures. The number of class one stores making notification
under the law dropped from a high of 576 in 1979 to 132 in 1982 and then to 125 in
1983. Oyama, supra note 65, at 64 (citing MITI research statistics). Thereafter, it re-
mained below 200 until the late 1980s when U.S. pressure forced reform. NIHON Ry.
0TSO SHINBUNSHA, RyvTs0KEIZAI NO TEBIKI 1989 [THE RETAIL ECONOMY HANDBOOK 1989]
69 (1989). In 1987, the number jumped to 203 from 157 in 1986, and some regional
MITI offices announced the intention of accepting notifications regardless of local op-
position. In 1990, after the law had become a trade issue and MITI had announced
that it would accept all notifications without preconditions, the number of class one
stores rebounded to a pace of over one thousand openings per year. See Frank K
Upham, Retail Convergence: The Structural Impediments Initiative and the Regulation of the
Japanese Retailing Industry, in NATIONAL DmrVxsrTy AND GLOBAL CAPITALIsM 263-97 (Su-
zanne Berger & Ronald Dore eds., 1996) [hereinafter Retail Convergence].
69. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 279.
70. Id.
71. Id. Economists have questioned the assumed inefficiency of the LSRSL. See
Takatoshi Ito & Masayoshi Maruyama, Is the Japanese Distribution System Really Inefficient?,
unpublished paper presented at The National Bureau of Economic Research Confer-
ence on the United States andJapan: Trade and Investment, Oct. 19-20, 1989 (on file
with author); Kiyohiko G. Nishimura, The Distribution System ofJapan and the United States:
A Comparative Study from the Viewpoint of Consumers, unpublished paper presented at The
Japan Economic Seminar, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, Nov. 16, 1991.
Whatever the measure of efficiency, however, the dramatic increase in large store open-
ings upon loosening of restrictions implies that the LSRSL had a substantial impact on
market behavior in the retail sector.
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or were forced into price or merchandise cartels with local
merchants also benefited at least in the short run, but the overall
effect of the law does not seem to have been to ensure "enter-
prise opportunities" for small merchants in any absolute sense.
In fact, the number of small retailers began to decline for the
first time in Japanese history between 1982 and 1985, a period of
tight restrictions under the LSRSL.
7 2
Despite the law's apparent shortcomings, few directly in-
volved in retailing were completely dissatisfied with the LSRSL
during the 1980s. Small merchants complained about the law's
inability to protect them from a decline in absolute numbers,
but vigorously defended the law when it came under attack.73
Large retailers complained about the arbitrary power granted
the small merchants, but did not generally oppose the law or call
for its repeal. Besides its protection for small merchants, the law
had also helped large retailers form an effective cartel.74 Presi-
72. Id. Stores with less than three employees declined 9.3% and stores with three
or four employees declined 1.1%. KEiziM KIKAKUCH6 [ECONOMIC PLANNING AGENCY],
KAIHOGATA RYOTS0 SHISUTEMU NO K6CHIKU NI MUKETE [TOWARD THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
LIBERALIZED RETAIL SYSTEM] 66-67 (1988) [hereinafter EPA REPORT] (quoting MITI,
WAGA KUNI NO SHOGYO [JAPANESE COMMERCE]). In the meantime, the number of stores
in every other category increased, with that of the largest, over 100 employees, increas-
ing 4.5%. Id. The decline in absolute numbers of small stores does not mean that the
LSRSL was not having the intended protective effect. The decline would likely have
been much sharper without the law.
73. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 280. There was also a subtle shift in
attitude among the small retailers. Their decline during the period of the LSRSL's
strictest enforcement convinced many that they could not survive on their own and that
competition with the new forms of retailing required a revitalization of established com-
mercial areas that could only be accomplished with the cooperation of large retailers.
Id. at 282. Their conviction did not extend, however, to advocating either the repeal or
substantial relaxation of the LSRSL. They wanted to retain control so that they could
invite or exclude large stores into their areas as circumstances dictated. To ensure their
continuing ability to do so, many small merchants actually wanted the formal statutory
power of the LSRSL strengthened. Rytitsii kindaika ni shdgai [Obstacle to Modernization of
Distribution], NIHON KEIzAI SHINBUN, Oct. 21, 1988, at 1 [hereinafter Obstacle to Moderni-
zation]. The Nihon Keizai Shinbun stated:
It's a rule under the LSRSL that large stores must talk with the local merchants
before opening, but the authority is in various forms of administrative gui-
dance. If this rule were to disappear, it would be like a kite whose string has
been cut. We need the authority to conduct adjustment transferred to the
local governments.
Id.
74. See Miyazawa, supra note 36, at 60 (discussing cartelization of large scale retail-
ing); Gekishin, supra note 29, at 11-12; Tsuruta, supra note 20, at 51; Obstacle to Moderniza-
tion, supra note 73, at 1; Tamura, supra note 36, at 15; Uny6 kaizenka kaiseika [Implementa-
tion (ofLSRSL) Reformed? (Statute) Amended?], NIHON KEizuA SHINBUN, Nov. 28, 1988, at 3
PRIVATIZED REGULATION
dent Shir6 Asami of Eidensha, a large regional appliance re-
tailer, in 1988 candidly noted, "[t]he level [of restriction] is just
about right now. Any looser and rivals could come in. Any
stricter and we couldn't expand OUt." 75 Another source summa-
rized the large retailers' attitudes by stating:
To repeal the LSRSL and go to free competition would
threaten earnings, and the big superstores are most afraid of
that. The fundamental consensus is that the LSRSL should
be applied in a way more advantageous to the superstores.
Without mincing words, they would like a shift from re-
stricted competition under the leadership of small retailers to
managed competition under the leadership of the super-
stores.
76
(hereinafter Implementation]. Cartelization of large stores did not mean the end of com-
petition. Just as they had under the DSL, competition and change continued, and en-
trepreneurs created new forms of retailing like specialty stores, discount stores,
franchise chains, and electronic marketing that effectively bypassed the restrictions of
the LSRSL. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 281. The forces that most visibly
restructured the distribution industry in the 1980s, however, were the massive leisure
complexes and the convenience stores. Id. On the one hand, retailers moved out to
the suburbs and built huge retail, sports, and entertainment centers on former factory
sites. On the other hand, retailers "downsized" their stores below the LSRSL level and
opened 24 hour convenience stores. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 281. Be-
tween 1982 and 1985, the same period in which the smallest independents were de-
creasing in number by 9.3%, the sales of convenience stores rose by 84%, faster than
any other form of retailing. EPA REPORT, supra note 72, at 21. During the late 1970s,
when MITI had enforced the law more or less as written, there had been intense com-
petition for territory and reduced profits. By August 1988, the superstores had regis-
tered their highest profits in history, however, and large retailers had generally re-
bounded. Swaying Large Stores Law (1), supra note 14, at 6. The reasons were complex
and included increased profit margins made possible by a rise in the yen. Arguably the
cartelization engendered by the LSRSL had also contributed to improved profits. Priva-
tizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 280-81. That the ranking of the largest retailers re-
mained essentially stable through the decade supports the proposition that the cartel
effect of the LSRSL stifled competition. Miyazawa, supra note 36, at 60. The top six
super stores were Daiei, It6y6kad6, Seiyu, Jusco, Nichii, and Unii. Id.
75. Gekishin, supra note 29, at 11.
76. Id. Most large retailers spoke in more measured tones, especially when speak-
ing for attribution. President Nakauchi of Daiei, the largest superstore, for example,
made a perfunctory nod toward free competition but was clearly satisfied with the way
the law had protected his store's status when he stated:
I approve [of retail liberalization] in both general theory and in the particu-
lars. It is, however, not necessary to repeal the LSRSL. That would be unac-
ceptable - before you knew it, there would a Sears opening next doorl It
would be fine if the Commercial Activities Adjustment Board would just dis-
cuss matters correctly. Not even getting a foot in the door is inappropriate,
but if it was done according to the language of the statute, it would be fine.
Id. at 12. The rhetoric was not entirely uniform. When asked whether the LSRSL pro-
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E. Reform Under Pressure: The Structural Impediments Initiative
Despite retailers' general satisfaction with the LSRSL, some
level of reform became inevitable in the late 1980s. Foreign
pressure was a major impetus for reform, but domestic pressure
was equally strong. Between 1988 and 1989, the Japanese me-
dia,77 the Keidanren,'s the Economic Planning Agency79 ("EPA"),
the Fair Trade Commission"0 ("FTC"), and the Shingy6kakushin,
or Second Administrative Reform Commission" l all called for va-
rying degrees of relaxation. Perspectives varied, but all cited the
heavy toll on Japanese consumers, especially the gap between
dropping import prices and high retail prices, and the unfair-
ness and anti-import bias inherent in the implementation of the
LSRSL. 2 As the direct target of small retailers' pressure to
strengthen the LSRSL, only MITI resisted.
In December 1988, MITI's Councilor for Commercial Distri-
bution, Michinao Takahashi, responded to U.S. criticism by
pointing to the rising share of imports in the total retail sales of
superstores and department stores.83 Takahashi, reiterating the
special circumstances that made the rate of about 200 new large
stores per year appropriate, stated:
tected the superstores, President Nishikawa of Unii, a company which had seen its
steadily rising market share frozen in sixth place by the strengthening of the LSRSL in
the 1980s, stated:
No. No. If we fall into a protectionist mentality, our industry is finished. We
grew because we made it our practice to always be looking for opportunities
for new stores, new locations, and new products. If a company is protected by
the law and fixates on controlling its own dominant territory, it will be ru-
ined.... We don't need it. We don't need it. Under the restrictions [of the
law], all is serene and peaceful, but if it all becomes vested rights, then those
with influence are strengthened, and that's a problem.
Id. at 11-12.
77. See Reform Distribution Now, JAPAN. ECON. J., Mar. 25, 1989, at 10.
78. See Keidanren, Daikibo kouritenpohM kaisei no hy6ka, Keidanren sangy6kibanbu
[Evaluation of the LSRSL Revision, Keidanren Foundation Group], Aug. 1993 (on file with
author); Keizai Koho Center, Deregulating Distribution: Keidanren Proposals for Transport,
Trade, Retailing, and Farming and Food Arocessing, KKC BRIEF No. 48, July 1988.
79. See EPA REPORT, supra note 72, at 37-38 (analyzing need for deregulation of
retailing sector and LSRSL).
80. See FTC REPORT, supra note 40, at 37-56 (discussing deregulation of LSRSL).
81. See Kiseikanwa he ch6setsu honkakuka [Toward Achieving Deregulation of the Adjust-
ment Process], NIHON KEizMA SHNBUN, Nov. 13, 1988, at 3 (summarizing results of Second
Administrative Reform Commission).
82. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 283.
83. Id. at 284-85.
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Japanese retailing is characterized by many stores of ex-
tremely small scale densely packed into small land areas. If
you look at it from this perspective, some adjustment of com-
mercial interests is necessary within each area and the LSRSL
is one way to accomplish that. If large stores were completely
free to open, it would plunge local business into chaos.8 4
Even Takahashi, however, recognized that the delays and
conflicts caused by the LSRSL were excessive, that there was ex-
cessive variation in local rules, and that reforms of the adjust-
ment process and some relaxation of hours were necessary.8 5 He
took pains, however, to stress that complete deregulation was
premature:
On the one hand, many people talk about the benefits and
convenience to consumers [of 24 hour convenience stores].
Closing times are one example. If you have to go to work or
something and return to find the stores all closed, there's
nothing you can do. It's very inconvenient. So, complete lib-
eralization would be great, they say. But you can not forget
the perspective of the really small merchants caught in this
kind of competition. How much protection do you give
them? From this perspective the framework [of the LSRSL]
is necessary.
8 6
Takahashi's question was partially answered on May 24,
1990, when MITI announced a package of short and long term
reforms pursuant to the Structural Impediments Initiative
("SII") talks with the United States. Immediate steps would be
taken under current law to make opening a large store quicker
and easier. MITI would submit to the 1991 regular session of the
Diet amendments to the LSRSL designed to streamline the pro-
cess. MITI further pledged within three years to fundamentally
reevaluate its policy toward the retail industry, including consid-
eration of total liberalization. 7
The immediate measures meant substantial changes in the
operation of the law. First, MITI announced that it would accept
84. Michinao Takahashi, Uny6 no 'kaizen' de daitenh wa sonzoku suru [With "Reform"
in Implementation, the LSRSL Will Continue], EKONOMISUTO, Dec. 13, 1988, at 56.
85. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 284.
86. Takahashi, supra note 84, at 57.
87. See Ptivatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 285 (analyzing MITI response to
U.S. pressure to reform retailing industry during Structural Impediments Initiative
("SII") talks).
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all notifications submitted under the law. Second, time limits
were placed on the commercial adjustment process. The pro-
cess still began with an explanation by the prospective retailer of
its plans to local merchants, but the new rules limited this stage
to four months and eliminated the requirement of the local
merchants' consent."8 Even if opponents remained dissatisfied,
the formal process moved to the next stage. The entire process
from initial announcement of intention by the large retailer to
the final decision was to take no more than eighteen months.8 9
In addition to the measures relating directly to the process
of commercial adjustment, MITI immediately increased the per-
missible hours and days of operation for large stores and ex-
empted retail space devoted to imports from the law in certain
circumstances. 90 It also initiated measures to increase the "trans-
parency" ' of the process by requiring quarterly reports on the
status of pending notifications, establishing a bureau within
MITI to answer inquiries regarding notifications, and providing
for limited disclosure of meeting results of the various entities
involved in the adjustment process.92
MITI explained these measures to the United States as the
maximum change possible under the LSRSL. The eighteen
month deadline, however, was almost double the maximum time
under the statute itself. The liberalized hours and days of opera-
tion, moreover, were well short of what MITI could have estab-
lished by simply revising its own ministerial order. Transparency
remained impossible so long as the informal and non-statutory
pre-notification explanation meetings were a significant part of
the process. Had MITI simply decided to follow the formal pro-
cess stipulated in the LSRSL, the degree of liberalization and
transparency would have been much greater. To do so, how-
ever, would likely have meant an increase in the speed of reform
unacceptable to MITI.
While the fundamental nature of regulation under the
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Masu Uekusa, Government Regulations in Japan: Toward Their International
Harmonization and Integration, in JAPAN's ECONOMIC STRUCrURE: SHOULD IT CHANGE?
237, 264-67 (Kozo Yamamura ed., 1990) (explaining general criticism of Japan in SII
talks regarding lack of administrative transparency).
92. Id.
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LSRSL remained unchanged, the results changed dramatically.
In the second half of 1990, over nine hundred prospective new
large stores were announced, more than double that of the pre-
vious year and more than nine times the rate from 1982 to
1985.98 The U.S. toy retailer, Toys "AI " Us, became the first for-
eign store to be allowed to open under the LSRSL and an-
nounced that it planned one hundred stores by the end of the
decade. 94 Large Japanese retailers also reported that the adjust-
ment process had become easier.95 Small merchants and local
governments accelerated the trend toward using large stores as
the nucleus for the revitalization of established areas.96 Trade
associations for small and medium retailers also began to lobby
on the national level for various forms of subsidies to replace the
declining protection of the law.97
In May 1991, the Diet amended the LSRSL effective January
1992.98 The amendment raised the floor space dividing line be-
tween class one and class two stores, liberalized the procedures
for the large store councils, urged restraint on local government
restrictions, and eliminated adjustment altogether for areas of
less than 1000 square meters devoted to imports.99 These statu-
tory measures, while significant, were overshadowed by changes
in MITI's implementation of the law effective January 1992. The
eighteen month period for opening a store was further short-
ened to one year.100 Pre-notification explanation and negotia-
tion, which had taken up to ten years in the mid-1980s, were
eliminated. After notification, the owner of the proposed build-
ing had to explain their plans to local merchants, a process
93. Shutten ch6setsu gajinsokuka (Store Opening Adjustment Process Quickens], YOMIURI
SHINBUN, Dec. 6, 1990, at 1, 6 [hereinafter Store Opening Process Quickens].
94. Id. at 1.
95. Id.
96. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 286.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 287.
99. Store Opening Process Quickens, supra note 93, at 6.
100. Privatizing Regulation, supra note 11, at 286. The elimination of the local
Commercial Activities Adjustment Boards was crucial to the shortening of the period in
the proposed amendment and to increased transparency. Id. The regional Large
Stores Council was to perform the initial deliberation on the impact on local retailers
and consideration of reductions in size or operating conditions. Id. at 286-87. It was
hoped that the regional rather than local nature of the council and the status of its
members as quasi-public servants, making them subject to criminal liability for bribery
or self-dealing, would eliminate the corruption and deliberate delay that had marked
the history of the boards. Id. at 287.
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which could not exceed four months. The next step for the re-
tailers who planned to open in the new building was notification
and an eight month commercial adjustment period. 01
The next steps came in 1994 with the publication of MITI's
promised reassessment, reforms, and further incremental
amendments of the LSRSL. Although the interim SII Report
had hinted at suspension of the law altogether for some areas,
the reassessment in 1994 concluded no major steps were neces-
sary because the prior measures had already eliminated the out-
standing problems.10 2
MITI's appraisal appears correct because new store notifica-
tions continued at a much higher level than during the 1980s,
despite adverse economic conditions. 3 The increasing number
of large volume stores, a growth in direct importing by retailers,
and new marketing strategies led to drops in the prices of im-
ported consumer goods such as business suits, British whiskey,
and U.S. cosmetics, which had resisted even the most drastic yen
appreciation of the 1980s.1°4
Substantive reform did not mean, however, a fundamental
change in regulatory style. Although liberalization meant more
stores opening more quickly, there are indications that the na-
ture and locus of decision-making remains largely unchanged,
which is considerably more important from the perspective of
regulatory process and administrative transparency than the
number of stores opened. The chairperson of one large stores
council in western Japan stated:
101. Id. at 286. The purpose of this step is to decide whether the proposed retail
complex should be allowed to open as planned or whether changes should be recom-
mended by MITI.
102. Id.
103. Approximately 60% of new stores were allowed to open as planned, and ad-
justment periods remained within the one-year limit. Most gratifying to the United
States and their Japanese allies, the first half of the 1990s saw a rapid growth in dis-
counting, including the continuing expansion of Toys "A " Us, and an increase in price
competition in retailing markets. Id. at 286.
104. See generally Emily Thornton, Revolution in Japanese Retailing: Bargain Hunting
Catches on in Japan, Boosting the Fortunes of Discount Stores, FORTUNE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 143
(discussing changes in Japanese retailing sector); Yumiko Ono, Bargain Hunting Catches
on in Japan, WALL. ST.J., May, 19, 1992, at bl;Japan Shops the Wal-Mart Way, ECONOMIST,
Feb. 6, 1993, at 67 (describing recent changes in Japanese retailing industry). Leonard
Schoppa reports that Toys "A "Us had opened 14 stores as ofJune 1994 and had plans
for 10 more by mid-1995. LEONARDJ. SCHOPPA,JR., BARGAINING INJAPAN: WHAT AMERI-
CAN PRESSURE CAN AND CANNOT Do 76 (1997).
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It's too bad but there is no objective basis for calculating the
amount of floor space to cut. The commercial data are
worthless, so we've never used them. We usually just follow
the opinion of the locals, which means the local
merchants.... It's scary to think what we would do if we had
to give a reason for our conclusions. 105
The LSRSL process has shifted substantially toward liberalization
in terms of speed and the number of stores opened, but remains
legally informal in terms of the locus and criteria of decision
making.
II. JAPANESE REGULATORY STYLE IN DIFFERENT
CONTEXTS: FURTHER EVIDENCE OF PRIVATIZED
REGULATION AND A GLIMPSE AT
ITS LIMITS
MITI's implementation of the LSRSL is not an aberration.
It is representative of the fundamental nature of Japanese regu-
lation in a range of industries and regulatory contexts, each with
distinct legal, political, and bureaucratic characteristics. To be-
gin, Part II examines licensing in broadcasting and transporta-
tion, where regulators choose among potential entrants, impose
conditions on the entrant's operations, or both. Part II next ex-
amines MITI's management of competitive conditions within
statutorily designated declining industries. Part II then tests the
limits of privatized regulation in the face of determined resist-
105. The Nihon Keizai Shinbun in November 1994 analyzed the implementation of
the statute in all eight regional MITI bureaus and found that the incidence of MITI
recommended floor space reductions increased from 23.2% of notifications between
January 1992 and March 1993 to 39% between April 1993 and March 1994. Hirogaru
Daikiten Fus6 [Large Store Strife Spreads], NIHoN KEiZAI SHINBUN, Nov. 23, 1994, at 10
[hereinafter Large Store Strife Spreads). The recommended reduction in floor space was
as high as 60% to 70% in some cases. Id. A MITI spokesperson rejected this characteri-
zation, claiming that the Large Store Councils "respect the locals' opinions" but then
make "comprehensive" judgments. Id. An official at one large retailer reported that
the amount that it had to pay to local merchants to open a new store, Y3000 per square
meter generally and over Y4000 in the Kansai area, had declined by 50% but had not
disappeared and that the "pre-pre-notification adjustment" had reappeared in other
guises. Id. The Nihon Keizai Shinbun report was corroborated by other sources. On
November 17, 1994, the Keidanren called for the step by step repeal of the LSRSL, and,
in June 1995, an FTC panel agreed. The panel, consisting mainly of scholars, con-
cluded that the law still lacks transparency, injures consumers by limiting competition,
and requires new stores to enter into backstage deals with local merchants. FTC Panel
Calls for Abolition ofLarge-scale Retail Law, JAPAN DIG., June 26, 1995, at 11.
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ance by individuals unwilling to comply with the unwritten rules
of privatized regulation.
A. Evidence of Privatized Regulation in Other Contexts
1. Licensing
The licensing of television broadcast stations by the MPT 106
and the licensing of land transport, particularly taxis and inter-
urban bus routes, by the regional bureaus of the Ministry of
Transportation ("MOT") illustrate the characteristics of priva-
tized regulation in the context of licensing. These ministries'
statutory authority to regulate is clear, and their power either to
deny at the outset or later to withdraw the right to operate forces
firms into an ongoing relationship with the ministries. The mar-
ket structures of these industries, however, are very different, in-
dicating that the MPT and MOT face different challenges in
maintaining stability and market control.107
a. Television Broadcast Licensing 1 8
The statute under which the MPT licenses broadcast televi-
sion stations is a product of the postwar occupation ofJapan and
a virtual copy of the U.S. Federal Communications Act. 109 The
Broadcasting and Radio Wave laws, 1 consistent with its U.S.
counterpart, require the MPT to evaluate multiple applicants
106. See Denpah6 [Radio Wave Law], Law No. 131 of 1950 (Japan); Hdsoh6 [Broad-
casting Law], Law No. 132 of 1950 (Japan).
107. See generally Jonathan Weinberg, Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in
Japan and the United States, 39 BUFFALO L. REv. 615 (1991) (discussing high barriers to
entry into television broadcasting market injapan). Moreover, the television market in
Japan is concentrated into five national groups and has historically been closely associ-
ated with leading politicians within the LDP. Id. at 665-67, 671. There are low barriers
to entry in the land transportation sector, especially the bus, trucking, and taxi indus-
tries. The transport sector is also more diffuse economically and more closely tied to
local rather than national politicians.
108. This section of the Article is drawn primarily from Weinberg, supra note 107,
at 615-735; Takaaki Hattori, Kiseikikan no arikata to menkyoseido [ The Methods of Regulatory
Organs and the Licensing System], 67 HORITSU JIHO 22-27 (1995) [hereinafter Methods of
Regulatory Organs]; Takaaki Hattori, Tokyd shin U kyoku ni ytiseish6 no ikisugi "gy6seishid6"
[The MPT's Excessive Administrative Guidance to Tokyo's New Television Station], HOsO
HiHvY, May 1992, at 16-19 [hereinafter Excessive Administrative Guidance]; Yasuhiko
Tajima et al., Hdsdseido no shdrai to h6s6h6 (T6ron) [ The Future of the Broadcasting System and
Broadcasting Law], 67 HORrrsu jiH6, 28-53 (1995).
109. See Weinberg, supra note 107, at 661-64.
110. See Broadcasting Law, Law No. 132 of 1950 (Japan); Radio Wave Law, Law No.
131 of 1950 (Japan).
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and choose the one most qualified to serve the public interest.1
Despite the similarity between the U.S. and Japanese statutes,
however, actual practice under the two statutes differs signifi-
cantly, illustrating the divergent ways U.S. and Japanese adminis-
trative agencies operate within similar formal legal constraints.
The story of postwar broadcast licensing begins in 1950
when the MPT's predecessor, the Radio Regulatory Commission
("RRC"), had to decide how to allocate AM radio licenses among
many applicants. Consistent with the U.S. statutes and practice,
the applicable Japanese regulations provided, "when there is a
shortage of availability in frequencies, ... priority shall be given
to the applicant whose plan can be considered to contribute
most to the public welfare."" 2 When the RRC actually allocated
the licenses, however, it avoided the competitive process alto-
gether, substituting a process that eliminated the need to evalu-
ate candidates or make legally binding choices among them.
Instead of gathering information about the applicants
through a formal investigation and a series of comparative hear-
ings, the RRC simply told the applicants that it would accept only
a single application. This ipponka ch6sei or "unification adjust-
ment" 3 process draws on the same concept that animates com-
mercial adjustment under the LSRSL. The process forces the
various prospective licensees to bargain among themselves, often
with direct or indirect guidance from the ministry or its desig-
nee, t1 4 until they can form a single company and submit a uni-
fied application for the license. This has been the mode of oper-
ation used by the MPT ever since the 1950s. 15
The key question in adjustment is who decides, and on what
criteria, who will participate in the bargaining process. Under
the LSRSL, the process was typically begun by one of the large
stores announcing its intention to open in a particular area.
Thereafter, the chain constituted one side of the negotiating
process. The identity of the other side was more complicated
111. Weinberg, supra note 107, at 664.
112. Id.
113. See id. at 664-68 (describing unification adjustment process).
114. See id. at 666 (describing MPT practice of choosing designee to facilitate unifi-
cation adjustment process); see also Excessive Administrative Guidance, supra note 108, at
16-19 (describing role of MPT in licensing of Tokyo Metropolitan Television).
115. Weinberg, supra note 107, at 664 n.206. In fact, the ipponka process dates
from the beginning of broadcasting in Japan under the Wireless Telegraph Act of 1915.
See GREGORY KASZA, THE STATE AND MASS MEDIA IN JAPAN 1918-1945 74-79 (1988).
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because the local merchants were different each time a large
store was opened. According to the statute, the chamber of
commerce was to represent their interests through the consulta-
tive process,' 16 but MITI's avoidance of the statutory process
meant that informal and unstable groupings of small merchants
might on occasion supplant the chamber's role. In these cases,
it was potentially difficult for the large store to determine from
whom the "right" to open should be purchased and to be sure
that both MITI and the rest of the area merchants would respect
the bargain. This resulted in inordinate delay and led to the
creation, within the retail chains, of specialists in techniques of
interpreting local power structures and assuring the cooperation
of local power brokers. One supermarket chain executive told
the author that "store openers" required only two skills, patience
and the ability to drink large amounts while negotiating with lo-
cal merchants.
The process in television licensing is considerably simpler,
largely because the participants generally are repeat players.
The Japanese media industry is dominated by five groups, each
is affiliated with one of the five national newspapers and main-
tains a national television network with a flagship Tokyo sta-
tion." 7 When the MPT announces the availability of a new
channel in an area where the network believes a new affiliate
would be worthwhile, the network encourages related persons
and firms to form a company to file an application with the
MPT's regional office." 8
The MPT then chooses an influential person in the region
to facilitate the adjustment process." 9 If the prefectural gover-
nor is an ally of the ruling party, he frequently conducts the ad-
justment. If not, it may be a local business leader or even a Diet
member from the area who has a particular interest in the com-
munications industry. One participant described the adjuster's
role as:
116. See LSRSL, Law No. 109 of 1973 (Japan).
117. Weinberg, supra note 107, at 665-66.
118. Id. at 668-70. Typically local businesses, including independent local media,
also file applications, and the total number of formal applications, most of which are
proxies for the real parties in interest, can reach over one thousand. Id. The 159 com-
panies who applied in 1991 for a new Tokyo channel, however, may be more typical of
the number of applicants for any given broadcasting license. Excessive Administrative
Guidance, supra note 108, at 16.
119. Weinberg, supra note 107, at 666.
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[T]o compare the contact telephone numbers listed on the
various applications, and group together all those with identi-
cal numbers listed. This practice eliminated some sham ap-
plications, filed in the hope of gaining extra seats at the ip-
ponka table, and began to narrow down the applications to
the important players. [The] task... was to lead these play-
ers - most importantly, representatives of the key stations -
to an agreement acceptable to all regarding the shareholder
and board-of-directors structure of the new venture.
12 0
The complexity of the adjustment process for television li-
censing varies widely. In a rural prefecture with a preexisting
radio licensee, for example, standard practice simply would be
to assign the licensee the television license. Because the radio
licensee normally was owned by a consortium consisting of the
leading prefectural newspaper, and regional banks and compa-
nies, rivals were rare and little adjustment was necessary.1 21 In
large cities with multiple licensees and economic groupings the
process required more direct intervention by the MPT or its des-
ignees.12
120. Id. at 667-68. The leader of the process sometimes becomes the head of the
new station. Id.
121. Id. at 671. Because the leading figures in adjustment often included powerful
LDP politicians, the licensing process was a prime source of financial resources for the
LDP. Former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's term as Minister of Posts and Telecom-
munications in the late 1950s established Tanaka and later associates like Shin
Kanemaru as powerful players in communications policy and opened up numerous op-
portunities for their individual participation in granting new licenses. Kanemaru, for
example, emerged as the largest shareholder of TV Yamanashi after it was awarded the
UHF license forYamanashi Prefecture. Id. Because TVYamanashi was part of a consor-
tium that also operated the dominant newspaper and a local radio station, Kanemaru
became a central player in the regional communications oligopoly as well as its repre-
sentative in the Diet. Id.
122. The MPT took a very activist role in the licensing of Tokyo Metropolitan Tele-
vision in 1991-93, for example. Rather than allow the 159 applicants in 1991 to work
out their own formula for adjustment, the ministry dictated who would form the core
group for the single applicant and the respective capital contributions from different
types of participants. The entire process was informal. In fact, the MPT announced its
schedule so that formal consultation for selecting the licensee would begin and end on
Friday, May 22, 1992, and the preliminary license would issue on Monday, May 25, 1992.
As it worked out, the adjustment took longer than the MPT had anticipated and the
license did not issue until January 1993, and even then only 158 of the original 159
applicants agreed. The 159th applicant persevered and forced the MPT to reject its
application formally. See Excessive Administrative Guidance, supra note 108, at 16-19. For
a story of one attempt by an outsider to use judicial review to break into the system, see
Takaaki Hattori, Hds6kyoku kaisetsu narazu (6): Nihon yi!rydterebi (kabu) no menkydshinsei o
megutte [No New Station (1): About Japan Pay TV's License Application], H6s6 RPoTro,
1997]
430 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:396
The MPT's choice of uniform adjustment has contributed
to the concentration and homogenization of the Japanese me-
dia. 2 3 Because the process involved established LDP figures, lo-
cal economic and communications consortia, and one or more
of the national media groups, the chances of diversity among
broadcast licensees were low, both in terms of economic and
political divergence.'2 4
Homogeneity in media perspectives and the concentration
of media in a small number of groups with ties to the LDP and
Japan's business establishment had clear political and economic
advantages for the party, its members, and its supporters. The
absence of a major branch of the media at the national level that
was controlled by heterodox views severely limited the develop-
ment of a popular consciousness substantially at odds with that
of the LDP. At the local level, the process gave LDP Diet mem-
bers both the opportunity to reward supporters with a place at
the table and to take a place there themselves.
That the MPT should choose a method of implementation
congenial to the LDP and the major players in the communica-
tions industry is not surprising. One explanation is that the MPT
bureaucrats are the politicians' agents and that agents generally
do what is in their principals' interests. Alternatively, the iden-
tity of interests among MPT implementation policy, the LDP,
and the media may be because the ministry has created an indus-
try structure of its own liking. A highly concentrated, profitable,
and homogeneous industry, dependent for its maintenance on a
peculiarly discretionary form of regulation is quite likely to be
just what MPT bureaucrats would choose irrespective of LDP
needs. The fewer the players in the industry and the less diverse
their perspectives, the more stable will be the industry relation-
ships that form the basis of privatized regulation. That the pro-
cess also provides lucrative positions for retiring MPT bureau-
crats is not coincidental.
Nov. 1, 1987, at 56-63 [hereinafter No New Station (1)]; Takaaki Hattori, H6skyoku
kaisetsu narazu (ka): Nihon yi2ry6terebi (kabu) no menky6shinsei o megutte [No New Station (2):
About Japan Pay TV's License Application], HOsO SIPoTro, Jan. 1, 1988, at 62-67 [hereinaf-
ter No New Station (2)].
123. Weinberg, supra note 107, at 684-86.
124. Id. Given the composition of the typical licensee, it may not be too extreme
to argue that the broadly held commonality of interests and views throughout the in-
dustry made either form of heterogeneity literally unthinkable. See id.
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b. Transportation Licensing
The same pattern of privatized regulation exists in transpor-
tation despite industry conditions quite dissimilar to broadcast-
ing.125 The Land Transportation Law sets forth criteria for the
MOT to apply in licensing new entrants to the industry or when
granting new routes to existing licensees. The prefectural Land
Transportation Bureaus, charged with the task of licensing, how-
ever, consistently resisted applying these criteria and instead re-
lied whenever possible on the industry to make these decisions
through an adjustment process fundamentally similar to that
used by the MPT.
The licensing process consisted of four steps.1 26 The first
was determining actual and future demand and whether the cur-
rent licensees could meet it.l" 7 If not, the agency had to under-
take the second step, determining the number of additional
licenses needed and whether they should be allocated only to
existing licensees, to new entrants, or to both according to some
ratio.12 8 Assuming that some new licensees would be created,
the third step was to decide which potential new entrants met
the statutory criteria, and the final step was choosing which
125. See generally AmRA MORITA, KYONINKA GY()SEI TO KANRYOSEI [LICENSING ADMINIS-
TRATION AND THE BUREAUCRACY] 141-298 (1988) (analyzing licensing bureaucracy in Ja-
pan). Morita's data on the MOT are primarily from the 1950s and 1960s, but discussion
of the proposed deregulation of the taxi and trucking industries in the 1980s and 1990s
confirmed that the process continued at least throughout the early 1990s. See Yoshio
Inoue, K6ky6rydkin to kyoninkatetsuzuki [Public Fares and Approval Procedures], H6 TO
SEISAKU, Feb. 1982, at 45; Akira Negishi, K6kydry6kin to sh6hishahogo [Public Fares and
Consumer Protection], HOGAKU SEMINAA zOKAN: GENDA NO viGYO, Dec. 1980, at 200-08;
Yoshi Shiomi, Basujigy6 menkyo shinsei ni kakaru ky6tei no hdteki k6sokuiyoku [The Legally
Restrictive Power of Agreements Concerning Applications for Licensing Bus Operations], 105
SH6HO ZASSHi 563-71 (1992); Wamai Soneno, Noriaijiddsha jigydshakan no uns6jigy6 no
menkyoshinsei oyobi jigy6suik6 nikansuru ky6teichti no g6i ga h6teki k6sokuryoku o ytishinai to
sareta jirei [An Example of the Legally Restrictive Power of the Agreement Process Among Bus
Companies Concerning Transportation Licensing Applications and Business Operations], 1358
HANREI JIHO 181-85 (1990); Interview by Ronald Dore with Masao Ogura, President and
Chairman of the Board of Yamato Transportation Co. (Nov. 1993) (transcript on file
with author) [hereinafter Ogura interview].
126. MORITA, supra note 125, at 189. Morita deals with a wide array of transporta-
tion issues. This Article focuses on the licensing of taxis with reference to taxi fare
setting and route allocation in the trucking industry. These areas were chosen for two
reasons. First, they are representative of the phenomena that Morita describes in other
contexts. Second, they have been a source of continuing concern to Japanese eco-
nomic regulation into the 1990s.
127. Id. at 189-90.
128. Id. at 190-91.
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among them were most qualified.1 2 9 At each of these stages, the
conflicts between existing licensees and new applicants and
within each group was potentially intense. Unlike the situation
in television broadcasting, the cost of entry into the taxi, inter-
urban bus, or trucking industry was too low to constitute an ef-
fective barrier or create a natural oligopoly. The number of po-
tential applicants, thus, was not so easily controlled either by the
ministry or by the existing industry.
To deal with the determination of demand, perhaps the
technically most difficult of its tasks, the regional road transpor-
tation bureaus relied on statutory deliberative councils.13 0 Like
the Large Stores Council in the LSRSL context and similar to
deliberative councils throughout Japanese Government, the
fid6sha uns6 kydgikai, or Motor Vehicle Transportation Delibera-
tive Councils, were tripartite bodies with representatives of in-
dustry, consumers, and the public interest.13 1
Statutorily required consultation with deliberative councils
is common in Japanese administration as it is in many other
countries. 3 2 The actual function of the councils vary widely in
Japan. 133 In some contexts, it has been a mere kakuremin6, or
fairy's cloak, to legitimate agency decisions, while in others it has
been the site of intense political conflict.'3 4 In transportation,
the deliberative council virtually replaced the bureaucratic
agency in making the most difficult and sensitive decisions re-
garding the determination of demand for taxi service and bus
129. Id. at 192-93.
130. Id. at 202.
131. Id. at 203. Each council had nine members, three from industry, three from
users or consumers, and three from "experienced and learned citizens" or the relevant
government agency. Id.
132. See DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 269-76 (1986) (claiming that regulation in
Great Britain is much more flexible and consultative than in United States); Id. at 90-91
(discussing use of advisory committees and voluntary industry regulation in Great Brit-
ain); STEVEN KELMAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 191 (1981) (discussing use of advi-
sory committees in both Sweden and United States); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW 189-90 (1991) (analyzing use of advisory committees in United States).
133. See Schwartz, supra note 23, at 217-41 (providing overview of use of delibera-
tive councils).
134. Id. The role of deliberative councils in transportation regulation was crucial
in making decisions. This contrasts with the practical veto power MITI gave to the local
merchants in the LSRSL context which caused the role of the councils to become
purely ritualistic.
PRIVATIZED REGULATION
routes.13 5 The recommendations were not concerned with gen-
eral directions or broad policy. They set specific numbers of ad-
ditional licenses or vehicles to be allowed during specific time
periods in specified areas. The formal determination by the
agency itself, therefore, became nothing more than the ratifica-
tion of the council's prior decision.
A major problem with the shifting of decision-making from
the agency to the deliberative council was the dominance of the
latter by the industry. Although industry representatives consti-
tuted only three of nine total members, commentators agree
that these representatives controlled both the agenda and sub-
stance of council deliberations."3 6 The technical nature of the
issues and the diffuse nature of consumer interests made it diffi-
cult to have consumer representatives without any connection to
the industry. The dominant role of the local chamber of com-
merce in choosing members and the probability that chamber
designees would reflect industry views exacerbated this difficulty.
Independence was even less likely among the three members
chosen from the MOT and persons of "learning and experi-
ence," who were usually directly or indirectly tied to the indus-
try.
1 3 7
Along with the capture aspect of industry control of the de-
liberative councils, Akira Morita emphasizes their legitimating
function and the effective insulation of the Road Transportation
Bureaus and the MOT from political attack.13 8 This shift of deci-
sion-making from the agency to the quasi-public deliberative
council also meant that the locus of real power was farther from
the agency formally responsible, and that it would be harder for
135. MORTA, supra note 125, at 202. According to Morita, the agency followed the
council's recommendation in 99% of the cases. Id. (citing Gydsei kansatsuh6koku 1958
[Administrative Inspection Report 1958]).
136. Se, e.g., MORITA, supra note 125, at 202 (discussing domination of deliberative
councils by industry representatives in transportation sector).
137. Id. at 224. Although warning that it oversimplifies the role of the councils,
Schwartz notes that at one point industry representatives held 64% of the 1411 commit-
tee, subcommittee, and specialist seats on MITI's Industrial Structure Council, the lead-
ing economic council, and a full 98% of the seats on MITI's steel subcommittee.
Schwartz, supra note 23, at 224. Inoue and Negeshi confirm Morita's contention that
industry dominates the MOT councils. See Inoue, supra note 125, at 47 (discussing
domination of transportation advisory councils by industry members); Negishi, supra
note 125, at 203 (analyzing influence of industry representatives seated on transporta-
tion advisory councils).
138. MoRITA, supra note 125, at 207.
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dissatisfied parties or ordinary citizens to challenge decisions.13 9
Although there is no direct evidence that avoiding judicial re-
view was among the goals of the MOT in choosing to rely virtu-
ally entirely on the councils, it is another instance of the bureau-
cracy fashioning its decision-making processes in a way that les-
sens the chance of judicial scrutiny.
The Land Transportation Bureaus' practice in the remain-
ing three steps of licensing more closely resembles the MPT's
practice in broadcast licensing. The rapid increase in economic
growth in the 1950s and 1960s led to a concomitant increase in
the number of applicants for new or additional inter-urban bus
routes. 4 ° The degree and intensity of conflict made the deci-
sions among them difficult, and the frequent involvement of lo-
cal politicians exacerbated the political risk. The Bureaus' re-
sponse was to instruct the industry to limit the number of appli-
cations to the number of available licenses. Morita describes the
process:
The Ministry of Transportation sent "autonomous adjust-
ment" administrative guidance to the applicants. Here auton-
omous adjustment meant that the rival applicants were to dis-
cuss and adjust their interests and create a single application
or reduce the number of applications to the number avail-
able. For example A and B would discuss and decide that A
would apply for route X and B for route Y and that each
would withdraw its other application. Or the applicants
would decide to enter agreements allocating cargo areas or
schedules, sharing facilities, etc. When there were many ap-
plicants, they would also sometimes form new legal entities
139. It is likely that the doctrines of standing and ripeness would block a direct
attack on a bureau decision that stated that a particular number of additional licenses
were required in a given area at a given period because that number, in and of itself,
would not have an immediate effect on any individual's legal rights. Such a decision
might be challenged indirectly, however, by a rejected applicant arguing that the
agency had illegally underestimated the demand for taxis and that this error led the
agency to reject its application. Such an argument would be complicated, however, if
the bureau could simply respond that it was correctly considering the deliberative coun-
cils' advice. Moreover, such a challenge would probably fail because it would be diffi-
cult for the rejected applicant to show that the rejection was because of the number of
allotted licenses rather than for any number of other possible reasons. The plaintiff
would then be forced to show illegality on the part of the council and that this illegality
caused its determination of the needed additional licenses and that the bureau fol-
lowed its advice, rather than arriving at the same number through the exercise of its
own discretion.
140. MORrrA, supra note 125, at 206.
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through mergers or joint investment and achieve a single ap-
plication thereby.14 1
It is unclear how actively the agency intervened to monitor
the unification process or to supervise its result. At times the
MOT may have been able simply to indicate the number of ap-
plications and rely on the industry members to decide who
would submit them. At other times the agency relied on the
good offices of local notables as the MPT did in the broadcast
licensing context. 4 Both methods left the decisions for the ap-
plicants to work out through private bargaining, which meant
that "the ministry did not abide by the system and itself compare
the applicants' suitability in light of the licensing criteria and
select the most qualified." 4
In contexts such as large scale increases in the number of
taxi licenses, autonomous adjustment did not always succeed in
producing the exact number of license applications that the
Road Transportation Bureau was willing to grant. This forced
the Bureau to convene the statutory hearing process and choose
among applicants. Even at this stage, the MOT's primary con-
cern was to mediate an agreement among the applicants. 44
This process, which is the equivalent of the adjustor's role in
broadcasting adjustment, caused excessive delays. More troub-
141. Id. at 216. One such autonomous adjustment became the basis of a contract
action when one of the parties withdrew and attempted to violate its terms. The court
found the agreement not legally binding, although its reasoning was partly based on
the plaintiffs own earlier failure to live up to the agreement's terms. SeeJudgment of
the Supreme Court, Second Petty Bench, Nov. 24, 1989, 1344 HANREI JIH6 132 (1990);
see also, Shiomi, supra note 125, at 563-71 (discussing Okud6go Tourist Bus case);
Soneno, supra note 125, at 181-85 (analyzing Okud6go Tourist Bus case).
In the taxi industry, the trade association actually filed all applications on behalf of
its members until 1979, when the FTC made it clear that the practice was a violation of
the AML and that the individual companies had to file individually. Thereafter, they
simply filed separate identical applications. In the words of one commentator, there
was "absolutely no change." Yoshitsugu Akiyama, Takushijigy6 no kiseikanwa ni kan suns
ikk6satsu - A Study of the Deregulation of Taxi Industry (sic), SHAK.M KAGAKU, July, 1994, at
26; see Harunori Yamada & Noboru Kobayashi, Takushiijigy6 ni kakaru unchinseigenjiken
[A Case of Limitations on Taxi Fares], KssE1 TORIHiI, Feb., 1983, at 43 (discussing FTC's
formal warning of Gumma Prefecture taxi association).
142. See Shiomi, supra note 125, at 563 (descibing mediation of financial power
brokers in Okud6go Tourist Bus case); Soneno, supra note 125, at 182 (discussing medi-
ation in Okud6go Tourist Bus case).
143. MORrrA, supra note 125, at 217.
144. Id. at 217-18.
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ling to Morita was the distance that the whole approach took the
licensing system from its statutory goals:
The Ministry of Transportation's greatest concern in these
decisions was not to whom to give the license or how the in-
dustry should develop along a given route or in a given area;
that is, it was not concerned with realizing its policy goals.
Rather it was adjusting the interests of the applicants and
other interested parties. It follows that the ministry's attitude
was not to control opposition to its decisions by taking actions
that would realize its policy objectives. Instead, it took the
passive and defensive attitude of softening opposition by
avoiding decisions altogether. 145
The agency still resisted a decision on the merits even when
mediation failed. 46 It instead relied almost exclusively on dis-
qualifying individual applicants on trivial grounds rather than
deciding which among qualified applicants best fit the statutory
criteria. The agency was extremely strict on form, even disquali-
fying applications for typographical errors. It used the social
trust criterion broadly and loosely, once disqualifying an appli-
cant because of a divorce.147 It relied, whenever possible, on
marginally relevant numerical requirements such as garage
space rather than more central, albeit less mechanical, criteria
related to market performance.1 48
Masao Ogura's description of MOT licensing in the truck-
ing industry confirms Morita's account of the MOT's role in taxi
licensing. Ogura is the president of Yamato Transport, one of
Japan's largest freight companies, and an outspoken critic of the
bureaucracy. He found the ministry's persistent refusal to exer-
cise its discretionary power in the truck licensing process so min-
imal that he characterized it as the "abandonment of administra-
tive power." 149 According to Ogura, the MOT did no independ-
ent investigation and would have had no data on which to base
decisions if it had been forced to make any.
Of course, the MOT had no desire to make any decisions.
According to Ogura, the MOT's role under the Road Transpor-
145. Id. at 222.
146. See id. at 222-31 (describing MOT criteria used to disqualify applicants rather
than making decisions based on merit of applications).
147. Id. at 226-28.
148. Id. at 228.
149. Ogura Interview, supra note 125.
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tation Law was the same as MITI's under the LSRSL. The MOT
would simply say no to new applicants whenever an existing
competitor objected. Because each firm realized that its own
chances of getting new routes in the future depended on the
good will of its competitors, the role of the MOT did not neces-
sarily mean that new routes were never granted. Instead of be-
ing recalcitrant, most industry members adopted a "you scratch
my back and I'll scratch yours" approach that allowed new en-
trants unless there was a chance that it would cause "excessive
competition," in which case existing firms in that market exer-
cised their veto power and the MOT indicated that it would re-
ject the application.150
When faced with a competitor's veto, Yamato's initial course
of action was to enlist a politician not to persuade the MOT to
accept the application, but to help persuade the other trucking
company to withdraw its opposition. If political intervention
failed or was unavailable, Yamato frequently succeeded by offer-
ing to divide the market with the established companies. When
persuasion and collusion failed, Yamato often purchased the
right to the route from the competitor.' Finally, in three ex-
treme cases where all else failed and the prize was worth the cost,
Yamato filed a formal application despite its rival's veto. When
the MOT refused to act on the application, Yamato sued to com-
pel the MOT to make a decision. In each of these instances a
license was issued within a year of the filing of litigation. As
Ogura put it, "[b] ureaucrats are all alike. You file administrative
litigation, and their attitude changes just like that. They hate
litigation."'52 The problem with litigation as a normal tactic,
Ogura claimed, was that the Road Transportation Bureau could
stall an applicant for up to five years before a court would enter-
tain a suit for administrative inaction.15 3
150. Id.
151. Id. It is unclear from the text of the interview whether Yamato would acquire
the rival company or simply pay it to withdraw its objection to Yamato's license.
152. Id. It is unclear what happened with these suits because they were withdrawn
once the licenses issued. The assumption is that they were suits to force an agency
decision, but Ogura does not explicitly say so.
153. Id. In at least one transportation case, a court has found a much shorter
period to be too long. See Mitsubishi Taxi Group v. Japan, 1454 HANREIJIHo 61 (Osaka
Dist. CL, May 3, 1993). Mitsubishi Taxi sued for compensation for the MOT's delay in
accepting and then ruling on its application to increase its fare. The MOT's delay was
less than six months, of which the court found two months was excessive and ordered
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2. Cartelization in Industrial Policy
Cartelization has been a by-product of the mode of policy
implementation chosen by the ministry in each of the areas dis-
cussed thus far. Cartelization was not, however, a formal part of
government policy. In many areas of industrial policy, on the
other hand, cartels ranging from production cartels to help tide
industries over recessions to export cartels as a response to trade
pressure are an explicit vehicle for policy implementation." 4
a. Types and Uses of Cartels
Cartels in Japan have a variety of legal natures. Many are
compensation. The ministry was apparently attempting to punish Mitsubishi for ignor-
ing earlier administrative guidance and to force it to raise its fare to its competitors'
level. Mitsubishi wanted a fare increase that would still keep it below its competitors.
The passage of the Administrative Procedures Law ("APL") in 1993 may have made
Ogura's tactic even more effective and may have substantially weakened the MOT's
power to refuse to accept or act on an application. See Gy6sei tetsuzukih6 [Administrative
Procedures Law], Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan). For a discussion of exactly how the APL
may affect the MOT's practice of delaying action to force applicants to negotiate or
"adjust their activities" with competitors, see Tadasu Watari, Ky6ninka shinsei no katte na
shori wa yurusarenai [The Arbitrary Treatment of Permit Applications Will not Be Allowed],
HOGAKu SEMINAA, Nov., 1994, at 42-45. Watari describes an instance where a railroad
company duly filed an application for a fare decrease for both cargo and passenger
service. When it was vehemently opposed by its competitors, the applicant rallied con-
sumers and used support for the application. Nonetheless, the MOT returned the ap-
plication and instructed the company to reapply after it had adjusted the matter with its
competitors. According to Watari, this type of administrative behavior is much more
difficult under the APL. For a similar discussion of how the APL and local versions
thereof will affect similar practices in land use, see Katsuya Uga, Cy6sei to shimin no kankei
no henkaku [ Changes in the Relationship Between Citizens and Administration], HOGAKu Ky-
OSHITsU, Aug., 1996, at 4.
It is also important to note that Yamato Transport was not the only transportation
company to use litigation to disrupt privatized regulation. Despite the Mitsubishi Taxi
Company's well publicized victory, the best known maverick in the taxi industry has
been the MK Taxi Company of Kyoto. MK has used the courts to force the MOT to
allow it to break ranks with its competitors and maintain lower fares, first in Kyoto and
then later in other parts ofJapan. For differing views of the decade-long process and its
relationship to the taxi industry in general, see Shinichi Kido, MK h6shiki de takushii
gy6kai wa sukuenai [ The MK System can not Save the Taxi Trade Association], EKONOMISUTO,
Oct. 10, 1985, at 54; Nobuo Sakamoto, MK takushii no t6sen wa shippai shiteinai [ The MK
Taxi Challenge is not Failing], EKONOMISUTO, Jun. 7, 1994, at 60; see Akiyama, supra note
149, at 15-42 (discussing complicated regulatory scheme for taxis and MK's role
therein).
154. See generally Harry First, Structural Antitrust Rules and International Competition:
The Case of Distressed Industries, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 1054 (1987) [hereinafter Structural
Antitrust Rules] (providing general theoretical approach to use of cartels in depressed
industries policy).
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secret and illegal, as is true of any economy, and are intended
solely for the private benefit of the cartel members. This Article,
however, is concerned only with the range of cartels, policy car-
tels, formed with some degree of government involvement or ac-
quiescence. 155 Policy cartels come with a wide range of legal au-
thority, including none at all.
At one end of the spectrum are formal policy cartels that
have been statutorily authorized, such as the depression cartels
under the AML and the capacity-scrapping cartels under the de-
pressed industries legislation of the 1970s and 1980s.156 Next on
the spectrum of formality are statutes that delegate the responsi-
bility to monitor and promote a specific economic sector to a
ministry, but stop just short of authorizing cartelization. The Pe-
troleum Industry Law ("PIL") is a representative example of
such a "sectoral" policy cartel.'5 7 Finally, there are "jurisdic-
tional" policy cartels, for which the only legal authority is the
general mission statement in the statute that established the par-
ticular ministry. These cartels are jurisdictional because they are
established under the general jurisdictional authority of the par-
ticular agency.' 58 Despite their technically criminal nature, both
155. Because these cartels are connected in varying degrees to government policy,
the term policy cartels is used. Policy cartels are further divided into three categories
based on their legal nature: formal policy cartels, sectoral policy cartels, and jurisdic-
tional policy cartels.
156. These cartels are formal and legal. The scope of a firm's cooperative activity
that is exempted from the AML may vary, but the cartel's existence has received formal
government approval. The members, actions, and scope of these formal, policy cartels
form part of the public record. See Tokuteifuky6 sangyd antei rinji sochih6 [Declining Indus-
tries Law], Law No. 44 of 1978 (Japan) [hereinafter DILl; Tokutei sangy6 k6zo kaizen rinji
sochih [Structurally Depressed Industries Law], Law No. 44 of 1978, as amended 1983 (Ja-
pan) [hereinafter SDIL].
157. See Sekiyugy ho [Petroleum Industry Law], Law No. 128 of 1962 (Japan) [herein-
after PIL]. The PIL clearly contemplates an active supervisory role for MITI in the
petroleum industry. It requires each firm to file annual production plans for review by
MITI, which then must publish annual five year supply plans for the industry and na-
tion as a whole. MITI uses the firms' production forecasts to decide whether to license
new refining capacity, to issue administrative guidance advising individual firms to re-
strict output, and to develop retail price guidelines for the industry. Because of its
broad responsibilities under the PIL, MITI and industry members argued that the PIL
implicitly authorized cartelization under the ministry's guidance. In the 1970s, how-
ever, the Supreme Court in the Oil Cartel Cases determined that the PIL did not author-
ize such activity and, further, that industry action that violates the terms of the AML,
even when undertaken with explicit MITI permission and encouragement, remains sub-
ject to criminal liability. See SHIND6, supra note 3, at 137-49 (analyzing MITI's role in
cartelizing petroleum industry in context of Oil Cartel Cases).
158. See Tstishd sangy&shh6 [M1TIFstablishment Law], Law No. 275 of 1952 (Japan).
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jurisdictional and sectoral cartels have been a common means of
carrying out the monitoring and promotional duties of minis-
tries during much of the postwar period. Such cartels are fre-
quently well known and openly discussed.
The Japanese Government, via the FTC, has been reluctant
to pursue criminally even clearly illegal policy cartels. The rea-
sons are complex but include an FTC preference to act through
warnings and other consultative procedures, rather than formal
legal proceedings.159 Some commentators argue that this reli-
ance on informality is simply a more effective means of enforce-
ment in the Japanese social and cultural context, but extrinsic
pressures on the FTC may be more important constraints. The
construction firms that are at the center of the cartelization pro-
cess, known as dang6, are a major source of funds for LDP politi-
cians, for example, and any threat to the profits culled from
dang6 would be a serious threat to the politicians. 6 '
The tolerance of cartels and the reluctance to prosecute
them is more interesting than simply corrupt politicians acting
to protect their benefactors. Sectoral and jurisdictional cartels
are illegal, but they also are inextricably interwoven with bureau-
cratic policy and policy implementation.' 6 ' One reason thatJap-
MITI's mission statement provides, for example, that MITI was established to en-
courage economic development and stability. MITI oversaw numerous such cartels
from the 1950s through the 1970s in a broad range of industries, with the contentious
steel cartel of 1964 and 1965, known as the Sumitomo Metals Incident, being perhaps
the best known example. The author uses the term "jurisdictional policy cartels" be-
cause their sole legal basis is the jurisdiction of the sponsoring agency.
159. ScHOPPA, supra note 104, at 219-21; see Harry First, Antitrust Enforcement in
Japan, 64 ANTITRUST LJ. 147, 155 (1996) [hereinafter Antitrust Enforcement in Japan]
(stating that FrC "has always preferred to act informally, disposing of the bulk of its
cases through warnings or guidance."); HALEY, supra note 2, at 162-63.
160. Id. The seriousness of the threat to profits from the cartels was illustrated in
1982 when the FTC threatened to move against construction dang6 and faced such a
political backlash that it eventually not only pulled back, but even issued a set of "guide-
lines" telling the industry precisely how they could conduct dangd to avoid being subject
to FTC attention. SCHOPPA, supra note 104, at 223; BRIAN WOODALL, JAPAN UNDER CoN-
STRUCrION: CORRUPTION, POLICS, AND PUBLIC WORKS 36-48 (1996). Even in 1992, af-
ter dang6-related corruption scandals threatened to bring down the LDP for the first
time in almost fifty years sending the mass media into a righteous uproar over political
corruption, Construction Minister Kishiro Nakamura intervened openly with the FTC
investigations to prevent a series of prosecutions of construction companies involved in
dang in Saitama Prefecture. MARK TILTON, RESTRAINED TRADE: CARTELS IN JAPAN'S BA-
SIC MATERIALS INDUSTRIES 112 (1995).
161. For most of the postwar period, the Ministry of Construction ("MOC") has
structured the award of public projects to foster implicitly, if not directly create, the
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anese ministries go to such lengths to facilitate cartels is un-
doubtedly the needs of ruling politicians, as exemplified by the
flow of contributions from dang6 or the electoral support of local
merchants in the LSRSL context. There are, however, fre-
quently legitimate policy rationales as well. Each ministry views
the nurturing of a healthy industry as its primary goal, and it
defines health as stability for the weak and small firms and effi-
ciency for the successful ones. 162
Less noble motives are also at work in the bureaucratic pref-
erence for cartels. Cartelization strengthens the trade associa-
tions through which privatized regulation typically operates and,
thus, makes governance much easier than would fidelity to the
statute. Fewer personnel, especially technically trained person-
nel, are needed, and ministries frequently can appear to avoid
making what would be politically dangerous choices. On a per-
sonal level, the price cutting, bankruptcies, and other destabi-
lizing phenomena that accompany market discipline would en-
danger the jobs waiting for bureaucrats upon their retirement
from government service. 163
Cartels, thus, address a wide range of policy, political, insti-
tutional, and personal needs of the bureaucrats who facilitate
them. The advantages to industry are even more apparent, but
only an examination of such cartels in operation can provide an
dang6 system. This designated bidder system, under which only a certain number of
approved construction companies can bid for government projects, effectively estab-
lishes cartel membership. The regular leaking of the supposedly secret "ceiling prices"
for acceptable bids guaranteed cartel members the highest possible price for the pro-
ject. The subsequent publication of all bids meant that the cartel could discover and
punish any company that submitted an inappropriately low bid. Just to be sure that
private punishment was effective, the MOC would drop any cartel cheaters from the
designated list for the next round of bidding. WOODALL, supra note 160, at 36-50. This
activity is technically illegal, but is conducted under the agency's explicit authority to
monitor a specific sector. Id.
162. The rationales for stability vary. For the MOC or Ministry of Transport
("MOT") it is often quality and safety. Stable industries with adequate profit margins
are supposedly necessary for safe infrastructure projects and transportation networks.
For MITI, stability in energy and other basic industries, such as steel or petrochemicals,
is justified as necessary for secure supplies for downstream sectors. In other instances,
there is a social welfare rationale, as illustrated by MITI's protection of small merchants
under the LSRSL and of the cartels under the declining industries legislation.
163. Most bureaucrats have a substantial personal stake in guaranteeing a stable
and profitable industry because their most financially rewarding period personally
comes in their early 50s after they amakudari, or descend from Heaven, descending
from their ministry into a company within the sector they previously regulated.
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accurate idea of their role in the economy as a whole. While
such data are normally difficult to obtain, recent analyses of Jap-
anese industrial policy by U.S. political scientists provide valua-
ble new data on the way cartels operated under Japan's declin-
ing industries statutes of the 1970s and 1980s. 164
b. Declining Industries Legislation and the Cement Cartel
i. The DIL and SDIL: Statutory Protection of Declining
Industries
Increasing competition from newly industrializing countries
in the 1970s and the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 posed new
challenges to MITI: namely, to manage the decline of a wide
range of hitherto successful industries. 165 To make matters
worse, this was also the period when the Oil Cartel Cases'66 con-
firmed what the FTC, in its episodic bureaucratic struggles with
MITI, had long argued. The FTC asserted that informal policy
cartels, whether jurisdictional under the MITI Establishment
Law or sectoral under statutes like the PIL, were prima facie ille-
gal and that the executives of companies participating in policy
cartels would be liable to criminal prosecution. The result of
these two factors was a series of laws, including the 1978 De-
pressed Industries Law'67 ("DIL") and its successor, the Structur-
ally Depressed Industries Law168 ("SDIL") of 1983, aimed at giv-
ing MITI the policy tools to manage declining industries.
Among these tools was the authority to foster and supervise car-
tels to cut production capacity in designated industries.169
164. See geerally GREGORY NOBLE, REGIMES AND INDUSTRIAL PoLIcY. THE POLITICS
OF COLLECTIVE ACTION INJAPAN AND TAIwAN 1-54 (ch. 3) (1995) (unpublished disserta-
tion, on file with the author) (analyzing use of cartels in Japanese steel industry during
1970s and 1980s); TILTON, supra note 160, at 35-49 (discussing cartel activity in Japanese
industry); ROBERT M. Ugiu, TROUBLED INDUSTRIES: CONFRONTING ECONOMIC CHANGE IN
JAPAN 107-15 (1996) (discussing steel industry's efforts to cartelize in 1970s).
165. Ugiu, supra note 164, at 103-06. The management of declining industries did
not start with the DIL nor has it been limited to MITI. Textiles went into decline in the
1960s, and when shipbuilding went into decline in the early 1970s, it was under the
jurisdiction of the MOT, rather than MITI. See id.
166. See LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 23, at 184-88 (discussing Oil Cartel
Cases as challenge to informality in Japanese industrial policy); see also SHINDO, supra
note 3, at 137-49 (analyzing use of administrative guidance in context of Oil Cartel
Cases).
167. DIL, Law No. 44 of 1978 (Japan).
168. SDIL, Law No. 44 of 1978, as amended 1983 (Japan).
169. While there are significant differences between the DIL and the SDIL, for the
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These laws empowered MITI, after prior consultation with
the FTC, to create formal cartels that would not be subject to
AML prosecution. 17° The rationale was that cooperation would
lead to enhanced efficiencies that would either revitalize the in-
dustry or ease its decline. 171  What is most interesting about
these cartels is that they lacked the tools necessary to be effec-
tive. First, they were voluntary. No firm was forced to join them,
and there was no legal control over outsiders. Second, there was
no limitation on imports. MITI and the affected industries had
proposed including both measures in the legislation, but both
were dropped when the FTC and the U.S. Government objected.
The reliance on cartels to carry out economic policy without
providing any legal means to control members or to bar new
entrants into the market defies economic theory and common
sense. 172 Even in the best of worlds, cartels are difficult to man-
purposes of this Article, the two are treated as a single statute. The SDIL replaced the
DIL at the end of the DIL's five year term. Whereas the DIL was limited to capacity
cutting cartels, the SDIL authorized joint production, sales, purchasing, product spe-
cialization, and mergers as well. By the end of the 1980s, U.S. pressure prevented its
renewal or strengthening. Instead, the SDIL was replaced by the Structural Conversion
Facilitation Law ("SCFL"), which remained effective until 1994. See Sangy6k6z6 tenkan
enkatsuka 7inji sochih6 [Structural Conversion Facilitation Law], Law No. 24, of 1984 (Ja-
pan) [hereinafter SCFL]. Unlike its predecessors, the SCFL did not allow direct carte-
lization. Rather, MITT was to advise firms individually on the capacity cutting process.
Whether this technical distinction made any difference in the actual process remains to
be seen. See TILTON, supra note 160, at 48 (presenting pessimistic view of differences
resulting from SCFL's procedural changes).
170. LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 23, at 90. Under both the DIL and SDIL
capacity elimination cartels were exempt from AML attack once approved by MITI.
Other types of cartels, however, were still covered by the AML, meaning the FTC essen-
tially had a veto power over cartel activity. See id. at 191-92 (analyzing statutory provi-
sions of DIL and SDIL).
171. Id. at 188. This rationale is commonly used for various forms of assistance to
industries beset by international competition. See Alan Sykes, Protectionism as a "Safe-
guard ": A Positive Analysis of the GATT "Escape Clause" with Normative Speculations, 58 U.
CHI. L. REv. 255 (1991) [hereinafter Protectionism as a "Safeguard"] (arguing that govern-
ment assistance is not efficient means of revitalizing or easing decline of industry); see
also Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, supra note 159, at 147.
172. Of course, there are other examples of cartels that are successful without
legal means of creation or enforcement. One is the mob controlled cartel in New York
City's construction industry. See RONALD GOLDSTOCK ET AL., CORRUPTION AND RACKE-
TEERING IN THE NYC CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY. THE FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
ORGANIZED CRIME TASK FORCE 11-100 (1990). The authors assert that the mob has or-
ganized a successful cartel in the New York City construction industry for most of the
twentieth century. As a result, project costs in New York City are the highest in the
United States. Id. at 15. The authors point out that the inevitable problem with cartels
that lack formal, legal means of compulsion is enforcement, which they refer to as "ra-
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age, and the situation in the late 1970s and 1980s was decidedly
not the best of worlds. Within each industry a minority of firms
opposed cartelization because those firms believed they would
thrive in the expected market shake-out. It was natural to expect
these firms to resist joining any cartels and to cheat if they did.
These industries were, furthermore, internationally noncompeti-
tive. They were losing market share overseas, published domes-
tic prices were substantially higher than world prices, and the
standardized nature of the products meant that there was little
difference between Japanese and foreign quality. To make mat-
ters worse, Japan's trading partners were sensitive to its persis-
tent trade surpluses and would likely object to any detectable
barriers to imports. In the face of these threats, the DIL and the
SDIL gave the industries and MITI no tools beyond the right to
cooperate in a limited range of activities without legal liability.
The result in some sectors was what one would expect. Do-
mestic aluminum production virtually disappeared, a victim of
the impact of rising energy prices on a product often described
as "congealed electricity."17 The collapse was not, however, so
sudden or uncontrolled that MITI and the industry were pre-
vented from reserving the lion's share of imports for overseas
subsidiaries of Japanese firms.I74 MITI also failed to form an ef-
fective cartel in the minimill sector of the steel industry, a failure
caused not by a flood of imports, but by the constant defection
of relatively efficient domestic producers. 75 These failures, how-
ever, were the exception. In seeming defiance of market eco-
nomics, several sectors succeeded in managing their markets so
that most firms survived intact, imports achieved little or no mar-
ket penetration, and domestic prices remained comfortably
high. Remarkably, by maintaining export prices well below its
tionalization," and that the mob played the role of "rationalizing body" in the New York
City cartel. Id. at 65. MITI and the trade associations played this role in Japan.
173. TILTON, supra note 160, at 52-56.
174. Uiuu, supra note 164, at 17. In the aluminum smelting industry, the increase
in energy costs made the price differential between domestic and foreign aluminum so
high that production fell 97% and nine of ten plants closed in the decade from 1977 to
1987. See TILTON, supra note 160, at 50-79 (describing decline of domestic aluminum
production in Japan during 1970s and 1980s). Imports replaced virtually all domestic
production, although it is worth noting that the industry and MITI were able to save the
lion's share of the Japanese market for captive imports controlled by former domestic
producers. Id. at 58-61.
175. NOBLE, supra note 164, at 29-31 (ch. 3).
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domestic prices, Japan remained a net exporter in most of these
sectors even though its industries were high cost producers of
products similar in quality to those produced elsewhere.' 76 De-
spite repeated anxiety in the Japanese media about the hollow-
ing out of the economy, domestic production in most sectors,
including chemicals and kiln products like cement, iron, and
steel, has not decreased during a period of supposed decline.1
77
Explaining how this feat was accomplished is difficult and
complicated. Each industry varies in important ways that affect
the ease and means of market control. The role of technology
in production, the degree of capital intensity, the political re-
sources of the industry association and its unions, the fungibility
of its products, the gap between domestic and world prices, the
sensitivity of powerful trading partners to import barriers, and
many other factors differ from industry to industry and among
products within the same industry. 78 The process of forming
and enforcing the cartel thus differed in each instance.' 79
ii. The Cement Cartel
The method by which the declining industries statutes
worked is evidenced by a successful cartel in the cement indus-
try. As is true for most of Japan's designated depressed indus-
tries, cement began its competitive decline after the first oil
shock in 1973. By 1975 it had received FTC permission to form a
depression cartel under the AML. Over the next decade, the
industry formed two further legal AML production cartels and a
series of illegal and unauthorized price cartels.' 8 1 After investi-
176. TILTON, supra note 160, at 9-11, 139, 171. Cement is a sector dominated by
middle income "late developers". It is not a sector where one would expect an ad-
vanced nation like Japan to be a leading producer. The product is relatively standard-
ized, advanced or expensive technology plays little role in production, and labor costs
are a significant part of overall costs. Japan, furthermore, enjoys no particular advan-
tages in either natural resources or transportation.
177. Id. at 11.
178. Umu, supra note 164, at 10-21.
179. Id. The difficulty of getting data on what are, to reiterate, illegal activities
further increases the difficulty in generalization because illegality means that data gath-
ering will be unusually idiosyncratic and dependent on finding sources which may not
be readily confirmed or refuted by more conventional sources.
180. TiLTON, supra note 160, at 89. The FTC also pursued cement producers for
unauthorized price cartels in a 1990 case. In this later case, however, the FTC actually
initiated criminal action and levied fines of US$96 million. Because the FTC did not
pursue legitimate aspects of the cement cartel, such as the exclusionary boycott, priva-
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gations and FTC warnings regarding the private cartels in 1983
and 1984, the industry applied for official designation as de-
pressed in 1984.81 It remained under MITI protection under
the SDIL and its successor the Structural Conversion Facilitation
Law' 82 ("SCFL") until 1990, when capacity expansion restrictions
under the latter were lifted.'83 Throughout this period, designa-
tion meant that certain cooperative measures were legally possi-
ble and that mergers could take place with lessened FTC scru-
tiny. At no time during this period, or before or since, has MITI
or the industry itself had the legal power to restrict imports or to
force compliance with production or price agreements. Under
the SDIL and SCFL, neither the earlier AML cartels nor the later
sectoral cartels possessed the legal tools necessary to control the
market.
It is surprising, therefore, to examine the state of the inter-
national cement market as of 1992, after almost twenty years of
formally recognized "depression" and "decline" of the Japanese
industry. Three of the four countries to export over five million
tons of cement in any single year from the 1970s through the
early 1990s were Spain, Greece, and South Korea.i"4 The fourth
was Japan, which was the leading exporter of cement in the pe-
riod from 1979 to 1986 and again in the early 1990s. 185 Japan
was able to achieve this status despite published domestic ce-
ment prices that averaged 68 percent higher than import prices,
and 154 percent higher than its own export prices between 1986
and 1993.186 Despite these differentials, imports have never cap-
tured even as much as five percent of the domestic market, and
in 1992 the import market share was 1.2 percent. 187
To maintain this degree of market control, MITI and the
industry used a combination of public and private efforts that in
many important respects resembles regulation in the licensing
process for stores, television channels, and transportation routes.
The major actors were MITI on the Government side and the
tized regulation in the cement industry continued into the 1990s. See SCHOPPA, supra
note 104, at 248.
181. TiLTON, supra note 160, at 92.
182. SCFL, Law No. 24 of 1984 (Japan).
183. TILTON, supra note 160, at 115.
184. Id. at 80-81.
185. Id. at 81.
186. Id.
187. Id.
PRIVATIZED REGULATION
trade associations for the cement and ready-mix concrete indus-
tries on the private side. 8' Playing secondary roles were the
FTC, without whose acquiescence market management would
have been impossible, and the trade associations in the construc-
tion industry, without whose cooperation the cement cartel
would collapse."' In the background were the Ministry of Con-
struction ("MOC"), whose designated bidder system makes
dangd possible, and the LDP, whose financial interests were
served by the entire arrangement and who passed the legislation
that created the legal framework for declining industry policy. 190
At the core of the system was an agreement among the trade
associations in the cement, ready-mix concrete, and construction
industries to boycott non-member firms. The construction in-
dustry agreed to buy only trade association cement, and the ce-
ment cartel promised to sell only to members of the construc-
tion trade association. If a construction company bought im-
ported cement, for example, members of the cement association
would not sell to it in the future. Similarly, the cement associa-
tion would boycott trucking firms, ready-mix concrete firms,
trading companies, or longshoremen who handled or purchased
imported cement.
Supporting these private arrangements were formal and in-
formal efforts by MITI, the MOC, the FTC, and other govern-
ment agencies, including customs officials and local govern-
ments. MITI played the central role by helping the cement in-
dustry organize and maintain its cartel and by taking a
particularly active role in encouraging and monitoring an effec-
tive cartel among the many small scale ready-mix concrete com-
panies. 191 The MOC cooperated when necessary to facilitate the
relationship between the cement and construction industries,
particularly when changes in the basic agreement were needed.
The FTC's role was what it has been throughout its history: to
ignore exclusionary boycotts due to the need to enforce priva-
tized regulation. 92 Finally, local governments and customs offi-
cials are alleged to have attempted to block imports by refusing
188. See id. at 83.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 84.
191. Id. at 90-91.
192. The FTC has almost never pursued exclusionary practices in any context. See
Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, supra note 159, at 170-73.
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to sell land or delaying clearance of South Korean imports.1 98
These arrangements contributed to making the Japanese
construction industry the most expensive in the industrialized
world.19 4 Because Japan's construction market is also the largest
in the world, the social cost of this inefficiency is enormous. 95
The cartelization of all the industries involved in construction
likely contributed substantially to these high costs in a way that is
remarkably similar to the impact of the cartelization of the retail
sector on the high cost of consumer goods in Japan.
The most obvious beneficiaries of this arrangement were
the cement companies and their employees. Profits were main-
tained at an artificially high level, and the need to address high
costs either through technological innovation or lowered wages
and layoffs was reduced. The benefits of the cement cartel to
MITI, the MOC, the construction industry, and the ready-mix
concrete industry are more complex.
It is at least partially true that the ministries involved were
simply following the LDP's instructions, but the interests of the
politicians may not be a complete explanation. 9 There is good
reason to believe that bureaucrats have their own personal, insti-
tutional, and policy reasons for preserving stable industries. A
cement industry disappearing under a flood of imports would
have much less room for retired bureaucrats. 197
193. TILTON, supra note 160, at 108-09
194. WOODALL, supra note 160, at 17.
195. See id. at 48. Construction investment as a percentage of GNP in Japan,
18.2%, is more than twice that of the United States, 8.5%, and almost 50% higher than
the United Kingdom's, 12.4%, the next highest among advanced, industrialized na-
tions. Per capita spending on construction in Japan, US$3480, is twice that in either
the United States, US$1630, or the European Community, US$1690. Id. Furthermore,
the construction industry is growing faster in Japan than in any comparable country.
Between 1987 and 1993 theJapanese market expanded by nearly 50%, and the propor-
tion of the national work force in construction grew from 4.7% in 1955 to 9.6% in 1992.
Id. The inefficiencies are reflected qualitatively as well. Although the top Japanese
firms are unsurpassed, they coexist with a large sector of small construction companies
whose "technological capacities [are] only slightly superior to those of medieval build-
ers." Id. at 38.
196. See id. at 39-40. The classic example is that of Shin Kanemaru, an LDP
"kingmaker." See supra note 121 (setting out Kanemaru's involvement with broadcast-
ing sector). Police arrested Kanemaru in the early 1990s after discovering over US$50
million in gold bullion and negotiable securities in a condominium rented by
Kanemaru to store the booty from dang6 payoffs. Id.
197. The need for positions with private firms, therefore, is a reason for bureau-
crats to foster a healthy industry, but it does not explain why the industry would hire
bureaucrats. Tojustify the amakudari system, the firms must see a connection between
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Mark Tilton claims that MITI also had a policy interest in
preserving domestic production that was independent of the
LDP's need for a flow of campaign contributions and its own
bureaucrats' desire for secure retirement positions. Tilton ar-
gues that MITI saw cement as one of a group of basic industries
whose survival was vital to Japanese economic well being. The
ministry supported high profits only for domestic production
and balked when the cement industry proposed importing Ko-
rean cement within the cartel framework. Cartelized imports
would have preserved the LDP's source of funds, the profitability
of the industry, and its dependence on bureaucratic cooperation
and, thus, amakudari positions, but it would have done so at the
cost of declining domestic production. MITI combined with the
FTC to block the plan. The FTC was concerned with effects on
prices and MITI claimed that domestic producers becoming im-
porters was inconsistent with structural reform.198 In Tilton's
opinion, therefore, MITI's implementation of the statutes is fully
understandable only when the ministry's concern with a stable
domestic supply of basic industrial materials is considered as an
important and independent motivation. 199
No matter what explanation of its motivations one accepts,
all observers agree that MITI could not have created effective
cartels without the industries' cooperation.200 The system suc-
ceeded because of the relationships among industries that both
made them interdependent and provided the economic rents
that allowed each industry to pay cartel prices to its suppliers.
Thus, the construction industry would not have honored the ce-
ment or ready-mix concrete exclusionary agreements if they had
not been able to charge cartelized prices in tur
°201
their good fortune and ministry policy. Sumitomo metals, which had prided itself on its
status as the only steel company without an ex-MITI official on the payroll, hired its first
immediately after MITI threats to withhold foreign exchange forced it to abide by a
production cartel it felt favored its rivals. Similarly, the Cement Association and the
Ready-Mix Concrete Federation hired their first retired bureaucrats in 1984 when they
decided to join the SDIL framework. TILTON, supra note 160, at 92-93.
198. Id. at 83, 111-12.
199. Id. at 19-21.
200. URiu, supra note 164, at 25. MITI had no statutory basis either to compel
cartel behavior against reluctant firms or to prevent legal attacks from the FTC.
201. Here is one piece in the puzzle of why the FTC and others allowed the dang
system to continue for so long and so openly when dang6 appears to be merely an
unholy combination of political corruption and industrial gangsterism. It may indeed
be such a combination, but dangd is also at the center of an industrial structure that
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MITI's role is most reflective of the distinctive characteris-
tics of Japan's regulatory style in the facilitation of these private
arrangements. Limited statutory power meant the ministry had
to take a more active role than was usually necessary in the li-
censing case studies, where the industries needed the ministries'
permission or acquiescence to operate. In the declining indus-
tries context, however, MITI had no comparable power, and
firms could either refuse to join the cartel or cheat if they
thought they could prosper in a market shakeout. SDIL cartels
were vulnerable not only to internal defections by members, but
also to their customers' access to cheaper imports. If the domes-
tic price was so high that it outweighed the costs of rupturing
stable relationships with their suppliers and the ministries, MITI
had no legal means to prevent customers from turning to
cheaper imports.
To overcome these weaknesses, MITI needed strong allies
in the ready-mix concrete sector of the cement industry and in
the construction industry. In construction, the dang6 system had
long ago created and maintained an effective cartel adminis-
tered through the trade association. Concrete was more diffi-
cult. It was a new industry created in the 1960s and 1970s when
the cement industry shifted from selling dry concrete directly to
construction companies to selling it through newly created
ready-mix companies. The cement companies decided not to
create wholly owned subsidiaries. Instead they tried to maintain
effective control through the safer and cheaper tactic of creating
interlocking keiretsu relationships by limited equity investment,
loans, and exchanging personnel. °2 These measures might
have succeeded if the cement companies had been alone or if
there had been substantial barriers to entry, but gravel, construc-
tion, and trading companies were also forming ready-mix com-
panies and were independent of cement industry control. By
1977, when the construction industry was suffering from a pro-
supports a great deal more than the LDP and the construction industry. For the FTC to
attempt to eradicate dang6 root and branch, rather than occasionally pursuing extreme
or inappropriate cases, would mean a structural change in the economy that few in
Japan desire or consider necessary.
202. TILTON, supra note 160, at 89. Onoda Cement, for example, "invested some
equity in the ready-mix concrete firms to which it sold cement and dispatched some of
its own employees to them in order to exert some control. Cement companies also
loaned money to create leverage with ready-mix companies." Id. at 89-90.
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longed recession between the two oil shocks, there were over
4000 ready-mix concrete companies, and MITI had already iden-
tified the industry as a potential source of disunity and excess
competition.0
A prerequisite to preservation of the cement industry, there-
fore, was stability in the ready-mix concrete sector.2 04 MITI did
not have the legal tools to restrain entry into the sector so suc-
cess depended on the creation of private institutions strong
enough to become MITI's partners in gaining control over the
sector. MITI took the first step in 1976 when it joined the Ce-
ment Association-and the Ready-mix Concrete Federation ("Fed-
eration") forming the Committee for the Modernization of the
Ready-Mix Concrete Industry ("Committee") .201 The Commit-
tee in turn organized the industry into industrial cooperatives,
which would qualify for government subsidies as small businesses
and which could coordinate capacity scrapping efforts, share de-
mand forecasts and investment plans, form joint sales compa-
nies, and take other measures to lower production and raise
prices.2 6 With cement industry support, the Federation had
considerable success in expanding membership and participa-
tion in the various joint activities. By 1979, ready-mix concrete
prices had improved considerably relative to cement prices, re-
ducing the fears of excessive competition in the industry.20
The organization of the ready-mix industry was only one
part of the industries' and Government's reaction to deteriorat-
ing conditions in the construction sector during the 1970s. Vari-
ous other steps were also necessary before the Cement Associa-
tion, which did not have a history of close cooperation with
MITI, was able and willing to use the statutory framework for
declining industries. The FTC had to make clear that independ-
ent action by the cement industry was no longer possible, first by
the denial of further AML depression cartels and then by warn-
ings against the industry's unauthorized price cartels. Although
it is unclear whether the FIC set out specifically to support MITI
policy, the result of its actions was to replace an illegal price car-
tel with the broader and legal SDIL cartel. Because the indus-
203. Id. at 90.
204. Id. at 89-91 (discussing Japan's ready-mix concrete cartel).
205. Id. at 90.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 91.
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try's previous efforts had lacked both the legitimization and sup-
port of bureaucratic guidance and monitoring, it had been vul-
nerable to prosecution and to defection within its ranks. Once
under MITI's aegis, however, the Federation could conduct a
range of cooperative activities with political and legal legitimacy.
Equally important, the now legalized inter-firm cooperation
could serve as the basis for collusion that went beyond the
boundaries of the SDIL. While these activities may not have
been entirely immune from FTC prosecution, the cover of the
legal activities made detection a great deal more difficult.y08
MITI's role as information clearinghouse for SDIL activities ena-
bled it to monitor other activities as well.
At the core of the sectoral policy cartel formed on the basis
of the formal SDIL cartel was the triangular agreement among
the construction, ready-mix concrete, and cement industries,
which was in turn supported by agreements with trading compa-
nies, trucking firms, and longshoremen to boycott imported ce-
ment. These agreements were in direct conflict with the terms
of the SDIL, which pointedly did not authorize any barriers to
imports. They were also in violation of the AML. These agree-
ments, however, received widespread support and assistance
from local governments and MITI. °9
If importers were able to find available port facilities and get
by customs, they had to find a trucking firm willing to forego
future business with domestic companies. The Cement Associa-
tion's agreement with the truckers' trade association established
208. See id. at 93-101 (discussing formation of cement industry cartel and role of
MITI and FTC).
209. Id. at 106-10. At least one local government refused to sell land to a Korean
company, apparently for protectionist reasons, and customs officials deviated from their
prior methods and international practice to require cement importers to use a method
of weighing cement, which caused a three month delay and forced the company to
build an entirely new US$250,000 facility. Id. at 109. After the facility was completed,
officials returned to the previous practice. MITI also contributed its support to these
agreements. Before SDIL designation of the cement industry in 1984, testing proce-
dures for Japan Industrial Standards ("JIS") had been the same for all cement. In De-
cember 1984, however, MITI made testing more stringent for imported cement and
required concrete companies to disclose any use of imported cement There was no
direct disclosure requirement, but companies using imported cement had to have the
tests done by a semi-public testing organization, making clear the identity of companies
using imported cement. The additional testing requirements were expensive and time
consuming, and disclosure provided the industry with immediate and reliable informa-
tion on violators of the boycott. Id.
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a registration system to limit the former to use of the latter's
trucks. In return, the truckers refused to handle imported ce-
ment. If, nonetheless, cement importers managed to find a
truck, the Cement Association followed the trucks to discover
which ready-mix companies were using imports. Domestic ce-
ment companies then tried to intimidate the "criminals," as they
called them, by cutting off supplies of domestic cement. While
these practices were not on the public record, participants and
trading companies spoke openly about them in the press. One
trading company official stated, "[g]iven our relationship with
the domestic producers we cannot start importing immediately.
But the import business is certainly attractive."21 0 An official of
the Committee on Special Measures to Deal with Imports and
Exports formed by the Cement Association spelled out its policy
to refuse to deal with any importers as follows:
Japanese importers will have to bear all the costs of facilities
for imports and sales on their own. They will have no support
from [domestic cement] makers. Even if they bring in
cheaper imports, there will be high costs for them, and the
price will end up being the same as for domestic cement. 211
Despite the openness of these activities, the cement industry
did not have much reason to fear FTC intervention. Although
the FTC had pursued price cartels and even attacked excessive
dang6 on occasion, it had never disturbed a concerted refusal to
deal with imports, despite repeated reports of such activities.2 12
Despite the acquiescence of the FTC, the active encourage-
210. Id. at 107.
211. Id. at 107-08.
212. Some commentators attribute this reluctance to a policy preference for at-
tacking price cartels that the FTC believes have a more direct and immediate impact on
domestic prices rather than a willingness of the FTC to join in creating barriers to
imports or even to a general weakness vis-d-vis other agencies and the LDP. Other
commentators argue that the FTC does not consider all cartels as equally illegitimate
and is most concerned with cartels that are inconsistent with national policy. Con-
versely, policy cartels, especially sectoral policy cartels formed with the active encour-
agement of another agency with specific statutory responsibility to supervise the indus-
try, are often considered legitimate. When the cartel is an integral part of national
policy, or when the FTC had a voice in the formation and design of the cartels, as was
likely the case in the cement cartel of 1984 and other cartels under the SDIL, the
chance of interference is further lessened, even though the cartels are likely to go be-
yond the legal authority granted by the statute. See generaly SCHOPPA, supra note 104, at
219-21; Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, supra note 159, at 147; LAw AND SOCIAL CHANGE:,
supra note 23, at 169.
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ment of the MOC and MITI, occasional harassment of imports
by local governments and other officials, and the best efforts of
the trade associations, the price differential between imported
and domestic cement was so great that the cartels did not hold
perfectly. In 1984, both South Korean and Taiwanese producers
succeeded in selling enough cement to gain a 0.3 percent share
of the Japanese market. The response ofJapan's Cement Associ-
ation, besides the measures designed to stop further imports de-
tailed above, was to approach its Korean and Taiwanese counter-
parts with an offer to share the market in return for their coop-
eration. The part of the deal that called for Japanese cement
companies to import Korean cement was blocked by MITI and
the FTC as inappropriate to structural adjustment under the
SDIL, but the Association's efforts to convince their foreign ri-
vals to profit from rather than destroy the domestic cartel appear
to have been generally successful. Korean cement was thereafter
priced below domestic cement, but substantially above the world
price. A spokesperson for the trading company that eventually
imported Korean cement expressed his philosophy as, "[w] e will
not set prices so as to provoke domestic manufacturers. It is a
distribution company's duty to make sure a situation does not
develop where bad money drives down prices, and I intend to
live up to this duty."2 1 3
This pattern of illegal cartelization directed at a specific pol-
icy goal has been repeated many times in the course of industrial
policy toward "troubled industries." Robert Uriu describes simi-
lar patterns among a wide range of industries under a number of
statutes, including shipbuilding, textiles, coal mining, cotton
spinning, paper, synthetic fiber, steel minimills, and integrated
steel. 1 4 Tilton recounts similar efforts in other industries desig-
nated under the DIL or SDIL, including aluminum, petrochemi-
cal, and steel.2 15 The PIL has been the vehicle for sectoral policy
cartels in the petroleum industry, including the price and pro-
duction cartels that were the subject of FTC prosecution in the
Oil Cartel Cases and the gasoline import cartel.
213. TILTON, supra note 160, at 111.
214. See generally URiu, supra note 164, at 45-236 (analyzing cartelization in various
domestic Japanese industries, including shipbuilding, cotton spinning, paper, and
steel).
215. See TILTON, supra note 160, at 50-79, 122-68, 169-89 (discussing illegal carte-
lization efforts in aluminum, petrochemical, and steel industries in Japan).
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Despite the variety of industries and legal and political cir-
cumstances, certain commonalties can be found and related to
the traits that characterized our previous three case studies. The
most striking is perhaps the divergence from legal rules. Inter-
industry agreements to honor each other's cartels and to boycott
imports were at the core of declining industry policy, and yet the
underlying statutes did not permit the collusive control of either
domestic defectors or imports. 1 Private actions intended to ac-
complish either, with or without MITI encouragement, were vio-
lations of the AML despite the informal consultations with the
FTC that in practice eliminated the chance of criminal prosecu-
tion. The statutes may have broadened the industrial policy pro-
cess by involving the FTC, a step made legally and politically nec-
essary by the Oil Cartel Cases, but neither statute gave any entity
the legal power to enforce the results of such consultation.
Thus, the Cement Association was not able to use legal means to
prevent imports; it had to resort to private efforts, such as follow-
ing renegade truckers and threatening defecting concrete com-
panies with retaliation, or rely on government obstructionism,
such as the manipulation of the testing requirements for im-
ported cement.2 17
Thus, private bargaining among the involved industries and
among the various firms within the industries replaced the appli-
cation of statutory norms or formally promulgated administra-
tive regulations. As a result, the implementation of declining in-
dustries policy was considerably easier for MITI than it would
have been if MITI had not been able to rely on private actors to
formulate and carry out much of the policy. Declining indus-
tries policy, therefore, shares an ease of regulation with the pre-
vious case studies, but there is a distinct difference in degree.
Unlike in the LSRSL context, MITI could not simply refuse to
accept notifications and allow the private bargaining to follow its
own course more or less undisturbed.
Declining industries policy required active bureaucratic in-
tervention on at least two levels. First, as a prerequisite to dele-
gation, MITI had to be certain that the industry had the organi-
zational strength to control the market. In some sectors, as in
216, Id. at 17-18.
217. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (discussingJIS and manipulation
of testing standards for cement).
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ready-mix concrete, this meant strengthening the trade associa-
tions. 8 Second, the lack of legal means of market control
meant that bureaucratic intervention was necessary, even with
strong trade associations. The formal reporting requirements
under the statutes, which could be used indirectly to discover
the use of imports, meant MITI could act as an information
clearinghouse for the cartel. MITI's power to manipulate rele-
vant rules or procedures, such as the testing requirements for
imported cement, meant that MITI could erect additional barri-
ers to imports, supplementing the industries' own means of con-
trol.2 19 These did not need to be permanent or formal. If timed
correctly, they could play a decisive role in discouraging imports
without becoming visible enough to become a trade issue.
B. The Limitations of Privatized Regulation: The
Entrepreneurial Exception
Privatized regulation does not always succeed. Three in-
stances where privatized regulation failed entirely or partially to
achieve the sponsoring agency's goals include the gasoline im-
port cartel organized by MITI under the PIL, the declining in-
dustries cartel in the minimill sector of the steel industry, and
attempts by local governments to control land use, specifically
the size and shape of high rise buildings in residential areas. In
each instance, entrepreneurs challenged the adjustment pro-
cess, revealing the limitations and weaknesses of the privatized
regulation model.
One of the keys to privatized regulation is a cooperative pri-
vate sector with the unity and cohesion to create, monitor, and
enforce agreements. Entrepreneurs necessarily threaten
sectoral unity. They often introduce new ideas or technology
and tend to ignore group interests in favor of their own goals,
which are often growth, rather than maintenance, of market-
share. They are also willing to trade assurance of survival for the
chance of greater profits and frequently disdain the rhetoric of
consensus and harmony that permeates privatized regulation in
favor of the iconoclastic rhetoric of individualism and competi-
tion.
218. TILTON, supra note 160, at 92, 100.
219. Id. at 101.
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1. The Lions Oil Incident
Sometimes control of entrepreneurs is relatively easy, as
when the high costs of entry create a natural oligopoly and in-
crease the possibility of consensus, which was arguably true in
broadcasting and many declining sectors. Alternatively, trade as-
sociations in cooperation with government agencies may take di-
rect action to enforce the cartel, as was characteristic of the in-
terlocking cement-concrete-construction cartel, which required
constant maintenance through devices ranging from following
"criminal" trucks to shifting customs standards. When active en-
forcement is difficult, embarrassing politically, or simply too ex-
pensive, paying the entrepreneur to comply may be the cheapest
and most effective means of control. In some circumstances,
however, none of these measures works, and extraordinary meas-
ures become necessary. Such was the case with Taiji Sat6,
founder of the Lions Oil Company.
220
To manyJapanese and U.S. commentators fed up with what
they characterized as "Japan Inc.", Sat6 was a dream come true
when he appeared on the international scene in 1983. Instead
of the scion of an established family, Sat6 is the illegitimate son
of the spurned mistress of a small time blackmarketeer. Instead
of the buttoned down graduate of an elite university, he is the
graduate of a junior college, all the more remarkable because
two year colleges in Japan are predominantly finishing schools
for prospective brides and overwhelmingly female. Moreover, as
a former amateur fighter and street brawler, Sat6 prefers boxing
to golf.22 1
Most importantly, however, Sat6 knew how to work the mar-
ket and had a taste for profit that he pursued vigorously and with
utter disregard for its cost to his competitors. Sat6 began with a
single, independent gas station. He bought surplus gasoline on
the spot market, priced aggressively, and soon was able to steal
customers from his affiliated competitors. Rival station owners
cut his hoses, adulterated his tanks, physically attacked him, and
sent dozens of drivers to his stations for Y500 of gas, each paying
with Y10,000 notes and insisting on the full panoply of service,
220. See Frank K Upham, The Man Who Would Import: A Cautiony Tale About Buck-
ing the System in Japan, 17 J. JAPANESE STUD. 323, 327 (1991) [hereinafter Cautionay
Tale] (describing Lions Oil Incident).
221. See generally id. (discussing Taiji Sat6's personal background).
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including emptying ash trays, checking the air, and wiping the
windshield. When Sat6 complained of harassment, the police
not only refused to protect him-he was the problem, they ar-
gued, for "destroying order in the industry"-but actually ar-
rested him for using excessive force in his own self defense.223
Sat6 prospered despite his tormentors. 4 He quickly ex-
panded to a chain of stations and began looking for a source of
gasoline that would be both cheaper than the domestic spot
market and would allow him independence from the domestic
refiners whose control of the distribution system denied him
complete market freedom. He quickly realized that imported
gasoline would meet both these requirements. Because of the
PIL-based sectoral cartel, Japanese gas prices were well over the
world market price, and the diversity of the world's petroleum
refining industry meant that finding suppliers should not be a
serious problem. Furthermore, importing gasoline, as well as
other refined petroleum products, was perfectly legal.2 25 All
Sat6 had to do under the PIL was notify MITI of his plans.2 2 6
Sat6 found his supplier in the Singapore Petroleum Com-
pany, which already had a lucrative business selling naphtha to
Japan with MITI's blessing, and secured the necessary line of
credit from his long-term bank, J6nan Credit Bank. Sat6 filed
the necessary documents on December 3, 1984. The MITI offi-
cial receiving the notification objected that his action would un-
dermine the national policy of supporting domestic refining ca-
pacity and maintaining low kerosene prices. Sat6 simply re-
sponded that he had a legal right to register and that he would
leave national policy to others. On December 6, Sat6 held a
press conference to announce that he was importing 3000 kiloli-
ters of gasoline and planned to sell it at ten percent below the
222. Id. at 328.
223. Id.
224. Cautionary Tale, supra note 220, at 328. Lions' survival illustrates the funda-
mental weakness of privatized regulation, the ability and willingness of cartel members
to cheat. To survive, Lions had to have gasoline, the only source of which were the
refiners that constituted the cartel and that were in cartelized relationships with Lions'
retail competitors. That Sat6 seems never to have had difficulty getting gasoline from
domestic refiners means that he was always able to find refiners willing to sell to him on
the spot market despite the threat he posed not only to his retail rivals, but also poten-
tially to the survival of the import cartel.
225. Id. at 329.
226. PIL, Law No. 128 of 1962 (Japan).
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current prevailing price. 27
The tanker full of 3000 kiloliters of Lions Oil gasoline, ac-
companied by a fleet of small boats and helicopters from the
domestic and international media, entered Kobe harbor on De-
cember 28, 1984. The ship was duly offloaded into bonded stor-
age tanks to await customs clearance on January 7, 1985. Sens-
ing that a dramatic victory over establishment Japan, a victory
unprecedented at least in the degree of international attention
and interest, was soon to be his, Sat6 passed the New Year's holi-
day in a celebratory glow.
Sat6's victory celebration ended on January 4 when the
manager ofJ6nan Credit Bank arrived at his office. Skipping the
usual New Year's greetings, he tearfully reported, "[w] e can not
continue financingl It's not my idea, but .... We just can't
finance any company that does not follow national policy."22 18 It
appears that the Ministry of Finance ("MOF") had issued gui-
dance against granting credit to any company violating national
policy and J6nan Credit Bank's headquarters would not allow
the manager to disregard the MOF's instructions, despite their
legally voluntary nature. Without credit, Lions Oil could not pay
the customs duties due in three days and Sat6 faced the prospect
of imminent ruin.
Sat6 was rescued by an unlikely savior. On January 7 and 8,
Sat6 went to MITI headquarters and signed an agreement for-
mally accepting MITI's administrative guidance against the im-
port of gasoline and renouncing any intention to import gaso-
line in the future. Sat6 then signed a written request that MITI
use its good offices with the cartel to find a buyer for the current
cargo at commercial rates, and assure future allocation of gaso-
line from cartel members at the previous conditions and
prices. 29 Thereafter, Nippon Oil, whose president was the
chairman of the Petroleum Association of Japan and, thus, the
titular chief of the cartel, agreed to purchase the offloaded gaso-
line. To make sure that all watching understood the import of
their victory, MITI and the association required that the
purchase not go forward under the official designation of "gaso-
227. See Cautionary Tale, supra note 220, at 330.
228. TAji SATO, ORE WA TS0SANSHO NI BARASARETA [I WAS BUTCHERED BY MITI] 1,
147 (1986).
229. Id. at 162-63.
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line", which would have been a formal violation of national pol-
icy, but as "naphtha."2 3 0
Despite his apparent capitulation, Sat6 was not finished. He
immediately began looking for a secure line of credit and a new
import contract. He soon found the necessary financing from a
variety of new sources, including a foreign bank, but finding the
gasoline was more difficult. First the Singapore Petroleum Com-
pany, mindful of its profitable naphtha business, refused a sec-
ond contract. Sat6 headed for the Philippines on February 13,
where he signed a contract for 4500 kiloliters to be delivered in
April. The Japanese Government countered with a threat of for-
eign aid delays to the Philippines, however, and by April the deal
was dead. Finally, Sat6 thought that he had found a supplier, an
undisclosed People's Republic of China refinery operating
through a Hong Kong broker, that was beyond the reach ofJapa-
nese pressure. Sat6 held another press conference on May 24 to
announce that a tanker with cheap gasoline would be arriving in
Osaka on June 2.2s
The tanker never arrived. When Sat6 called his broker, he
was told that a previous report that the ship had been loaded was
erroneous. Further inquiries indicated that some unexplained
"difficulty in production" had caused an indefinite delay. Sat6
eventually learned from Chinese representatives that they could
not export gasoline to Lions Oil at that time. They would, how-
ever, be glad to sell him naphtha.
Sat6 was defeated, the crisis was over, and national energy
policy was safe. Sat6 had successfully demonstrated, however,
the vulnerability of the gasoline cartel to a determined and so-
phisticated attack. Although Sat6 was no longer in a position to
challenge the cartel, other entrepreneurs undoubtedly waited in
the wings. As a result, MITI and the Petroleum Association con-
vinced the cabinet that they needed further legal power to main-
tain the cartel in the future, and in 1985 the Diet passed the
Provisional Measures Law on the Importation of Specified Petro-
leum Products.232 The law banned the import of gasoline with-
230. Id.
231. Id. at 135-44. This arrangement was particularly gratifying to Sat6 because it
reprised the strategy of one of his personal heroes, Kjir6 Matsukata, who had defied
government and cartel wishes by importing "red oil" from the Soviet Union in the early
1930s. Id.; SAMUELS, supra note 5, at 175-76.
232. Cautionary Ta/e, supra note 220, at 336. The Provisional Measures Law on the
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out a permit and established, as necessary criteria for a permit,
that the prospective importer have domestic refining capacity
and adequate storage facilities. Because the petroleum industry
already suffered from overcapacity, no outsider was likely to in-
vest in the refining capacity or storage facilities necessary to
meet these criteria, which meant that the law effectively limited
import permits to the members of the existing gasoline cartel.
The law, disingenuously described by MITI to the international
media and its trade partners as a "liberalization" of the gasoline
market, had transformed the illegal sectoral cartel into a legal
cartel directly enforceable by compulsory administrative orders.
Sat6 entitled his memoir of these events I Was Butchered by
M!TI and successfully portrayed himself to the media as a free
trade warrior slain by the greedy oil companies and the all pow-
erful MITI."' 3 The story is more complicated. Sat6 had defied
the rules of privatized regulation and come within a hair of suc-
cess. Moreover, the path was open to others to attempt to break
the cartel after securing a foreign line of credit. Stopping such
attempts likely would have required increasingly open bullying
of foreign governments, companies, and banks, a cost much too
high for Japan to pay more than once. 3 4 Instead, the Govern-
ment decided to forsake privatized regulation and move to
straight command and control regulation by requiring a license
to do what had previously been legally unrestricted.
Formalizing regulation in the petroleum sector ran few
risks. Only established domestic refiners, all cartel members,
could qualify to import gasoline, and none of the refiners was in
the economic position to risk open market competition.
Importation of Specified Petroleum Products was passed in December 1985 and ex-
pired in 1996. See Tokutei sekiyuseihin yunyti zantei sochih6 [Provisional Measures Law on the
Importation of Specified Petroleum Products], Law No. 95 of 1985 (Japan).
233. See Cautionary Tale, supra note 220, at 323 (describing Lions Oil incident via
review of Sat6's book). The full story of the Lions Oil Incident may never be publicly
known. MITI officials argue privately that Sat6 was never really interested in importing
gasoline or breaking the cartel. They argue that Sat6 instead intended from the begin-
ning to extort a payoff from the Petroleum Federation. At the time, there were rumors
to the same effect, stating that Sat6 had sold some of his stations to major refiners at
inflated prices as part of the payoff. Such factual ambiguity is precisely what makes
privatized regulation both possible and so resistant to attack.
234. The U.S. Government was largely silent during the Lions Oil saga, despite the
intense media attention. The reason, according to one United States Trade Represen-
tative source, was that U.S. refiners were not in a position to export gasoline to Japan at
that time.
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Neither MITI nor the industry, therefore, needed to worry that a
member would apply for an import permit without thorough
consultation with the trade association and MITI itself. Many
sectors of the regulated economy, however, are not so settled.
The prospect of an outsider or defector makes formalization
much riskier, because it opens up the process to the possibility of
direct judicial review and the straightforward application of stat-
utory criteria to a process that all participants, save the outsider,
would prefer to remain informal. It was generally more prefera-
ble to manage policy cartels informally, putting up with occa-
sional cheating, than to exercise formal, legal power and run the
risk of placing control over the particular sector's future in the
hands of the courts or, even worse, the market.
2. The Minimill Sector
235
Another episode of outlaw entrepreneurs is the story of To-
kyo Steel Manufacturing ("TSM") and its father and son presi-
dents, Tar6 and Masanari Iketani. Although personally more
conventional, the Iketanis shared both Sat6's acute business
sense and his vigorous opposition to government or private ma-
nipulation of the market. Unlike Sat6, however, they were suc-
cessful in their defiance of cartelization and triumphed in a
thirty year war with MITI, the steel cartel, and the general trad-
ing companies.2 3 6
Minimills employ a different technology from the more fa-
miliar integrated steel mills. Instead of using blast furnaces to
process iron ore into pig iron and then steel, minimills use elec-
tric arc furnaces to turn scrap into finished steel products. They
operate on a much smaller scale and are much more flexible in
their production functions. Until recently, they occupied a mar-
ginal niche within the steel industry, producing relatively low
quality and undifferentiated products sold primarily to the con-
struction industry. Within Japan minimills traditionally did not
enjoy the long term contracts, stable financing and marketing
relationships, and subdued competition that characterized the
integrated mills. These apparent disadvantages, however, dis-
235. This section of the Article relies heavily on the unpublished work of Gregory
Noble. See generally NOBLE, supra note 164, at 1 (ch. 3) (analyzing Japanese industrial
policy in steel minimill sector). The works of Uriu and Tilton confirm Noble's
conclusions.
236. Id. at 5 (ch. 3).
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guised unappreciated competitive advantages. Compared to
blast furnaces, electric arc furnaces can be turned on and off
cheaply, can operate at low production volumes efficiently, and
can be built, upgraded, moved, and shut down easily. This flexi-
bility combined with the Iketanis' willingness to introduce new
technology and enter new markets to enable TSM to flaunt the
interests of managed competition and emerge victorious. 23 7
Minimills were a small and unstable adjunct to the steel in-
dustry in the 1960s. They consisted largely of independent fam-
ily firms with only loose ties to the integrated firms that domi-
nated the industry. They were useful for recycling scrap and fill-
ing small lot orders, but subject to the wide fluctuations of
international scrap prices on the supply side and the cyclical na-
ture of the construction industry on the demand side. Their fi-
nancial instability made them vulnerable to acquisition by the
integrated companies, and despite the Government's willingness
to mediate market sharing agreements to help them survive,
many were acquired in the 1950s and 1960s and converted into
downstream fabricators and dignified resting places for execu-
tives retiring early from the integrated firms.
In the early 1970s, minimills were in a period of rapid ex-
pansion. The capacity of minimills increased sixty percent
from 1972 to 1974, and the concern among MITI bureaucrats
shifted from protecting minimills from acquisition, to control-
ling their investment rate and encouraging self-restraint. Be-
cause steel prices were high, however, the minimills were eco-
nomically successful and largely uninterested in cooperation.
MITI realized that discipline could be imposed, reckless expan-
sion checked, and excess competition avoided only by consolida-
tion. MITI reversed its previous policy of protecting minimills
from competition and urging the integrated steel makers to
enter the minimills' markets and establish "cooperative tie-ups"
with them. This consolidation through "adjustment" remained
the policy of both MITI and the industry for the next twenty
years, extending over several periods of boom and bust for the
minimills.2 9
237. See generally id. (discussing background of Japanese minimill sector).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 10-11 (ch. 3). This policy was pursued not only by MITI and the inte-
grated steel industry led by Nippon Steel, but also with the cooperation of the general
trading companies, the nine regional electricity companies, and any others who could
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Fluctuations in construction demand, high levels of invest-
ment-related debt, and trading company and government sup-
port over the next several business cycles enabled the major steel
companies to bring many of the independents under their con-
trol.2 4 ° MITI worked to accelerate the consolidation of the in-
dustry through the promotion of mergers and the encourage-
ment of production, investment, and price cartels. Its role was
classic "adjustment": facilitating industry groups with names like
Management Committee on Basic Problems that conducted
surveys and invariably advocated concerted measures to reduce
capacity; arranging private financing for firms that cut produc-
tion; using its regional offices to monitor cartel activity; mediat-
ing market allocation agreements; creating loan guarantee funds
for cooperative firms; ensuring that government procurement
for aid to developing countries was limited to suppliers comply-
ing with the appropriate pricing and investment conditions; urg-
ing general trading companies to refrain from undercutting car-
tel prices; and generally running interference for the industry's
goals in the larger political and bureaucratic world.2 41
These efforts bore fruit. Many independent firms were ab-
sorbed into the integrated companies, but the mainstream met
failure at one important point, the control of outsiders. Except
for a brief period when the FTC approved a recession cartel
under the AML,2 4 2 MITI lacked legally compulsory measures to
enforce jurisdictional cartels. TSM in particular resisted MITI's
legally, non-binding tools of industrial policy. The Iketanis ridi-
culed the rhetoric of duty and harmony and talked instead in
the language of competition and efficiency. 243  Above all,
Masanari Iketani urged that steel should not become another
perpetual dependent of the government like the textile industry.
bring leverage to bear on the minimills to give up their independence and join the
mainstream of the steel industry.
240. The time period under analysis has been compressed for purposes of this
Article. Not all of the devices mentioned were used during any particular period, but
all were present over the period under discussion, from 1975 to 1995.
241. NOBLE, supra note 164, at 12-31 (ch. 3). There were reports that MITI even
"cheated" on its own cartel by offering permission to build new capacity in the future if
independent firms would comply with the cartel. Id. at 29 (ch. 3) (describing incident
in 1977 that convinced three of nine remaining outsiders to defect and join mainstream
cartel).
242. Id. at 21, 24-25 (ch. 3).
243. Id. at 14 (ch. 3). For example, Iketani, at a time when MITI was pressing for
capacity reduction in order to raise prices, cut TSM's prices.
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Furthermore, TSM was in the financial and economic position to
ignore the threats of retaliation and prosper without the security
of cartels. TSM had no debt, had constantly streamlined its op-
erations, and used the newest technology.244 By the mid-1970s
when the steel industry and MITI were attempting to sustain the
cartel, TSM had transformed itself from a marginal player into a
firm capable of taking advantage of the inherent flexibility of
minimills not only to survive, but also to move into the hereto-
fore sacrosanct markets of the integrated mills.
Economic resources are not determinative in the decision
to resist or cooperate with the efforts of privatized regulation
and are not sufficient by themselves to succeed. Almost by defi-
nition, the targets of "adjustment" are economically successful
firms. What TSM had besides deep financial resources and a
technological edge was entrepreneurial leadership willing to
spurn the guaranteed profits of going along and to take the inev-
itable risk of competition, even in the face of industry and bu-
reaucratic hostility. The Iketanis were not ready to relax and en-
joy the fruits of their efficiency within the mainstream, even if
this included the chance to be the leader of the "convoy."2 45
TSM also had powerful allies outside the steel industry.
When Sat6 of Lions Oil was holding his press conferences prom-
ising cheap gasoline to Japanese drivers, no one except a be-
mused international media seemed to take his side. The under-
lying rationale of MITI's energy policy, independent refining ca-
pacity and cheap kerosene for heating Japanese homes, made a
lot of political, if not economic, sense to many groups, including
the LDP, the FTC, major Japanese banks, and the Keidanren. A
breakdown in the national gasoline cartel had little to offer to
most important players, and the refiners' cartel did not directly
threaten the economic independence of other sectors. Giving
the steel industry and MITI the tools necessary to rein in TSM,
however, was opposed by the FTC, a minority faction within the
LDP, most opposition parties, editorials in the Nihon Keizai
Shinbun, and significant elements within the business elite, in-
cluding leaders of the construction industry.2 1
244. Id. at 15 (ch. 3).
245. Id. at 43 (ch. 3). Among the carrots offered for cooperation was the chair of
the trade association.
246. Id. at 25-28 (ch. 3). These entities opposed MITI's draft of the SDIL.
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As a result of this political disunity, the steel industry and
MITI were never successful in acquiring the legal power to en-
force the cartel directly. Persistent efforts by MITI and the steel
industry to enable, encourage, and coerce the absorption of the
minimills into the mainstream, nonetheless, succeeded incre-
mentally. With each market downturn, a few more independent
firms were cajoled or coerced into mergers and tie-ups with ma-
jor producers. By the late 1980s, only TSM remained defiantly
outside the mainstream. TSM continued on as a strong in-
dependent competitor, even though other minimills, acting in
conjunction with the wishes of their larger parent firms, over-
took TSM in terms of marketshare. 247
3. Land Use Control by Local Governments
Local efforts to control land use began in the early 1970s
when urban and suburban governments used a form of adminis-
trative guidance known as "outline guidance" to slow down and
regulate real estate construction. 48 Outline guidance required
real estate developers to discuss their construction plans with
neighboring residents and adjust them in order to gain the resi-
dents' approval.2 49 Because municipalities did not have the legal
authority to pass binding ordinances controlling land use, out-
line guidance did not have the force of law, and cities could not
247. Id. at 39-40, 46 (ch. 3) (discussing fate of other "maverick" minimill firms in
Japan).
248. This section is based on the following work: TATsuo INOUE ET AL., KY6SEI HE
NO BOKEN [THE CHALLENGE OF CoNVnvALrrY] 8-35, 122-90 (1992) (defining "conviviality"
and application of conviviality to land'use); Ky6ko Isa, Kunrin suredomo kin6 sezu: Jidai ni
okurehajimeta nihon no h6ritsu [Reigning but not Functioning: Japanese Law Behind the
Times], Axiu, July 7, 1992, at 24; Mark Ramseyer, On the Non-Reviewability of Administra-
tive Guidance and Other Myths, (unpublished draft on file with author); Tsuneo Suzuki,
Y6k6shid6 no fujunshu to todokedesho no henreisochi [The Return of Notifications Because of a
Failure to Obey Outline Guidance], comment on the Judgment of the Utsunomiya District
Court of Feb. 28, 1991 (on file with author); Musashino shich6 kyisui ky6hi jiken
jdkokushinkettei ni tsuite [Regarding the Decision in the Appeal of the Case of the Refusal to
Supply Water by the Mayor of Musashino City], 954JURIsuTo 31 (Apr. 15, 1990); Y6k6shid6
no aratana tenkai [New Developments in Outline Guidance], NENP6 JICHiGAKU, 1994, at 94;
Katsuya Uga, Y6k6shid6: Futankin o chishin toshite [Outline Guidance with a Focus on Ex-
acted Payments], 880 JuiusuTo 106 (Mar. 15, 1987); Michael Young, Judicial Review of
Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 923 (1984).
249. Young, supra note 248, at 931-32. Outline guidance also generally required
developers to donate land or money for public services. See Uga, supra note 248, at 106;
Young, supra note 248, at 923. This Article focuses on the negotiations component
because of its apparent similarity to privatized regulation under the LSRSL.
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enforce it directly. Instead, unless the developer complied with
the guidance, cities refused to supply municipal services, such as
water or sewage hookups, or grant permits necessary to construc-
tion, such as access to city streets for oversize vehicles.25 °
On the surface, outline guidance reproduced the situation
faced by large stores under the LSRSL. Whenever a developer
wanted to build a high rise building in a residential neighbor-
hood, developers faced open-ended negotiations with a diffuse
group of adversaries, each potentially seeking self-interested con-
cessions. 25 1 There were, however, fundamentally important dif-
ferences. In the LSRSL context, the regional MITI office may
not have had the legal right to refuse to accept notifications, but
MITI's Establishment Law did give MITI jurisdiction over the
distribution industry. The LSRSL, furthermore, gave MITI spe-
cific power to structure the terms of a large store's opening. The
Construction Standards Law ("CSL"), in contrast, denied munic-
ipalities jurisdiction over construction standards and the design
plans of the built environment.2 52 The law gave those powers
exclusively to the MOC and the central government. The locali-
ties' position in terms of legal resources, therefore, was substan-
tially weaker than that of any of the agencies discussed thus far.
The municipalities' economic or social situation exacer-
bated their legal weakness. There was no way to create a win-win
situation similar to those created by cartelization in privatized
regulation in other sectors. Any concessions wrested from the
builder meant higher costs or lower profits with little opportu-
nity to pass them on to the eventual purchasers.
The political situation was also very different. In the LSRSL
context, MITI was acting consistently with dominant political
250. Young, supra note 248, at 932-33. Had the guidance been a valid local ordi-
nance, the city could have enforced it directly, perhaps with fines for excessive height
or orders to halt illegal construction. Local governments, however, did not have the
legal power to enact building requirements that went beyond those set by the MOC
under the Construction Standards Law. See Kenchiku kijunh6 [Construction Standards
Law], Law No. 201 of 1950 (Japan) [hereinafter CSL]. Local governments possessed
delegated jurisdiction over key permits and services, but their power was derivative of
the central government and could only be exercised in accord with the underlying
statutes for road transport, water, sewage, and so forth. Young, supra note 248, at 932.
Cities had no legal right to withhold or condition approval on grounds that the devel-
oper had not secured the permission for the proposed construction from neighboring
parties. Isa, supra note 248, at 24.
251. Young, supra note 248, at 932, 942.
252. Id. at 932.
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forces on both the national and local levels. Until the beginning
of the SII talks, no one was actively opposing the LSRSL because
no organized interest was being hurt by it. Similarly, "adjust-
ment" in the broadcasting and transportation industries was un-
dertaken with the approval of most if not all powerful groups
affected. In declining industries policy, the perceived need for
stability of supply in basic industries and the economic rents gen-
erated by effective cartels insured general political support.
The municipalities issuing outline guidance, on the other
hand, were out of the mainstream politically. They were typi-
cally controlled by anti-LDP coalitions or the Japan Socialist
Party. The LDP and the central government opposed outline
guidance and worked actively to eliminate it both through the
MOC, whose bureaucratic, political, and legal authority outline
guidance openly disdained, and eventually through the Ministry
of Justice ("MOJ").
To summarize, local governments were attempting to force
land developers to make significant financial sacrifices without
the slightest legal authority. Nor did local governments have any
resources with which to reward developers in return for coopera-
tion. Although often passionately supported by their own con-
stituents, local mayors were opposed by the LDP, a united cen-
tral bureaucracy, and the relevant business community.
Into this setting came Kiharu Yamada, owner and operator
of Yamaki Construction Company and a vigorous opponent of
outline guidance, particularly as practiced by Musashino City, a
Tokyo suburb known for its early and aggressive use of the prac-
tice. Yamada's approach to informal requests for cooperation
with government policy is reminiscent of Lions Oil's Sat6's re-
sponse to MITI's evocation of national policy: "You're ordering
something that ain't a statute or a regulation, and you're forcing
it on us. You're violating the separation of powers." As a parting
shot to Mayor Kihachir6 Got6 of Musashino, Yamada relied on
that supposed favorite U.S. aphorism, "You've got a problem?
Sue me."253
Yamada then proceeded to honor the guidance primarily in
the breach and reacted with vigorous litigation whenever chal-
lenged by either the city or neighbors. The litigation soon be-
253. Ramseyer, supra note 248, at 19 (quoting Kuni v. Got6, 1114 HANREI JIHO 13
(Tokyo Dist. Ct., Feb. 24, 1984) (Japan)).
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came the focal point of a two decade battle between Got6 and
Yamada. The latter initially sued the city in the 1970s for injunc-
tive relief when faced with refusals to respond to requests for
water and sewage hookups, then followed up with claims for
compensation for damages suffered during the delay. Yamada
was joined in his battle by the MOJ, which prosecuted Got6 in
1978 for criminal dereliction of duty in refusing to act on
Yamaki's application for water service. The Supreme Court
eventually affirmed Got6's conviction in 1989.54 The ultimate
judicial insult, however, was Yamada's successful taxpayer's suit
requiring Got6 to repay Musashino City for the cost of the
mayor's criminal defense. 55
The result of this successful litigation campaign was a series
of suits by other contractors in the early and mid-1980s request-
ing return of funds contributed to local infrastructure funds.
Although generally unsuccessful in the lower courts, the
Supreme Court decided in their favor in a 1993 decision 56 that
essentially ended the twenty year history of coercive outline gui-
dance with a ringing reaffirmation of the legal nature of admin-
istrative guidance in general and outline guidance in particular
stating, "outline guidance is not based on law. It is, for the
[city], simply a set of internal standards that cover the adminis-
trative guidance to be given entrepreneurs. Through measures
like the refusal to provide water service contracts, however, it ef-
fectively forces entrepreneurs to comply."257 The coercive na-
ture of outline guidance meant that its noble motives and lauda-
ble goals were insufficient to make it legal. The Supreme Court
ruled as follows:
Granted, the outline guidance was designed to protect the
living environment of Musashino citizens from uncontrolled
development. Granted, too, the administrative guidance en-
joyed broad support from Musashino citizens. Nonetheless,
administrative guidance may properly seek only contributions
that are voluntary. Because the conduct above violated that
254. See Suzuki, supra note 248.
255. Ramseyer, supra note 248, at 23 (citing Got6 v. Yamada, 1354 HANREI JIHO 62
(Sup. CL, Mar. 23, 1990) (Japan))
256. See Ramseyer, supra note 248, at 25 (citing Takahashi v. Musashino shi, 47
SAIBAN MINSH 574 (S. CL, Feb. 18, 1993) (Japan)); see Suzuki, supra note 248; New Devel-
opments in Outline Guidance, supra note 248, at 94 (providing somewhat different inter-
pretation of these same cases).
257. Ramseyer, supra note 248, at 26 (translation by Ramseyer).
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principle, it was an illegal exercise of public power.258
4. The Entrepreneurial Exception and the Limits of
Administrative Guidance
Although it took almost two decades to do so, the outline
guidance cases simply confirmed what other cases in other con-
texts had earlier established. The refusal of government agen-
cies to accept and act on applications, notifications, or statutorily
based documents was illegal. 259  Because privatized regulation
frequently relies on precisely this practice to create the frame-
work for "adjustment" activities by the private sector, the success
of Yamada's litigation strategy raises the complex question of
how law interacts with other social, political, and economic fac-
tors in each iteration of privatized regulation and why entrepre-
neurs like Sat6 and others have not used similar techniques to
destroy privatized regulation in other contexts.
An initial answer is that litigation might not have been as
successful in other sectors. Unlike the clear illegality of outline
guidance, the bureaucratic promoters of privatized regulation in
other sectors had not only the legal right to be involved in the
sector but also in most cases a legal obligation to promote its
growth as well. The legitimacy of bureaucratic involvement, in
258. Id. (quoting Takahashi, 47 SAIaAN MINSHO at 574) (translation by Ramseyer).
259. One instance occurred in the setting of affirmative action benefits for
Burakumin, a historically discriminated against Japanese minority who have received
various forms of assistance for the last 30 years under both local and central govern-
ment programs. Because Burakumin are completely indistinguishable from otherJapa-
nese without a background check and because it became politically difficult for the
government to identify Burakumin directly, many local governments developed a sys-
tem of administering benefit programs that resembled privatized regulation in some
ways. The Osaka city government, for example, delegated the task of identifying who
was of Buraku origin to private organizations controlled by the Burakumin themselves.
To make this system work, the city would simply refuse to accept applications for bene-
fits unless the application had the seal of approval of the appropriate organization.
This system worked fine until a split occurred in the Burakumin community and the
organization refused to give its seal to anyone who belonged to the rival organization.
Members of the latter organization then bypassed the prior private approval stage, ap-
plied directly to the Osaka city government, and then sued when the city refused to take
action on the application without the necessary seal. The plaintiffs eventually won at
the Osaka High Court, and the city reformulated the private organization to include
members of both factions. See Higashi v. Oshima (Osaka H. Ct.,July 30, 1979) (transla-
tion of opinion on file with author). The city did not discontinue the delegation of
power itself. See Frank K. Upham, Ten Years of Affirmative Action for Japanese Burakumin:
A Preliminary Report on the Law on Special Measures for D6wa Projects, 13 LAw IN JAPAN 39
(1980) [hereinafter Ten Years of Affirmative Action].
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other words, might have made the courts more tolerant of extra-
legal means for reaching a policy goal that was at least arguably
within the agency's statutory jurisdiction. 6 ° As a result, poten-
tial litigants might have faced additional difficulty on both pro-
cedural and substantive levels. First, in a procedural action to
force an agency to take action on or simply accept a plaintiffs
application, the time during which the agency could "reason-
ably" delay might have been judicially extended to the point
where it usually made more sense to participate in the give and
take of privatized regulation than to fight. This appears to be
true for Ogura in his relations with the MOT, where litigation
was a valuable tactical tool to force the agency to act in extreme
cases, but not a strategic means to destroy the system as a whole.
More telling, however, is the likely substantive result for the
litigant after the agency was forced to act on the merits of its
application. In outline guidance, reaching the merits virtually
guaranteed the developer success. Unless the locality was able to
show extreme behavior on the part of the plaintiff, it had no
discretion, and its denial of a sewage hook-up, for example, was
automatically illegal.2 61 In other contexts, however, a ministry's
decision would be discretionary. A court may be reluctant to
overturn discretionary actions even if they seemed more calcu-
lated to uphold the process of privatized regulation than to
achieve the goals of the statute. In other words, the agency
would likely be able to disguise a decision intended to maintain
the discipline of privatized regulation as simply an exercise of its
statutory discretion.
A potential plaintiff's difficulty becomes even greater be-
cause each local iteration of privatized regulation is part of a na-
tional system supported by a unitary bureaucracy. Enforcement
by the MPT, the MOT, or MITI is not limited to direct retalia-
260. In its decision in favor of Yamada, the Japanese Supreme Court specifically
left open the question of whether there might be circumstances where a developer's
refusal to cooperate with outline guidance would justify the denial of municipal serv-
ices. See Takahashi, 47 SAmAN MINSHO at 574. Ramseyer argues convincingly that the
body of outline guidance cases indicates that these circumstances will be rare in that
context. See Ramseyer, supra note 248, at 23-26. In another context, however, where
the balance of legal and political resources is reversed, courts might act differently,
especially if the government can argue that the private party's behavior amounted to an
abuse of rights. But see Suzuki, supra note 248; New Developments in Outline Guidance,
supra note 248, at 94.
261. See Young, supra note 248, at 932.
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tion in a specific one shot game as it is when a locality is enforc-
ing outline guidance. A national ministry, at least when dealing
with a national firm, is involved in a much more complex rela-
tionship with a myriad of opportunities for punishing violators
formally or informally. In many instances, these opportunities
are extended even further when one ministry can convince an-
other to cooperate, as was the case with the MOF's disciplining
of Lions Oil and the joint actions taken by several government
agencies in creating and enforcing privatized regulation in the
cement cartel.
Although indirect bureaucratic action to enforce an illegal
cartel, as one might characterize the MOF's administrative gui-
dance to J6nan Credit Bank to cut off credit to Lions Oil, may
have been just as illegal in some abstract sense as Musashino
City's refusal to approve a road or water permit to Yamaki Con-
struction, the practical meaning would have been different.
Lions Oil would have lacked both standing and ripeness in an
administrative lawsuit, leaving only a tort action for damages
under the State Redress Law.262 Although these damages would
in theory have been sufficient, Lions Oil would have had great
difficulty proving three necessary elements. First, a court may
have found MOF's guidance legal. Advising banks to avoid loans
that contravene national policy may seem unexceptional to Japa-
nese courts, especially if the guidance remains voluntary. Sec-
ond, because J6nan was not compelled to abide by the guidance,
the causal connection between the guidance and J6nan's deci-
sion would have been weakened. Third, Lions Oil may have had
difficulty showing actual injury, since it did in the end sell its
imported gasoline, as naptha, to Nippon Oil, and Japanese have
in the AML context been very reluctant to recognize legal causa-
tion for economic injuries.
For these reasons and perhaps others, the legal difficulty of
challenging privatized regulation would have been substantial in
most circumstances, but it is likely that the general lack of legal
challenges owes more to the benefits of privatized regulation to
all participants than to its ability to survive judicial scrutiny. For
example, most real estate developers complied with outline gui-
dance for a decade or more, leading one to suspect that either
the benefits of compliance or the costs of litigating may be
262. Kokka baishdh6 [State Redress law], Law No. 125 of 1947 (Japan).
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higher than they appear even in the more or less zero sum game
of outline guidance. 63 Both the benefits of going along and the
costs of open defiance are much higher in most privatized regu-
lation, where cartelization ensures not only guaranteed survival
for the weak, but also extra profits for the efficient.
In these nurturing conditions, it is only the outsider or the
maverick that will object to the preservation of the system. The
most directly affected outsider, of course, was the consumer, and
the standing and ripeness doctrines of Japanese administrative
law effectively eliminated any legal avenue of attack for consum-
ers and even many insiders. Examples include dissatisfied small
stores in the LSRSL context or advertisers or other media in the
broadcasting context. This still leaves room for mavericks like
the Iketanis and Sat6 who see privatized regulation as creating
opportunities for profit rather than for complacency. As the sa-
gas of both Lions Oil and TSM demonstrate, however, a maver-
ick had better be prepared for a prolonged battle before victory
can be assured. In most instances of privatized regulation, more-
over, the maverick will be battling not only the bureaucracy and
the unified members of its own industry, but also often members
of upstream and downstream industries. 64
263. Interviews with academic observers of land use practices in Japan report that
most developers still comply with municipal guidance in most instances. The level and
nature of exaction were affected by Yamada's Construction's litigation campaign, but
the practice continues. For a selection of cases and literature on the U.S. practice, see
ELLICKSON & BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS, (Chapter Three: Zoning Changes and the
Rights of Neighbors) (unpublished draft on file with author). This is not surprising
given that developers in the United States also face quasi legal exaction. It may simply
be cheaper to go along with "reasonable" demands than to fight. Alternatively, the
donations may get the developers better treatment than they are legally entitled to. In
other words, donations may function as an open bribe made not to an individual offi-
cial but to the city itself.
264. Sat6, for example, had a clear legal right to import gasoline, as clear as that of
Yamada to build and Iketani to produce steel. Sat6, however, lacked powerful allies and
financial staying power. No one, not even the U.S. Government or business commu-
nity, rallied to his cause, and he did not have the strength to buck the system alone.
Iketani, too, was a maverick of sorts and eventually became a pariah within some parts
of the steel industry. At the beginning of his battle, however, he was typical of the
minimill sector in that he was too small to be worthy of attention by the major players.
He was also an astute businessman, who chose his battles carefully and who avoided the
corporate debt that would have made TSM vulnerable to acquisition during recessions.
Most importantly, by the time the battle over minimills really closed, Iketani had power-
ful allies in opposing the inclusion of compulsory legal power in the declining indus-
tries statutes, including the United States and the Japanese FTC. Unlike in the cement
and ready-mix concrete cartels, there was no industry-wide consensus on the impor-
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Local governments like Musashino City, therefore, faced
political and legal obstacles that are not usually present in priva-
tized regulation, but outline guidance may have faltered for
structural reasons as well as political and legal ones. Unlike
privatized regulation, where members of the same or related in-
dustries negotiate among themselves on a horizontal basis, the
structure of outline guidance was vertical. It fit the traditional
model of command and control regulation neatly so that the
lines between the regulator operating in the public sphere and
the regulated business operating in the private sphere were
clear. As a result, the bureaucratic steps were discrete enough to
become the objects of administrative litigation, and the disap-
pointed contractors were in precisely the position vis-d-vis the
municipality to have standing to sue. 265 The local governments
were not delegating regulatory power to an organized industry
group ready to use it to establish and maintain a cartel, but
rather were ordering individual members of a hostile industry to
make unilateral sacrifices.
In doing so, local governments were relying on administra-
tive guidance to accomplish what would ordinarily be done with
clear and compulsory legal authority. That they failed merely
illustrates that administrative guidance can not replace legally
authoritative regulation outside of the framework of privatized
regulation. It is also further evidence of the point that it is not
administrative guidance that is distinctive about the Japanese bu-
reaucracy, but the incentive framework and legal nature of priva-
tized regulation within which it operates. Once that framework
is absent or breaks down, administrative guidance may be no
more powerful in Japan than informal guidance is in the United
States.
C. Characteristics and Limitations of Privatized Regulation
With the lessons of the entrepreneurial exception in mind,
the characteristics and limitations that define privatized regula-
tance of maintaining stability in the sector. Finally, by the mid-1980s when most of the
other independents had been absorbed, TSM's lone status as an outsider began to work
to its advantage as it was able to free ride on the industry cartel with little chance of
effective countermeasures.
265. The disappointed contractors were in precisely the same legal position as the
Burakumin in the Osaka affirmative action context. See supra note 259 (discussing
Burakumin affirmative action litigation).
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tion can be identified. Most obvious is the determinative role of
private parties under ordinary circumstances. In each case, the
public agency charged with making decisions under the applica-
ble legal rule delegated that power to private parties. Although
the statutes frequently envisioned a consultative role for quasi-
public committees, the agency, whenever possible, substituted
wholesale delegation for consultation and used its formal power
solely to ratify the private decision that emerged. When full del-
egation was not possible, the government played various facilitat-
ing roles. In declining industries policy, this included inter-min-
isterial cooperation to create the private entities necessary to
manage a successful cartel. In transportation licensing it meant
eliminating applicants on arbitrary criteria, and in broadcasting
it meant finding the right person to bring the various interests
together.2 66 But rarely did it mean independent decision-mak-
ing by the agency according to statutory criteria.
A second commonality follows naturally from the first and is
a key to the structure of the system. The legal norms that should
have dictated the process and results of regulatory action were
largely irrelevant. The technical requirements concerning floor-
space or market conditions promulgated by MITI under the
LSRSL played no role in the bargaining among small merchants
and chain stores in the 1980s. Nor was the "public welfare" crite-
rion of the Broadcasting and Radio Wave laws an apparent factor
in the bargaining that led to a single applicant for broadcast
licenses under the MPT. Even when formal statutory power was
invoked, as occurred most frequently in the transportation con-
text, the MOT avoided the application of substantive criteria. In-
deed, in many instances the regulatory result was not only unre-
lated to statutory norms but technically illegal, either because
the result was at odds with the formal goals of the legislation or
because it was a violation of the Anti-monopoly Law.
The law's irrelevance in most instances of privatized regula-
tion was only possible because the doctrines of Japanese adminis-
trative law insulated the adjustment process from judicial review
by most interests injured by it. The standing doctrine makes ju-
dicial review unavailable to most outsiders, and the ripeness doc-
266. With respect to Tokyo Metropolitan Television, the MPT made the basic deci-
sions itself outside of the formal procedures and then let the applicants fill in the de-
tails.
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trine prevents insiders from suing until the process is largely
completed. Privatized regulation is structured so that insiders
generally have more to lose by litigation than they could hope to
gain, further decreasing the chance of judicial intervention.
Even in the exceptional case, as recounted by President Ogura
of Yamato Transport Co., litigation is seen more as a wake up
call to the bureaucrats than as an attempt to vindicate the statu-
tory process.
The lack of legal control over the process is exacerbated by
its decentralized nature. One could imagine an extra-legal pro-
cess that was nonetheless governed by clear criteria created and
enforced by bureaucratic authority. These non-statutory criteria
might be related to efficiency, plan rationality, social or regional
equity, the personal ambitions of the bureaucrats, or the inter-
ests of the ruling party. The important point is that they would
be centrally determined and their uniform application enforced
by a hierarchical bureaucratic system. Such was not the case
with privatized regulation. Although occasionally enforced on a
national basis, its actual use was to enforce localized bargains.
There was no consistent set of objective or technical criteria in
any of the sectors this Article examined. Instead, the result was
determined by the relative bargaining strength of the private
parties involved in the particular negotiation.
The irrelevance of pre-established enforceable norms did
not mean chaos or disorder. On the contrary, the ad hoc bar-
gaining that was at the heart of privatized regulation may have
been more predictable than U.S. administrative litigation or the
adjudicative and rule-making procedures that judicial review
might have structured. Certainly, it is infinitely more predict-
able than the operation of the market, the uncontrolled nature
of which privatized regulation is designed to avoid. Participants
in the granting of television licenses, taxi permits, or declining
industry cartels likely knew rather well how they would fare in
the negotiations that occurred, and while the bargaining under
the LSRSL may have been somewhat less predictable, the stabil-
ity of market shares among large retailers at the height of the
LSRSL regime is dramatic evidence of the fundamental stability
and long term predictability of the system. Certainly the petro-
leum refiners and gas station owners considered the preserva-
tion of the import cartel as indispensable to the fending off of
the chaos that would have followed market competition. Even in
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the minimill sector, the mainstream of the industry led by Nip-
pon Steel was able eventually to bring all other minimills under
their control and to keep TSM's market share within managea-
ble bounds.
The process was predictable, however, only for those inti-
mately familiar not only with the structure of the system in gen-
eral but also with the circumstances of each iteration. While the
large stores may have been confident about market share on a
national basis and media groups may have been sure that they
would get some piece of the action in each new station, the pre-
cise result was a function of local circumstances. For outsiders,
there was no way to discover the existence of the system, much
less its nature or structure, and outsider participation at the local
level was virtually impossible. Nor, given its extra-legal and often
illegal nature, was information readily available even to the Japa-
nese media. Of course, even if outsiders knew what the process
was and its costs, entry into the bargaining circle was not open
but controlled by the parties themselves, supported when neces-
sary by their bureaucratic sponsors.
A final commonality of privatized regulation was the rheto-
ric of consensus. At times it was descriptive as in the use of the
convoy metaphor by commentators on the LSRSL system, while
at other times it evoked cultural ideals as in the reference to the
importance of duty and loyalty by members of the steel cartel in
their attacks on TSM. Frequently it was simply the expression of
the desirability of stability and order. In most of its manifesta-
tions, it was explicitly contrasted with the "excessive competi-
tion" of the market. The reference to coexistence and a shared
fate echoed the national mythology of "village Japan", "har-
mony", and uniqueness that often justifies and insulates self in-
terested action in Japan and obscures from view the conflict and
change that is also part of the reality of Japanese society. 67
267. Like every other society, Japan's traditions and traditional rhetoric are often
of recent origin. The tradition of harmony, or "wa", for example, is typically associated
by Japanese with Prince Shotoku of the seventh century. Despite these historical con-
notations, the spirit of wa as associated with Shotoku actually came into general use in
the twentieth century as a device to foster national unity. See generally Kimio It6, The
Invention of 'va' and the Transformation of the Image of Prince Shotoku in Modern Japan, in
MIRROR OF MODERNITY' MODERN JAPAN'S INVENTED TRADITIONS 1 (Stephen Vlastos ed.,
forthcoming, Univ. of Calif. Press) (discussing origin of use of concept of wa in twenti-
eth centuryJapan); see also EmicJ. HoBsBAWM & TERENCE 0. RANGER, THE INVENTION OF
TRADnoN 1 (1983) (analyzing theory of invented traditions in general).
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The plausibility of this rhetoric was heightened by the hori-
zontal nature of the process created by delegation. Instead of
many firms competing for a license or permit, only one emerged
from an apparently consensual process to accept it as its due.
The forced bargaining and the cohesion needed to make and
enforce decisions also likely led to a real level of mutual knowl-
edge and understanding, if not respect, inside each industry.
Even Masanari Iketani of TSM eventually became an officer of
the trade association. As the firms within a sector were forced to
cooperate, a natural hierarchy developed that usually survived
mavericks like Iketani and Ogura. Defection may still have been
possible, but interlocking personal and business relationships
substantially increased its cost and decreased its benefits.
III. PRIVATIZED REGULATION IN PERSPECTIVE
A reexamination of privatized regulation from a compara-
tive perspective can help clarify what in Japanese regulatory
practice is unique and what is merely one variation of practices
common elsewhere. This section first examines privatized regu-
lation from the perspective of the ideals of U.S. administrative
law, drawing primarily on the typology of Richard Stewart.2 6 8 It
then compares privatized regulation to two complementary
models of contemporary European regulatory practice, Wolf-
gang Streeck and Philippe Schmitter's private interest govern-
ance 2 69 and Gerd Winter's bartering rationality. 270
The ideals of U.S. administrative law are useful for two rea-
sons. First, they are likely to be representative of the normative
perspective of most readers, including Japanese and European
readers. Discussing them explicitly makes explicit what are likely
otherwise to remain implicit biases. Second, the transparency,
openness, and accountability of U.S. administrative procedure
are echoed in the norms of international trade, not only by U.S.
trade negotiators but also in the WTO Agreements on Technical
Barriers to Trade and Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. A
discussion of privatized regulation in these terms may fore-
268. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARv. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
269. See Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter, Community, Market, State - and
Associations? The Prospective Contribution of Interest Governance to Social Order, in PRIVATE
INTEREST GOVERNMENT 1, 10 (Wolfgang Streeck & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1985).
270. Winter, supra note 7, at 219-20.
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shadow and illuminate future trade debates and provide some
sense of what shape future international pressure on Japan is
likely to take.
The comparison with European models provides a less
starkly normative perspective. Both models describe patterns of
governance that involve the devolution of power from purely
public entities to private or quasi private actors. The Streeck
and Schmitter model of private interest governance examines
the structure of regulation and emphasizes the influential role of
associations in the creation and implementation of social policy.
Winter looks at the process of enforcement and argues that the
implementation of policy through legal rules has been largely
replaced by ad hoc bargaining between government agencies
and private parties.
The role of private organizations in private interest govern-
ance and the informal give and take of bartering rationality echo
the structure and processes of privatized regulation respectively.
Drawing out those similarities will dispel the idea that Japanese
regulation is so distinctive that it can be considered unique in
the strong sense of the term. Using the norms of U.S. adminis-
trative law as a lens as we draw these comparisons will enable us
to determine what is distinctive aboutJapanese practice because,
as we shall see, the ideals of procedural regularity, openness, and
transparency are neither foreign to private interest governance
nor entirely absent from bartering rationality.
A. Privatized Regulation Through the Lens of U.S. Administrative
Law
1. The Norms of U.S. Administrative Law
Much of the literature on regulation in the United States is
concerned with the legitimization of the role of the bureaucracy
in the economy, what one administrative law scholar has de-
scribed as U.S. lawyers' 200 year project to control government
action through law.27' The now-conventional wisdom portrays
the legitimization process as evolving in three stages, each linked
intellectually to more general stages of legal development and
271. Jerry Mashaw, Panel: The Structure of Government Accountability: Reinventing
Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57
U. Pirr. L. REv. 405, 414-15 (1996) [hereinafter Reinventing Government].
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historically to periods in the development of U.S. capitalism.
272
The first stage limits administrative agencies in a capitalist
economy to executing the commands of the legislature. Absent
legislation, the bureaucracy has no inherent power to intervene
in private activity, which is left to the actions of autonomous indi-
viduals operating in the world of private contract and property.
When the electorate through legislation authorizes intervention,
the agency does no more or less than enforce the clear dictates
of the statute. The judiciary's role is to ensure that the agency
does not stray too far from the expressed legislative intent. Aptly
called the "transmission belt" model by Richard Stewart, this
model recognizes no bureaucratic role in the formation of policy
and no discretion in its implementation.273
Although the transmission belt model satisfied the need to
justify government intervention in the private sphere and still
retains normative power, its descriptive power did not survive the
legal realists, the New Deal, and the establishment of the welfare
state. The establishment of independent agencies such as the
Interstate Commerce Commission or the Federal Communica-
tion Commission with the power to regulate sectors of the econ-
omy on the sole criterion of the "public interest" or "public con-
venience or necessity" made it clear that bureaucrats did more
than merely execute the legislative will. Even when the legisla-
ture attempts more specific instructions, definitional questions
inevitably leave wider discretion to the bureaucrats than the
broadest interpretation of the transmission belt would allow or
could justify. 274
The New Dealers' response was to link administrative discre-
tion to technical expertise, which was seen as both describing
the bureaucrats' policy advantage over legislators and judges and
justifying the otherwise unauthorized burden on private rights.
272. See Stewart, supra note 268, at 1678-81. The wisdom was not yet conventional
when Stewart wrote. See also JERRY L. MAsHAw, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE 16, 24 (1985) [hereinafter DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE]; PHILIPPE
NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW
18-19 (1978) (describing stages of general legal development and "evolutionist" theory
of legal development). That these stages of general legal development may never have
existed is irrelevant for the purposes of this Article. See Erhard Blankenburg, The Poverty
of Evolutionism: A Critique of Teubner's Case for "Reflexive Law", 18 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 273,
284 (1984).
273. See Stewart, supra note 268, at 1680-81.
274. DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 272, at 17.
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Because the courts remained in the background available to re-
view the exercise of this discretion, the problem of legislative
control implicit in the transmission belt model was at least ad-
dressed if not satisfied, but the primary justification for the bu-
reaucrats' independent discretion and power was their profes-
sional or scientific knowledge and methodology. 75
The expertise model itself came under criticism in the
1960s when critics argued persuasively that administrative agen-
cies had been captured by the regulated industries and that any
expertise was being exercised primarily to serve private instead
of public interests. The response was to open the system to a
wider range of interests and to greater political and judicial scru-
tiny, what has come to be called the interest representation
model.2 76 Both the legislature, through statutes like the Free-
dom of Information Act,2 7 7 and the judiciary, through the relax-
275. See JAmEs LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1 (1938) (providing classic
explanation of technical expertise model). Implicit in the expertise model was a shift
from viewing administrative agencies as law enforcers, applying rules to fact situations,
to substantive problem solvers. This new role demanded more than a knowledge of the
statute or of relevant facts pertaining to a single issue or incident; it demanded "the
application of continuous, specialized intelligence to underlying issues of policy" that
was to be acquired not only by specialized training or technical knowledge but also by
.constant exposure to a single type of problem." DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
STATE, supra note 272, at 19. Experience, research, and steadily increasing familiarity
with the substantive area would compensate for any initial lack of the requisite scientific
expertise.
276. A second response to the perceived failure of the expert model has been
deregulation. If expertise and administrative intervention in the economy was in most
cases simply a disguise for rent seeking behavior by the regulated industry, the proper
response was the elimination of regulation altogether. The classic example of deregula-
tion was the elimination of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the 1970s and free competi-
tion in airline pricing, but deregulation does not necessarily mean simply the end of all
government involvement. More frequently, it has meant the partial replacement of
command and control by market incentives. A typical example is tradable pollution
permits, where industry members are able to purchase and sell the right to emit certain
levels of pollutants. Another example is the auctioning of the broadcast spectrum
rather than its distribution through random allocation or competitive licensing. The
introduction of market principles, it is argued, both eliminates the cost of agency moni-
toring and enforcement and fosters more efficient results because the firm for whom
the resource is most valuable will purchase the right to use it.
277. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, §§ 1-3, 88 Stat. 1561
(1974); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 1241
(1976); Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat.770 (1972); Pub.
L. No. 94-409, § 5(c), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976); Pub. L. No. 96-523 § 2, 94 Stat. 3040 (1980);
see al/o DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 272, at 27; Reinventing
Government, supra note 271, at 417 (discussing specific statutory provisions guaranteeing
public participation).
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ation of threshold doctrines like ripeness and standing, de-
manded greater inclusiveness and accountability in the adminis-
trative process on the grounds that a diversity of views would
lead to decisions that were based on better information and that
reflected a wider range of interests.
The emphasis has been primarily on improving procedure
rather than eliminating administrative discretion. The legisla-
ture continues to draft statutes that delegate substantial power to
regulatory agencies, and the judiciary almost invariably prefers
to remand administrative mistakes for additional or different
procedures rather than dictating substantive results. This prefer-
ence for procedure is responsive to the U.S. preoccupation with
contest and rule metaphors:
It satisfies simultaneously a craving for direct democratic par-
ticipation in an increasingly bureaucratic public life and the
demand for equality before the law. There may be winners
and losers in bureaucratic politics, but the game should be
fair. Access to the seat of power - now the bureau rather
than the legislature or court - should be open to all.2 78
It is precisely this ideal of an open contest on a "level playing
field" with its implication of winner-take-all that clashes directly
with the norms and practices of privatized regulation.
2. Privatized Regulation from the U.S. Perspective
The relationship of privatized regulation to U.S. administra-
tive law norms will vary considerably depending on whether one
focuses on the formal law or its implementation in practice. The
LSRSL is illustrative. As written, it contains elements of both the
expert model and the interest representation model. The use of
consultative committees is not as developed in the United States
as it is in Europe or Japan, but it is not unknown and fits the
interest representation model comfortably.2 79 The committees'
anticipated role in the LSRSL was to bring together on both lo-
cal and regional levels representatives of the affected independ-
ent retailers, the retail industry more generally, consumers, and
278. DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, supra note 272, at 27-28 (empha-
sis in original).
279. See, e.g., Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub, L. No. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770
(1972); Pub. L. No. 94-409, Sec. 5(c), 90 Stat. 1247 (1976); Pub. L. No. 96-523, § 2, 94
Stat. 3040 (1980).
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the general public interest. If the regional committee had then
made the final determination subject to MITI ratification, the
statute would have been a variant of the pure interest representa-
tion model not dissimilar to the U.S. practice of negotiated
rulemaking.8 0
The LSRSL and similar statutes in other areas, however,
contemplate only an advisory role for deliberative councils leav-
ing it up to the bureaucrats to make the final judgment indepen-
dently. MITI and the other officials are supposed to rely not
only on the input of the consultative committees, but also on
bureaucratic expertise and experience. The resulting combina-
tion of interest representation and bureaucratic expertise, while
perhaps not replicated precisely within U.S. regulatory law, is
theoretically unremarkable.
The implementation of the statute, however, is another mat-
ter. Whatever else one might say about the standardless delega-
tion of public power to private parties, it is not anticipated by
U.S. literature on administrative law or economic regulation.
While capture theorists might argue that regulation in the
United States occasionally has approached this result in certain
sectors, the process has rarely resembled the LSRSL scheme.281
Indeed, the implementation of the LSRSL resembled the crea-
280. An obvious and important difference, however, is that 'regneg' is usually lim-
ited to rulemaking, which is prototypically policymaking. Privatized regulation is typi-
cally adjudication, the application of rules to a given set of facts, rather than rulemak-
ing. Although advisory committees have a role in adjudicatory decisions, as illustrated
by the licensing of new drugs by the Food and Drug Administration, this role is limited
by the nature of fact-finding in adjudication and the parties' individualized stakes in the
outcome. While tripartite or expert panels might play a consultative role, the due pro-
cess considerations involved in any adjudication would, in theory at least, require any
final decision to be made independently by the administrative agency according to
clear and accessible processes.
281. One area where a similar process occurs in the United States is the enforce-
ment of land use controls by local government. Variances, for example, are administra-
tively granted permissions to deviate from existing zoning restrictions. In planning the-
ory, they should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, but in practice they are
often routinely granted when neighbors either consent or do not object. In some in-
stances the neighbor's involvement is legally anticipated. At other times, it is simply a
product of administrative practice. See gmerally ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 263. El-
lickson and Been not only document the role of neighbors in the administration of
variances, but also trace the struggle of courts with the persistence of ad hoc dealmak-
ing between land developers and local governments. U.S. courts have evolved from
hostility toward deal making and attempts to prevent it to a grudging recognition of
both its inevitability and virtues.
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tion of a system of private ordering more than economic regula-
don.
This system of private ordering operated like a market. To
open a store, the large retailer had to purchase the right from
the small retailers in the area, just as it had to purchase or lease
land or any other factor of production. As with most markets, it
was created by the government giving rights to potential players
in accordance with political decisions and then stepping back
and allowing the final allocation of resources to be determined
by private decisions. In this instance, of course, it is a market
with a "twist." Instead of permanent entitlements allocated by
law, the rights are allocated by the bureaucracy and are transfer-
able without legislative action. The content of the rights is even
farther removed from the free market of conventional economic
analysis: instead of "private property" being the right to open a
store at an individual's discretion, the property right is to be free
from competition by large stores. In a conventional market, the
small merchants can theoretically protect themselves by purchas-
ing the large store owner's right to operate if the owner is willing
to sell and the merchants can match his price. 8 ' Under MITI's
reversed allocation of rights under the LSRSL, the large store
owner has the converse option of buying the small merchants'
right to remain free from competition if they are willing to sell
and the large store can meet their price.
It is no surprise that by the ideals of U.S. law, where the
principles of due process and judicial review reign supreme,
privatized regulation fares very poorly. Privatized regulation fits
none of the legitimizing models of administrative law. The
transmission belt model seems even more detached from reality
in the Japanese setting than it did in the U.S. setting: the intent
of the legislature, at least as articulated in the statutes, is ig-
nored, usually without even rhetorical reference to its terms or
goals.
The interest representation model seems initially to de-
scribe and legitimate the Japanese process better. Delegation
certainly meant adequate representation of the regulated par-
ties' interests. Indeed, until they were successful in reaching an
282. In practice, this right was illusory because there were several chains. To pro-
tect themselves, local merchants would have had to purchase the right from all of the
chains and would still have faced the possibility of new entrants.
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accommodation of their interests reasonably satisfactory to all
participants, no decision would issue, regardless of the agency's
view of the desirability of a given result. Of course, the interest
representation model was intended to rectify, not the under-rep-
resentation of the regulated industry or industries, but that of
the public interest, of the interests too diffuse or legally affected
too indirectly to be brought into the agency's inner circle.
Privatized regulation all but ignored these interests, unless
one takes the rather doubtful position that the ministries them-
selves somehow protected them. While certainly envisioned in
the underlying statutes, one is hard pressed to find actual in-
stances of such representation in any of this Article's case stud-
ies. If Mark Tilton's account is correct, declining industries pol-
icy included a vision of the national interest in the sense that
strategic economic planning required, in MITI's opinion, a sta-
ble domestic industry in a range of basic materials sectors. This
vision was never tested, however, by formal or even informal in-
teraction with the diffuse and unorganized interests the interest
representation model is intended to include in the bureaucratic
calculation. Even in outline guidance, where the residents' in-
terests in protecting their sunlight or preventing increased pop-
ulation density and traffic congestion were the raison ditre of the
process, the real but more diffuse interests of the residents of
other districts that inevitably had to absorb the displaced popula-
tion were ignored. It is difficult to see in these cases, therefore,
anything approaching the interest representation model.
The expert model appears to be a more plausible justifica-
tion for what was occurring. It advocates wide bureaucratic dis-
cretion and justifies judicial passivity, both characteristics of
privatized regulation. Japanese bureaucrats also boast a reputa-
tion for technical competence and political neutrality, and their
expertise has been credited with much of Japan's national suc-
cesses. Upon closer inspection, however, the idea of expertise
seems frequently as absent in the practice of privatized regula-
tion as the legislative mandate or interest pluralism of the other
models. The fundamental characteristic of privatized regulation
was not careful deliberation by thoughtful bureaucrats, but the
more or less unsupervised delegation of their power to the regu-
lated parties.
While one might surmise that ministerial expertise played a
crucial role in designing the structure of delegated decision-
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making, the supporting evidence is scant indeed.283 With the
important exception of declining industries, direct bureaucratic
intervention to correct stable compromises that fell outside the
bounds of administrative rationality were exceptional.2 84 The in-
terventions noted in this Article were typically not on substantive
lines. Instead bureaucrats intervened when necessary not to
shape the substance of a consensus, but to reinforce the frame-
work necessary to reach and enforce one. Thus, MITI bureau-
crats rarely, if ever, intervened in the LSRSL process during the
1980s, no matter how far the results diverged from statutory
goals. Similarly in transportation or broadcasting, the roles of
government were usually instrumental to the privatized process,
but not to its result.
283. One intriguing, if implausible, interpretation of MITI's implementation of
the LSRSL would portray it as an attempt to force market participants to internalize the
external cost of their productive activity. The decision not to prohibit large stores alto-
gether is a recognition that they benefit the public, but the requirement that they
purchase the right to open forces them to internalize some of the costs of their opera-
tion. These costs include the deterioration of neighborhoods, the loss of secure em-
ployment, and the destruction of human relationships among customers, neighbors,
and merchants, which many observers see as accompanying the disappearance of small
scale independent merchants. The establishment of a market for opening rights,
rather than simply a set fee, allows only the most efficient stores to open, because it will
be the most profitable stores that will consistently be able to meet the local merchants'
price. Thus, the social dislocation of a large store in an established retail market will
arise only when the large store is relatively efficient, not only in relation to the small
stores that it will drive out of business but also in relation to other large stores against
which it must bid to purchase the right to open. This process ensures not only that the
most efficient large store will acquire the right to operate but also that no store will
open unless the decreased profits or cost of going out of business for existing
merchants are less than the profit to be made by the proposed new store. When the
costs are greater than the gain, the new store will not be willing to meet the small
merchants' price, and the store will not open.
This theorizing has an attractively rational ring about it, and one can envision MITI
policy makers arguing in this vein, perhaps calling on experts in community develop-
ment or city planning to assist them in evaluating the importance of certain forms of
retailing to urban quality of life. But, of course, this vision is pure fantasy. Even the few
defenders of MITI's implementation of the LSRSL, including the occasional economist
who argued that the Japanese retail sector was efficient, did not argue that it was the
reasoned outcome of a policy debate over the public good. MITI may have operated
the statute like a market, but it was inspired by the political market of sectoral cartels
that we have seen operating throughout privatized regulation, not the logic of eco-
nomic markets that animates the idea of tradable pollution rights in environmental law.
284. Another instance is in the broadcasting context when the MPT had to inter-
vene to reach a stable compromise, particularly in the more complex environments of
urban licenses. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing MPT interven-
tion in licensing process). It is unclear, however, whether these interventions were in
the service of neutral expertise or for less legitimate purposes.
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In the declining industries context, however, intervention
may have been more policy based. In the cement industry case,
MITI and the MOC intervened to create and sustain the ready-
mix concrete trade association, and local governments and cus-
toms officials cooperated to restrict imports. Some observers
would classify this intervention as aimed solely at reinforcing the
private cartel illegally created on the foundation of the legal
structurally depressed industries law cartel, as simply a proce-
dural intervention to support the private interests of the cement
industry similar to the cartels under the LSRSL and elsewhere.
Tilton, however, has argued that declining industries interven-
tion had a strong policy component as well. He argues that the
cement cartel was important to MITI's policy objective of pre-
serving domestic cement production rather than cement com-
pany profits for their own sake.28 5 Of course, such intervention
by MITI was legally inappropriate, if not itself illegal. MITI en-
couraged criminal activity by the industry in a manner reminis-
cent of the administrative guidance attacked by the FTC in the
Oil Cartel Cases of the 1970s.
Even if this scenario were true, and it is vigorously opposed
in other studies of Japanese declining industries policy con-
ducted by Robert Uriu and Gregory Noble, 8 6 it is likely that
MITI's role fell short of James Landis' ideal of the expert and
neutral bureaucratic guardian of the public welfare. The curious
mixture of MITI's omnipresence in the economy and the fre-
quent weakness of its legal tools may have made compromise
with private interests necessary even when its goals were unre-
lated to party politics. The intertwining of bureaucrats' personal
interest with that of the regulated industry, most vividly exempli-
fied by the amakudari system, also makes any observer pause
before attributing exclusive causal power to motivations derived
largely from technical or expert analyses. There is also the im-
portant question of whether a regulatory regime that is largely
extra legal and often dependent for its implementation on ille-
gal behavior can really be characterized benignly as the exercise
of expertise. Nonetheless, if we are to view Japanese regulatory
style in U.S. terms, the expert model seems to fit better than any
other.
285. TILTON, supra note 160, at 83.
286. See URiu, supra note 164, at 1; NOBLE, supra note 164, at 1 (ch. 3).
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B. Japanese Regulation as Privatized Governance: Through the Lens
of European Models of Governance
Models of administrative law and practice devised to de-
scribe and legitimate U.S. bureaucratic behavior are perhaps not
the best source for a comparative understanding of Japanese
practice. The focus on formal law and the need to account for
and legitimize bureaucratic behavior are useful for identifying
the fundamental nature of Japanese practice, but they may be
too far removed from that practice and too representative of the
United States to be able to explain it.2 8 7
This section adopts and simplifies two European models
and uses them to examine Japanese regulatory style from a per-
spective less idiosyncratically identified with the United States.
The first, private interest government, will help to place Japa-
nese regulatory style within a model of social order. The second,
bartering rationality, provides a model of the regulatory process
that will enable us to understand the behavior of the parties to
Japanese regulation in institutional context. After a brief pres-
entation of each model, this section examines the degree to
which each model fits Japanese practice and tries to identify
what, if anything, is distinctive about Japanese regulatory prac-
tices.
1. Private Interest Governance
Drawing on the continental European tradition of ne-
ocorporatism, Streeck and Schmitter rest private interest govern-
ance on the idea of "associations" and "associational order." For
them associations' role in social order is commensurate to that
of the three traditional models of social order: the community,
the market, and the state. 28 8 According to Streeck and Schmit-
ter, associational order is overlooked by social theorists because
their analytical perspectives are limited by the boundaries of
their own models.2 89 Thus, market economists see associations
as cartels, communitarians see them as inevitably alienated from
287. Whatever the distinctiveness of privatized regulation, it may be U.S. regula-
tory practice that is truly unique. Its procedural formality and tolerance for judicial
intervention are arguably not repeated on the same scale anywhere else. See Robert
Kagan, On Regulatory Inspectorates and Police, in ENFORCING REGULATION 59 (K. Hawkins
&J. Thomas eds., 1984).
288. Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 269, at 1.
289. Id. at 3.
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the communities from which they emerge, and political scien-
tists and lawyers see associations as threats to liberal democracy
and the rule of law. 9° Once analyzed independently, rather
than as a deviation from or function of another form of social
order Streeck and Schmitter claim that "associational order"
constitutes a "separate logic of collective action and social order"
that has the same conceptual importance as the other three. 91
They state the core of their model as follows:
The central principle is that of ... negotiation within and
among a limited and fixed set of interest organizations that
mutually recognize each other's status and entitlements and
are capable of reaching and implementing relatively stable
compromises ... in the pursuit of their interests. A corpora-
tive-associative order is, therefore, based primarily on inter-
action within and between interdependent complex organiza-
tions.292
Streeck and Schmitter distinguish private interest govern-
ance from interest group pluralism. In their model, associations
do not simply reflect their members' private interests. 93 As-
sociations have enough organizational strength to create them as
well.2 94 They do not simply influence social policy; they directly
participate in policy formation and implementation. In this pro-
cess, they share "in the state's authority to make and enforce
binding decisions" that represent not only their own interests
but also those of other associations and of the state."9 To do so,
they require the organizational strength to make and enforce
decisions both internally among their members and externally
in the interactions with other associations and other social ac-
tors.
296
Paradoxically, private interest governance requires a rela-
tively strong and autonomous state. Associations do not arise
naturally from shared beliefs or interests, nor can they survive
once created without state assistance and enforcement.2 97 The
290. Id. at 3-4.
291. Id. at 11.
292. Id. at 10.
293. See id. at 10-11.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 20.
296. Id.
297. Id.
19971
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complex and diffuse member interests, the temptations of defec-
tion, and the difficulty of organizational stability and efficiency
are too great in contemporary society for associations to exist
without state assistance. Furthermore, without a state with some
degree of autonomy, delegation of public authority to private
associations would lead to rent seeking that would destroy the
political legitimacy of the model.298 Streeck and Schmitter's as-
sociational order, therefore, requires a state strong enough to
create associations and police their internal structure, to facili-
tate and manage interactions among associations, and to moni-
tor and limit associational activities so that they are consistent
with the public interest.
2. Bartering Rationality
The model of associational governance provides a way to
place privatized regulation in a broader model of social order,
but reveals little about the nature of the process of regulation
itself. If it is groups of small merchants, trade associations, and
deliberative councils that actually regulate substantial portions
of the Japanese economy, how can the process be characterized?
It is certainly not similar to the licensing or adjudication that
provides the fundamental typology of U.S. administrative law.
Nor does it have much to do with either the rule application of
the transmission belt model or the procedural due process of
the interest representation model. The process resembles bar-
gaining more than the typical activities of legal actors within the
sphere of public law. While many commentators have noted the
bargaining element in contemporary law, for our purposes the
most useful description of bargaining in the regulatory process is
"bartering rationality" that Gerd Winter argues dominates mod-
ern regulatory practice. 299
Bartering rationality is most obvious in the implementation
phase of regulation where the agency will frequently reach ac-
commodations with the regulated party to forego some aspect of
its formal regulatory power in return for certain actions or for-
bearance on the part of the regulated. The agency's legal power
298. Id. at 21. Otherwise, delegation of public authority would become what The-
odore Lowi calls "sponsored pluralism." See THEODOREJ. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM:
THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 60 (1979).
299. Winter, supra note 7, at 220.
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in this context is, as Winter puts it, a "mere bargaining chip," to
be traded incrementally for cooperation in the implementation
of policy goals.3 0 0 The agency's ability to refrain from full exer-
cise of its legal power can mean granting a permit when denial is
within its discretion as well as stopping short of full enforcement
of regulatory norms. In return, the firm can offer a range of
accommodations. It can agree to immediate partial compliance,
as when a firm agrees to drop legal opposition to enforcement
efforts; it can offer to provide benefits that the firm is not neces-
sarily required to give, as when a firm agrees to donate land or
an easement in return for a land use permit; or a party can sim-
ply agree to make certain payments to the government as in per-
mit fees or, more recently, auctioned pollution or broadcasting
rights.301
Regulatory bargaining has existed as long as regulation.
Identification and analysis of the phenomenon, however, are
more recent, as evidenced by the absence of any treatment of
negotiation in the classic theories of administrative law. Instead,
the concepts of fidelity to law, procedural due process, and
equality of treatment dominated the historical discussion of reg-
ulation on the continent as well as in the United States. The
ideal of regulation was equality of enforcement and fidelity to
the legislative will.30 2
According to Winter, this model began to decline with the
legal realists, who saw the gap between the ideal of full and equal
enforcement and the actuality of partial enforcement as inevita-
ble. 05 Some realists, notably Thurman Arnold, went further
and argued that the gap was not only inevitable, but also desira-
ble in practice. For Arnold, efficient government required will-
ful departure from the ideal, but the myth of "symmetry, moral
beauty, and logic" in law enforcement remained indispensable
for political legitimacy.5 04 Government was forced to create a
sub rosa organization that "constantly violate [d] those principles
300. Id.
301. Id. at 220-21.
302. Id. at 233-84. Equality of enforcement and fidelity to the legislative will are, in
other words, Stewart's "transmission belt" model of administrative legality, which Win-
ter cites as equally applicable to Great Britain and Germany as to the United States.
303. Id. at 234.
304. Id. at 234-35.
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in covert and hidden ways."3 0 5 In other words, scholars could
recognize and discuss the existence and desirability of the gap
but the "creed of full enforcement" must be left intact for law to
perform its legitimating function.
What is new for Winter in recent scholarship on regulation
is the advocacy of bargaining as an ideal, rather than as a neces-
sary accommodation, by those who take an economic, game the-
ory, or sociological approach to regulation, in other words by all
observers who study regulatory law as a social rather than a doc-
trinal phenomenon. For game theorists, "the expected rewards
for both agency and firm ... from mutual cooperation exceed"
what either party could expect by independent action.0 6 For
economists, the "efficiency criterion implies that a rational en-
forcement strategy will not seek to induce full compliance nor
even maximum feasible compliance with the law, but cost-justi-
fied compliance."3 0 7 For sociologists, "the attempt to control
regulatory enforcement primarily by external legal requirements
[is] deeply troublesome, insofar as it induces in both inspectors
and the regulated an attitude of legal defensiveness, a concern
for adequate documentation rather than substantive achieve-
ment, and a degree of rule-bound rigidity."30 8 For sociologists,
fidelity to law in the regulatory context is no longer "necessarily
a societal good."3 0 9 It becomes a social good only after an "ob-
jective analysis" has indicated that it comes "at an acceptable
cost."310
In order to function well in this bargaining process, sociolo-
gists advocate training regulators in the techniques of "interper-
sonal relations with complainants and businessmen; in the eco-
nomics of the regulated industry; in the organizational dynam-
ics, strengths and weaknesses of different kinds of business firms,
in standards for exercising discretion, in cultivating allies, such
as technical experts, within regulated firms...; or in alternatives
305. Id.
306. Id. (quotingJohn T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deterrence and the Ecology of Regulatory
Enforcement, 18 LAw & Soc'y Rzv. 179, 185-86 (1984)).
307. Id. (quoting Cento G. Veljanovski, The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement, in
ENFORCING RE:GULATION 173 (K. Hawkins &J. Thomas eds., 1984)).
308. Id. (quoting Scholz, supra note 306, at 185).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 237 (citingJOSEPH DIMENTO, GETTING COMPLIANCE: ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw AND AMEICAN BusiNEss 1-15 (1984)).
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to enforcement."3 1 1 Business rather than legal techniques be-
come the methods of regulation, and fidelity to law is no longer
even an aspirational goal of the regulatory process, being re-
placed both descriptively and normatively by social utility and
efficiency.
While strongest among scholars and administrative practi-
tioners, who have long treated the law more as a flexible refer-
ence point than a practical guide to action, Winter claims that
this shift in discourse has begun to be recognized in legal doc-
trine as well. He points to the inclusion of bargaining in sub-
stantive statutes, as in tradable pollution rights or the auctioning
of broadcast frequencies but then notes that courts remain skep-
tical of explicit bargaining by which agencies trade their legal
power for partial compliance without statutory authority. He
notes that U.K. courts have limited the ability of agencies to con-
dition the issuance of permits on private behavior that the
agency does not have the legal power to compel.3 12 He then
notes that German courts are less restrictive, allowing agree-
ments between private parties and agencies that are not specifi-
cally authorized by law if they relate to the basic goal the agency
is empowered to seek, are proportional, and are not forbidden
by law.313 Even in the United Kingdom, however, Winter argues
that judicial invalidation of bargaining is rarely a practical im-
pediment because lawsuits will only arise when the bargain falls
through.
3. Privatized Regulation from the Perspective of European
Models of Regulation
Cobbling the Streeck and Schmitter and Winter models to-
gether results in a regulatory world that has marked similarities
to Japanese practice. Government agencies do not attempt,
even rhetorically, to implement formal statutory goals but rather
do so to achieve some vision - Winter is not clear on where this
311. Id. at 236 (quoting Kagan, supra note 287 at 59).
312. Id. at 237-38. Winter also cites a U.S. case standing for the same proposition.
See Bringle v. Bd. of Supervisors of the County of Orange, 54 Cal. 2d 86, 351 P.2d 765 (1960).
The case, however, actually approved the condition. For a U.S. case disapproving a
conditioned approval, see ELUCKSON & BEEN, supra note 263 (presenting excerpted ver-
sion of Fritts v. City of Ashland, 348 S.W. 2d 712 (Ky. 1961)).
313. Winter, supra note 7, at 237-38.
314. Id. at 239.
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vision comes from - of social utility through bargaining. Further-
more, agencies work not through interaction with individual
firms on a one by one basis, but by delegating power to associa-
tions that are created and maintained by the state. Within the
associations, organization is premised on the principle of con-
sensus, not on the principle of legality. Bargaining is the modal
form of behavior for interaction among and within associations
and between associations and the state.
The parallels to theJapanese context are clear. The Streeck
and Schmitter associations are the small merchants and large
stores of the LSRSL, the shifting coalition of media groups in
broadcasting, the shingikai and industry groups in transporta-
tion, and the various trade associations in declining industries.
The mode of interaction and decision-making within industries
as revealed by the case studies is at least superficially consistent
with Winter's bargaining model. Law at best established a locus
for the bargaining, but it never provided a detailed guideline for
the results that emerged. The mode of interaction and decision-
making among the associations is also bargaining. The intricate
relationships across industries necessary to maintain domestic
production of cement, for example, were formed on the basis of
bargained for consensus and depended not on law, indeed they
were in large part illegal, but on a constant give and take among
the parties. Similarly, negotiations between large and small re-
tailers, and among media groups, were not based on the ostensi-
bly applicable statutory criteria, but on organizational, political,
social, and economic resources.
These surface similarities, however, mask some profound
differences in the role of the state and of law. The associations
of Streeck and Schmitter's private interest governance enjoy en-
during legal identities. Frequently, they are statutorily estab-
lished specifically to carry out delegated governance tasks. 1 5 At
other times, associations are preexisting entities that receive a
statutory mandate to operate within a given sector. Seldom, if
ever, are they totally informal as were the groups of small
merchants that in many instances took over the role of the statu-
tory committees in the LSRSL context or the media groupings in
315. See, e.g., Wyn Grant, Private Organizations as Agents of Public Policy: The Case of
Marketing in Britain, in PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENT 182-96 (Wolfgang Streeck & Phi-
lippe C. Schmitter eds., 1985).
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the broadcasting context. Nor were they simply industry trade
associations without any legally defined public role, as were the
trade associations in declining industries. Even when their role
was legally clear, as in the shingikai of the transportation context,
they went well beyond their statutory advisory role. In these in-
stances, furthermore, they were not the freestanding associations
envisioned by Streeck and Schmitter but rather were formal ap-
pendages of the agencies.
Private interest governance associations, therefore, receive
not only delegated power but. also delegated authority. They
have a clear legal identity and enjoy legal legitimacy. According
to Streeck and Schmitter, associations "shar[e] in the state's au-
thority to make and enforce binding decisions" and, as such, re-
ceive "a unique resource that no other environment but the state
has to offer: the ability to rely on legitimate coercion."1 6 Pri-
vate groups in the Japanese regulatory context may play a func-
tionally similar role because they may make and enforce binding
decisions, but they do so without legal legitimacy and often with
only implicit political authority. Their role may not be secret in
the sense of a totally private cartel, but it has rarely been as
openly debated and legally promulgated as the enabling legisla-
tion of private interest governance associations has been.
As a result, Japanese privatized regulation is both less clearly
tied to the state and less predictably successful. The less predict-
able success comes out in the excesses of the LSRSL and dang6
regimes, which went well beyond what in public discussion the
relevant ministries would have admitted to having encouraged.
The latter is apparent in the failure of MITI and the steel indus-
try to control the minimill sector and in the collapse of the
LSRSL system under the attack of the SII talks. The lack of polit-
ical authority and legal legitimacy means that privatized regula-
tion is vulnerable to both internal dissidents and politically pow-
erful outsiders in a way that private interest governance is not.
Not only can privatized regulation not rely on direct legal coer-
cion but its informal means of coercion are also substantially
weakened once they are exposed to public debate because priva-
tized regulation has rarely been fully discussed and agreed to in
a politically legitimate forum. As the Lions Oil episode demon-
316. Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 269, at 20.
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strated, indirect coercion can still work but only when the rele-
vant industry and government consensus is stable.
There are also corresponding differences between what ac-
tually occurs under Japanese privatized regulation and Winter's
model of bartering rationality. Despite its seemingly radical de-
parture from the conventional wisdom of Western administrative
law, Winter's scheme retains its fundamental organizing princi-
ples, the clear distinction between public and private spheres
and the resulting vertical orientation of the bargaining process.
Winter uses the term "barter" rather than "bargain" to capture
the commodification of law, the process where an agency swaps
legal power for party compliance. 17 In his model, the public
entity remains at the center of the regulatory process and there
is no wholesale delegation of power to private parties such as in
the Japanese context."' 8
Thus, one might say, bartering rationality correctly de-
scribes the process of adjustment in privatized regulation, but
gets both the parties and the locus wrong. Instead of the agency
incrementally bartering its legal power in return for private ac-
tion consistent with the statutory mandate, the mandate is dele-
gated to private parties who barter among themselves, not in the
vertical relationship of the public private distinction, but in a
horizontal relationship of parties that are hierarchically and le-
gally equal. The locus of the regulatory activity, therefore, is not
across the boundary of the public and private spheres, but within
the private sphere. Although it may typically be the public
power of the agency that creates the private space, the agency
itself stands outside of the bargaining process. Even when it
does intervene, as in selecting a facilitator for adjustment in
broadcasting or to create a durable trade association in the
ready-mix concrete industry, it does so within the private sphere,
not within the public sphere as delineated by the statute.
Nonetheless, Winter's tale of legal commodification pro-
vides insight into the Japanese situation. Several of his criticisms
of the recent academic developments that see bartering as legiti-
317. Winter, supra note 7, at 220 n.1.
318. Winter also does not anticipate the inter-penetration of public and private
spheres that is represented by the amakudari system in Japan and the revolving door
system in the United States. Indeed, Winter seems to assume that the public actors
operate in the public interest rather than as agents of political actors, a much debated
proposition.
PRIVATIZED REGULATION
mate or desirable clearly apply to privatized regulation. One
such criticism is his warning that regulation by barter may serve
to preserve inequality among the regulated. Another is his fear
that bartering will lead to a loss of a critical public. A third is the
possibility that compromise, the inevitable result of bartering,
obscures long term goals in favor of short term convenience,
what Winter phrases as the satisfaction of the parties to the com-
promise at the cost of stimulating them to proceed according to
some larger principle embodied in the law. A fourth is a more
general fear which states:
[C]ommodification destroys the political character of legal
power as it transforms legal endowments into commodities
for bartering. The agency does not exert its powers but
trades them. The commodification of legal power also tends
to privatize (in the name of the public, to be sure) the au-
thority given the agency.319
Winter's fears assume a model of bartering that does not
always comfortably fit privatized regulation, but their implica-
tions for the meaning of law in Japanese regulation are nonethe-
less intriguing."' It is irrefutable that privatized regulation fa-
vored and preserved the status quo and in that sense preexisting
inequality. It also sheltered the weak and restrained the effi-
cient, at least in the sense of limiting rapid shifts in market
share. Winter talks in terms of large firms having the resources
to take the Government to court, which hardly seemed a factor
in Japan, where it was as often the small emerging firm or the
outsider that was eager to act legally. The firms at the top of the
hierarchy in Japan were able to maintain that position through
the horizontal bargaining of privatized regulation. Because the
agency in Japan did not intervene to balance power relation-
ships, as Winter seems to assume that it does in Europe and
North America, recourse to court was unnecessary and undesir-
able for the more powerful firms.
Privatized regulation clearly prevented the development of
a critical public that would challenge its processes and results.
Of course, there were a myriad of reasons for the lack of a criti-
319. Winter, supra note 7, at 247.
320. The list of Winter's concerns for what he calls "commodification" is incom-
plete and distorted to make it useful to the analysis ofJapanese regulatory style. Winter
has other concerns that do not relate well to Japan and have, therefore, been omitted.
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cal public debate on the issues covered in this Article's case stud-
ies, but certainly the ad hoc and informal nature of privatized
regulation hindered public awareness of its existence and the
general satisfaction of its participants lessened the need to ap-
peal to public scrutiny. It is equally clear that it was not public
indifference or satisfaction that hindered debate. Once the is-
sue of the implementation of the LSRSL was raised during the
SII talks, the public debate was vigorous and generally favored
U.S. demands for reform. Without a powerful outsider, how-
ever, these issues remained obscured.
Winter's third fear, the loss of the principled and long term
goals of the law, is at the heart of privatized regulation. While
there are differences in the degree of commonality among the
case studies in this Article on several other dimensions, the at-
tenuated relevance of statutory norms remains constant. It was
only where the agency was unable to maintain the horizontal na-
ture of the process and had to resort to vertical demands, as in
the land use case, that the legal norms played a role. In outline
guidance the important norm, the lack of legal power on the
part of local governments, was negative. In privatized regula-
tion, on the other hand, the agency and the participants were
able to remain within the limitations of the model, to the exclu-
sion of legality as Winter means it here.
Winter's last fear, or conclusion as he phrases it, was that
bartering rationality privatized the public authority given the
agency. Arguably, Winter's bartered regulation does not priva-
tize authority to the degree that Japanese regulatory style did.
The agency remains at the center of his model. It swaps parts of
its legal power for compliance and, to that extent, remains in
control of the process. The Japanese agency remained in con-
trol as well, but at a much greater distance. It created and con-
trolled the locus of bargaining, but did little of it itself. If the
need arose, as it did for MITI during the SI1 talks, the agency
could take swift and determinative action, but while privatized
regulation operates successfully, it is private to a degree unfore-
seen by Winter's bartering rationality.
Japanese privatized regulation is also arguably more "pri-
vate" than Streeck and Schmitter's private interest government.
The latter depends heavily on legal recognition of the groups
operating as associations and of the legitimacy of the framework
within which they operate. Thus, associations are statutorily cre-
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ated entities with the power to compel firms or individuals to
become members, with a legally enforceable internal structure,
and with a monopoly in their status as intermediaries for a given
class, sector, or profession. Associations, furthermore, interact
with each other and the state within legally created institutions
and according to mutually recognized formal rules. While some
of these characteristics existed in privatized regulation, none of
the instances that this Article examined exhibited all or even
most of them. Even more striking, when elements of the formal
legality of associational governance have existed, they were fre-
quently ignored, as was the case when MITI chose to supersede
the consultative committees of the LSRSL in favor of informal
groups of merchants.
Unlike Streeck and Schmitter's neocorporatist regime,
therefore, privatized regulation did not operate within what
Claus Offe refers to as a "legal complex."3" In privatized regula-
tion, the law created the locus of private interaction, as when the
MPT refused to accept multiple applications, and the doctrines
of administrative law enabled the interaction to proceed without
outsider interference. Otherwise, law was absent, and private
bargaining structured the result. Privatized regulation, there-
fore, did not have the legal identity and status or the administra-
tive transparency that characterize private interest government.
CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
The scope and targets of government regulation have
shifted over the postwar period, but the techniques of privatized
regulation have remained remarkably stable. The same basic
tools were used during the Sumitomo Metals Incident of the
mid-1960s that were used in declining industries policy in the
1970s and 1980s. Similarly, although technological and eco-
nomic change has eliminated the demand for local television
broadcasting licenses, the MPT now reportedly uses "uniform
adjustment" in the allocation of satellite broadcasting rights.3 22
321. Streeck & Schmitter, supra note 269, at 22 (citing Claus Offe, The Attribution of
Public Status to Interest Groups: Observations on the West German Case, in ORGANIZING INTER-
ESrTS IN WESTERN EUROPE 123-58 (S. Berger ed., 1981).
322. Interview with Junichi Hamada, Institute of Social Science, Univ. of Tokyo,
Summer 1996 [hereinafter Hamada Interview].
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What has changed has been the content of economic regulation,
not the style.
Continuity in style has been all the more remarkable given
the extraordinary changes in the political, economic, and legal
environment. In the 1960s, MITI and the Iron and Steel Associa-
tion could back up their informal enforcement measures with
the threat of MITI's withholding of foreign exchange under the
Foreign Trade and Foreign Exchange Control Law
("FEFTCL") .323 They could also act with little concern that their
tactics or goals would be noticed or objected to by foreign gov-
ernments. By the 1980s, of course, neither condition was pres-
ent. 2 4 Furthermore, Japan had shifted from an industrial mer-
cantilist economy to a mature post-industrial economy with
much lower growth rates and much stronger constraints on ex-
port growth.
These "environmental" changes meant changes in the bal-
ance of power both between the ministries and the trade associa-
tions and within industries themselves, witnessed by the different
fates of TSM and Sumitomo Metals. The changes, however, had
not led to the development of a new form of economic regula-
tion. Whatever power the ministries may have had to dictate to
the private sector in the first decades of the postwar era was gone
by the early 1980s, but the loss of formal legal power may have
made all parties more dependent on the techniques of priva-
tized regulation. Certainly there were no indications in the mid-
1980s that Japanese administrative processes had become any
more transparent, open, or formal than they had been twenty
years earlier.
In the 1990s, however, privatized regulation faces a set of
new challenges. Most obvious is the state of the economy. By
1997, Japan had experienced over five years of recession, and
commentators warned that the banking crisis and depressed as-
set prices meant that full recovery remained a distant prospect.
The implication for privatized regulation was clear. A stagnant
323. See LAw AND SOciAL CHANGE, supra note 23, at 173; Gaikoku kawase ayobi
gaikoku bdeki kanrih6 [Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law], Law No. 28 of 1949
(Japan) [hereinafter FEFrCL].
324. By the 1990s, the Government had lost most of its direct control over interna-
tional financial movements, not only because of the liberalization of the legal regime
but also because of the increased independence of the most successful Japanese compa-
nies. Hamada Interview, supra note 322.
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economy meant that the participants in privatized regulation
could no longer count on an expanding pie to offset and dis-
guise its costs. Japan has overcome economic watersheds in the
past with little change in its domestic regulatory structure. It is
unlikely that sustained recession alone would force fundamental
changes, especially because economic duress increases the de-
mand for the "adjustment" that privatized regulation accom-
pishes so well at the same time that it makes it more difficult to
achieve. What makes permanent change a possibility is a concat-
enation of structural changes in the political, economic, and
legal environment in which privatized regulation must operate.
The full story of these developments is beyond the scope of this
Article, but four interdependent developments that have a direct
impact on privatized regulation will be mentioned here: a de-
cline in the social and political status of the bureaucracy,
changes in the political balance of power and the electoral sys-
tem, the enactment of the Administrative Procedures law3 25
("APL"), and continued conflict between the norms of interna-
tional trade and the structure of privatized regulation.2 6
First is the damage that a series of policy failures and cor-
325. APL, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
326. A fifth possible area is competition policy. If the FTC were to begin to en-
force the AML vigorously and in a manner designed to attack the exclusionary practices
that are at the heart of privatized regulation, it would present extremely serious
problems for its continuation. There are some signs that attitudes toward antitrust en-
forcement are changing. The IFTC, partly in response to U.S. pressure under the SII,
has significantly increased its activity during the 1990s, including an increase in formal
actions. See Antitrust Enforcement in Japan, supra note 159, at 157-73; SCHOPPA, supra note
104, at 244-50. In 1991, the FTC brought its first criminal action since 1973. Id. at 220,
248. A 1990 case against regional cement price cartels led to fines that surpassed the
total fines in all cases from 1978 to 1990. Id. at 248.
This new enforcement campaign by the FTC is unlikely, however, to affect priva-
tized regulation. The FTC remains weak in relation to the ministries that sponsor priva-
tized regulation, and the FTC has few natural allies in the Diet or among organized
interest groups. It is unlikely, therefore, to attack any aspect of privatized regulation
that is considered legitimate by the mainstream economic actors in Japan. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the Commission's burst of activity in the 1990s has been fo-
cused on resale price maintenance and other forms or price restraints and has not
extended to exclusionary practices. Indeed, the FTC has almost never attacked exclu-
sionary boycotts, regardless of whether the United States was watching. See Antitrust
Enforcement in Japan, supra note 159, at 170-73. The 1990 case against cement cartels is
illustrative of the relationship between the FTC and privatized regulation. Schoppa
states, "[w]hile the FTC punished the firms severely for colluding to raise prices, it did
nothing to force these firms to stop harassing construction firms and distributors that
handle non-cartel (e.g. Korean) cement, practices that have been widely reported in
the press." ScHoPPA, supra note 104, at 249. After the FTC action, domestic cement
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ruption scandals have done to the respect and prestige of Ja-
pan's bureaucrats. Both the creation and subsequent collapse of
the "bubble" economy of the late 1980s severely tarnished the
reputation of the MOF.3 2 7 In addition to the resentment of
those directly affected, the reporting on the intricacies of the
banks' bad loan crisis exposed the cynicism and social cost of the
amakudari system that is a central part of the glue that holds
privatized regulation together.3 2 8 Adding to the injury of the
bubble collapse was the insult of widespread and lavish en-
tertainment of MOF and other bureaucrats by their regulated
industries and even by other bureaucrats using tax revenues.3 2
The structural corruption of the financial crisis and the embar-
rassingly lavish nightlife of the top bureaucrats were exacerbated
by the sordidness of the Ministry of Health and Welfare scan-
dals.33 0 The discovery that the Ministry had allowed pharmaceu-
tical companies to sell stocks of HIV-contaminated blood prod-
ucts after safe foreign alternatives were available, both to allow
companies to sell otherwise worthless inventories and to give
them the time to develop ways to protect domestic marketshare
from U.S. and European competitors, was followed by the arrest
of the Administrative Vice Minister who had been appointed to
clean up the Ministry in a simple bribery scheme created by a
prices fell 2%, but they remained substantially higher than import prices and the cartel
was still able to keep out new competition. Id.
This approach to privatized regulation is instructive. Price gouging that harms the
Japanese consumer and does so without any basis in national policy, for example,
outside of the processes of bureaucratic sponsored privatized regulation, will be politi-
cally illegitimate and unprotected. Group boycotts established under the authority of
privatized regulation, on the other hand, are politically legitimate, even if illegal, and
are unlikely to be attacked by anyone other than the United States.
327. The run-up in land and stock prices that created the "bubble" greatly en-
riched those Japanese who owned land and stock but left the vast majority of Japanese
behind, increasing wealth disparities at a rate unknown up to that point in the postwar
era. When the crash came, even those who had benefited were embittered. Much of
the blame for the bubble and its aftermath fell on the MOF. See Milhaupt & Miller,
supra note 5.
328. See Ken Duck, Now That the Fog Has Lifted: The Impact ofjapan's Administrative
Procedures Law on the Regulation of Industty and Market Governance, 19 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
1686, 1696-99 (analyzing criticism of amakudari system for its role in scandals).
329. See Duck, supra note 328, at 1701-03 (analyzing influence and reigning in of
MOF-Tan network); Susan Pharr, Corruption and Democracy in Japan, paper presented at
Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, Mar. 13, 1997 (on file
with author) (discussing kankan settai, or bureaucrats entertaining other bureaucrats).
330. See Eric A. Feldman, Deconstructing the Japanese HIV Scandal, Working Paper
No. 30, JAPAN. POL'Y Rzs. INsT., Feb. 1997 (on file with author).
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shady nursing home entrepreneur looking for additional subsi-
dies. 3 '
The result is not simply the -general realization that bureau-
crats often act in a self serving manner. It is also the knowledge
that bureaucratic policy can often be fundamentally wrong and
that the error can mean huge costs for taxpayers. Because priva-
tized regulation relies on an aura of bureaucratic expertise and
neutrality-for legitimacy, the heightened public awareness that
bureaucrats are frequently both corrupt and wrong is likely to
constrain when and how privatized regulation can operate in the
future.
The second development consists of fundamental changes
in the balance of political power and the nature of the electoral
process. In 1989, the LDP lost its majority in the upper house of
Japan's bicameral legislature. In 1993, the postwar dominance
of the LDP was at least interrupted, if not ended, with the first
non-LDP government since the 1940s. The LDP, shortly thereaf-
ter, regained power and continues in power in 1997, but only as
a part of a coalition government. Repeated dramatic but vague
calls for reform of the bureaucracy and deregulation of the
economy have accompanied each of these regime changes, but
the series of new governments has meant little for privatized reg-
ulation so far. The LDP has retained primacy and, to the extent
that the parties articulate clear policy positions, the LDP and its
coalition partners are more protective of the status quo than the
opposition parties.
What will most likely matter in the long run, however, is the
change in electoral rules passed by the Diet in 1994.332 These
reforms eliminated the single non-transferable vote ("SNTV")
system in force since World War II and replaced it with a combi-
nation of single member constituencies and a proportional rep-
resentation list. Many commentators on Japanese electoral poli-
tics believe that the SNTV system discouraged issue-based
campaigning in favor of personalistic politics. The movement to
331. See, e.g., Okamitsu Admits to Taking Bribes, MAINICHi DuALY NEWS, Mar. 27, 1997,
at 1; Akira Kojima, Lost in the Mists, Bureaucracy Awaits Reform: Japan's Ministries Need
Clear Sense of Purpose, and Much Greater Accountability for Their Actions, NiKxEi WKLY, Feb.
10, 1997, at 7; Ex-Japanese Bureaucrat Admits Accepting Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1997, at
A4; Japanese Official Admits Corruption, Ir'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 27, 1997, at 8; Pharr,
supra note 329, at 2.
332. See K6shoku senkyoh6 [Public Official Election Law], Law No. 2 of 1994 (Japan).
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proportional representation and single member districts, it is ar-
gued, may enable voters to focus more effectively on diffuse is-
sues like consumer prices, the cost of living, or the environment.
If so, voters may demand an administrative process and a form of
economic regulation that is open to the participation of a broad
range of interests.
One step toward such an administrative system was the APL
passed in 1993 during the non-LDP government of Morihiro
Hosokawa. Like the reforms of the LSRSL, the APL is a product,
at least in part, of the SII talks. s  It requires additional hear-
ings, written statements of reasons for administrative denials,
and written explanations for administrative guidance. Although
a modest measure by U.S. standards of administrative process, it
has had some initial well-publicized effects. The Keidanren, Ja-
pan's peak business organization, has created an APL "hotline"
to receive complaints related to administrative abuses. The hot-
line was used by Amakusa Gas Co., a Kyushu natural gas distribu-
tor, to resist MITI attempts to force it to enter into "adjustment"
with potential competitors before expanding its distribution net-
work.3 34 The J6nan Credit Bank similarly refused to follow the
tradition of pre-clearance of new products by MOF and offered
lottery promotions for new savings accounts. When J6nan perse-
vered despite trade association and MOF criticism, several other
banks followed suit.33 5 On the other hand, the Keidanren official
in charge of the hotline complains that too many companies re-
main hesitant to confront the bureaucracy or challenge the sta-
tus quo. Others complain of the glaring loopholes of the law.33 6
It excludes local government completely from its coverage337
and applies only to administrative adjudication, leaving adminis-
trative rulemaking unconstrained. The latter is of special con-
cern to privatized regulation because shifts in regulatory stan-
333. The legislative history of the APL, however, predates U.S. involvement and
can be traced as far back as the 1920s. Efforts continued throughout the postwar pe-
riod. See Duck, supra note 328, at 1727-29.
334. Id. at 1746-47.
335. Id. at 1747-49.
336. Interview with Keidanren Official, Tokyo, Japan (Summer 1996).
337. This criticism ignores the fact that 47 prefectures passed their own adminis-
trative procedure ordinances with the force of law between 1994 and 1996. See
DEETABUKKU GY'SEI TETSUZUKIHO 1996 NENBAN [APL DATABOOK, 1996 EDITION] 135-261
(S-much_ gy..sei kanrikyoku [Management and Coordination Agency, Administrative
Management Office] ed., 1996) [hereinafter 1996 APL DATABOOK].
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dards and practices are often used to insulate markets from new
entrants, including of course, foreigners. Most of the law's pro-
visions, furthermore, require agencies only to "endeavor" to
carry out their instructions."3 8
Pessimism on the overall effect of the APL, however, may be
premature. Because the APL does nothing to improve directly
the prospects for effective judicial review under the ACLL, it is
unlikely by itself to lead to dramatic or immediate changes, but
many of the APL's provisions may provide bureaucratic, polit-
ical, and legal leverage to future opponents of privatized regula-
tion. A brief review of the potential effect of Articles 6, 7, and
37, for example, illustrates how seemingly small hortatory
changes may lead to greater opposition to resist privatized regu-
lation. Articles 6 and 7 instruct each agency to establish and
publish standard time periods for the processing of applications
and to begin to process applications as soon as they are re-
ceiveda 39 When the agency considers an application insufficient
for some reason, it should either give the applicant a reasonable
time to comply or deny the application. Article 37 states that any
formally complete notification, such as the notification required
of Lions Oil to import gasoline or one of the notifications re-
quired of large retailers under the LSRSL, shall legally be consid-
ered as accepted as soon as it arrives at the appropriate adminis-
trative agency. 0 The combined result of these three articles, if
the agencies and courts take them seriously, may be to make the
ubiquitous practice of forcing adjustment by refusing to accept
notifications or to act on applications and notifications upon re-
ceipt mean that recalcitrant parties can force the formal admin-
istrative process to begin immediately instead of being forced to
engage in informal adjustment negotiations while the agency sits
on the paperwork.341 In addition, when an agency nonetheless
338. Despite the absence of mandatory provisions, most agencies of the central
government have taken the APL seriously. See 1996 APL DATABOOK, supra note 337, at
123-33.
339. APL arts. 6-7, Law No. 88 of 1993 (Japan).
340. Id. art. 37.
341. Uga discusses the same effect of locally promulgated administrative proce-
dure ordinances on the practice of outline guidance in land use conflicts. See Uga,
supra note 248, at 106. Uga cautions, however, that the problems of inadequate legal
power on the local level and a city planning process that neglects citizen participation
that outline guidance attempts to address are real and that reforming the excesses of
local governments in outline guidance cannot provide a lasting solution. He argues
1997]
506 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:396
procrastinates, the publication of a standard time period for ac-
tion should enable rebels like Ogura of Yamato Transport to sue
more quickly and with a better chance of success.
The fourth of the interdependent factors threatening the
stability of privatized regulation is the continuing tension be-
tween the norms of international trade and Japanese regulatory
practice. 42 It is privatized regulation's legal inaccessibility that
poses a problem on the international level. Some degree of
privatization of the regulatory process occurs in every country,
whether through ad hoc capture of the bureaucracy on the
micro level or in the grand compromise of neocorporatism at
the macro level. Whenever it occurs, it creates an opportunity
for additional informal bargaining in the regulatory system,
which in turn puts an increased premium on information avail-
able most readily to insiders. Thus, when a large retailer in the
United States requires a conditional use permit or other zoning
measure from a local government, it may well end up in a nego-
tiation with either local merchants or prospective neighbors or
both, regardless of the legal nature of the permit process.3 43
that increased local autonomy and legal authority and an effective freedom of informa-
tion regime are necessary.
342. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Positive Economics of WTO Agreements on Regulatory Barri-
ers to Trade (unpublished draft on file with author) [hereinafter Positive Economics of
WTO Agreements].
343. The conflict between local merchants and chain stores is as old in the United
States as it is in Japan or France. At one point in the 1930s, twenty-seven states had
statutes that taxed chain stores discriminatorily in an open attempt to protect in-
dependent merchants from the perceived predatory practices of big city based chains.
See JOSEPH PALAMOUNTaN, THE POLITICS OF DISTRIBUTION 1 (1955); see also State Bd. of
Tax Comm'rs v.Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931) (upholding constitutionality of discrimi-
natory state tax statutes); 53 CONG. REc. 8130-31 (daily ed. May 27, 1936) (statement of
Rep. Robison) (supporting discriminatory state tax stautes favoring independent
merchants). These efforts eventually failed, primarily because large retailers were able
to forge political alliances with farm interests and effectively appeal to consumers, and
direct impediments on large stores and retailers are now unusual in the United States.
This has not meant the elimination of opposition to large stores, but it has forced local
merchants to frame their opposition in terms of community values, traffic concerns,
and quality of life issues and to forge alliances with residents opposed to large develop-
ments on grounds unrelated to the merchants' interests. They have had some limited
success, particularly in the Northeast. See, e.g., They're Up Against the Wal, TIME, Nov. 1,
1993. The key to these efforts' success has been the mobilization of residents to appear
at the public hearings required by the land use process in most states. Because a large
development of any type, retail or otherwise, will normally require some form of special
permit, residents are able to appear and argue that planning boards and the like,
should exercise their limited discretion in such matters to reject the store's application.
One opposition group, S.O.S. - Save Our Sturbridge (The Committee for Responsible
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When a U.S. state legislature requires manufacturers to obtain a
license for new car dealerships only when an established dealer
objects, a new locus for extra-legal bargaining among manufac-
turers, prospective new dealers, and established dealers is cre-
ated.344
Because bargaining requires and rewards a form of local
knowledge unnecessary in the hypothetical world of markets
governed solely by legal rules, outsiders begin at some disadvan-
tage in every market.3 45 In most instances, however, the bargain-
ing occurs in the shadow of legal rules, that is, with the realiza-
Growth), listed the following issues to be brought before a planning board faced with
an application from a large retailer, in their case Wal-Mart: net effect on property taxes
after expected decline in value of other commercial property; net loss ofjobs caused by
decline in other business activity; increased traffic, automobile accidents, and road
maintenance costs; increased car theft, larceny, and car insurance rates; increased po-
lice costs and lengthened response times; air and water pollution and loss of wetlands;
increased travel time for local residents; lower home values; after development of fast
food outlets, muffler shops, etc., and "[t]he money spent there goes to Arkansas, not
Sturbridge." Material provided by S.O.S. - Save Our Sturbridge (The Committee for
Responsible Growth) (on file with author).
Local land use authorities in the United States commonly have some degree of
discretion to refuse applications, depending on the nature of the development and the
permit required. The Japanese local governments in the land use context, on the con-
trary, did not have discretion to deny permits. See supra notes 248-258 and accompany-
ing text. Nor did the formal land use process provide for the same degree of public
participation.
344. See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox, 439 U.S. 96 (1978) (upholding
state statute requiring automakers to obtain approval of state motor vehicle board prior
to opening or relocating retail dealerships to new market if franchisee in new market
protests). The political impetus is exactly the same in both countries, and presumably
in every democratic society. Local merchants are able to persuade local governments to
protect their interests. For two further examples in the U.S. context, see also North
Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973) (strik-
ing down state statute which required that applicants for pharmacy operating permit be
.a registered pharmacist in good standing" or "a corporation or association, the major-
ity stock in which is owned by registered pharmacists in good standing."); Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (upholding state statute which prohib-
ited producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations).
A fundamental difference between the United States andJapan, however, is in the legal
nature of these attempts. In the United States, they take the form of formal statutes. As
such, they are not only subject to the political scrutiny of the legislative process, but also
they are subject to judicial review on both their general legality and, if they pass that
test, on the legality of their application in each instance. Because of the legal informal-
ity of privatized regulation and the deference of the Japanese judiciary toward adminis-
trative action, the Japanese version of local protection is much more politically and
legally insulated.
345. Outsiders may have advantages as well. See Steve Glain, Foreign Entrepreneurs
Find Fertile Ground for Start-ups in Japan, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1996, at Al.
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tion by the actors that recourse to litigation or some other form
of rule application is available.' Access to law sets limits on the
bargaining. Thus, in the zoning and car dealership examples,
the cost and likelihood of success in judicial review of an im-
proper denial will guide the bargaining. A knowledge of the for-
mal legal rules and institutions, therefore, can assist outsiders by
both informing them of the locus of the bargaining and by
counteracting the importance of local knowledge.
As we have seen, however, privatized regulation frequently
lacks a clear legal identity. The locus, procedure, and results of
adjustment in its many forms were usually not discoverable via
legal channels of information. Pre-prenotification commercial
adjustment in retailing was not promulgated as a statute or regu-
lation; nor was unification adjustment in broadcasting; nor was
the cartel formation of declining industries, whether it was the
clear cut import prohibitions of the gasoline cartel or the more
fluid maneuvering of cement or steel. Judicial intervention on
behalf of outsiders in each of these instances was at best a re-
mote possibility. By contrast, in the land use context, where
neither the threshold doctrines nor agency discretion posed sig-
nificant obstacles, judicial review was eventually effective. It is
also interesting to note that only in outline guidance were the
rules of the system openly debated and formally promulgated as
if they were laws, which may have ironically rendered the system
more vulnerable to attack than if the existence and nature of the
system had been entirely informal as in privatized regulation.
Privatized regulation, therefore, exacerbates the outsider's
difficulties by both making judicial review less effective and deny-
ing easy access to the information necessary to succeed within
the system. This problem is exacerbated when the outsiders are
foreigners, who usually lack the range and depth of local knowl-
edge necessary to operate within informal systems. As the ulti-
mate outsiders, only the clarity of effective rules or its equivalent
will allow them access to the market on anything close to an
equal basis.
It is not surprising, therefore, that transparency in Japanese
administrative processes has become a central issue in trade ne-
gotiations with the United States, perhaps the leading exponent
346. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
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of a legalistic approach to international trade.347 This dissatisfac-
tion with not merely the results of Japanese economic practices
but also with their nature was at the heart of the SII talks and is
captured succinctly by the frequent U.S. appeal to "level playing
fields" and other game metaphors. This Article has already re-
viewed the success of the SIT in reducing procedural hurdles and
delays under the LSRSL and contributing to the passage of the
APL, and this pressure is likely to continue. At the behest of
Kodak, the United States has taken to the WTO allegations of
exclusionary trade practices in the film industry,3 48 and the Fed-
eral Maritime Commission has begun administrative proceed-
ings to investigate exclusionary practices in the management of
harbor traffic.3 49 Both involve the particular mixture of private
and public actions that distinguish privatized regulation. U.S.
negotiators also persuaded their Japanese counterparts to in-
clude the specific language of the APL in trade agreements on
insurance and financial services, with the express purpose not
only of enhancing access in these sectors but also of strengthen-
ing the implementation of the APL within Japan."'0
These changes have been real, but it is unlikely that trade
negotiations by themselves can achieve fundamental or endur-
ing changes. In the first place, U.S. negotiating teams rarely
have the expertise or experience to understand the domestic
roots of what they are trying to change.351 More important, de-
spite their ideological posturing, the U.S. negotiators are more
interested in tangible results than free market purity. Thus, free
and open competition in, for example, the semiconductor mar-
347. Uekusa, supra note 91, at 237, 264-67 (discussing U.S. pressure during SII
talks for transparency in Japanese administrative process).
348. See Dewey Ballantine, Film in Japan, <http://www.dbtrade.com/casework/
film/film.htm>; Japanese Barriers on Imported Photographic Film and Paper: An Overview and
Summaty of the United States Submission to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel, <http://
www.dbtrade.com/casework/film/summarya.htm>; Japan - Measures Affecting Photo-
graphic Film and Paper: First Submission of the United States of America (Feb. 20, 1997)
<http://www.dbtrade.com/casework/film/wto/toc.htm>.
349. See Proposed Rules on Port Restrictions and Requirements in the United
States/Japan Trade, 46 CFR PART 585 [Docket No. 96-20], Nov. 13, 1996.
350. Duck, supra note 328, at 1741-42, 1726.
351. Thus, the U.S. negotiators remained mute when theJapanese disingenuously
claimed that 18 months was the shortest possible time limit for the LSRSL process
under the statute and when they characterized the law requiring a license to import
gasoline as a "liberalization" when, in fact, it made illegal the import of gas that had
been free before.
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ket, is ultimately less attractive than guaranteed market shares
for U.S. owned firms.3 52 Indeed when U.S. firms find a profita-
ble niche within Japan, they and their Government are more
likely to take advantage of protective regulatory barriers than ad-
vocate their dismantling.3 53 Democratic governments, especially
when reacting directly to company pressure for additional sales
in foreign markets, are unlikely to be consistent champions of
market discipline or the administrative rule of law if either
threatens the success of their own industries.
352. Under the Semiconductor Agreement ofJuly 30, 1986, the Japanese Govern-
ment agreed to take active measures to raise the domestic Japanese marketshare of U.S.
semiconductors to 20% and to maintain it at this level. This agreement was pressed on
the Japanese by the ideologically free trade Reagan Administration and pointed to as a
model by the more results oriented Clinton Administration. See SCHOPPA, supra note
104, at 67, 257-58.
353. The clearest recent instance of U.S. firms and their governmental advocates
tempering their deregulatory zeal when U.S. interests among those threatened by mar-
ket opening was the treatment of insurance under the Clinton Administration's Frame-
work Talks. Prior to the talks, the "third sector" of the insurance market, i.e., that
dealing with neither life nor casualty insurance, was heavily regulated in favor of U.S.
firms, which enjoyed substantial profits in this niche. The Clinton Administration, not
surprisingly, therefore opposed any unilateral deregulation of this sector. SCHOPPA,
supra note 104, at 267.
354. Of course the United States is not the only country that complains about
Japanese trade practices. Multilateral, as opposed to bilateral pressure also push toward
greater formality and openness in Japan's regulatory style. The Uruguay Round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations recently concluded two agreements, the WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade and the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, on regulatory practices that may eventually have an effect on privatized regu-
lation. These agreements prohibit regulatory protectionism and, most important for
the purposes of this Article, they go beyond merely prohibiting its most obvious form,
added requirements for foreign firms, to prohibit ostensibly neutral measures whose
true objective and impact are protectionist. When a trading partner suspects that a
facially neutral regulation is in actuality intended to protect domestic firms, therefore,
it can use the WTO dispute resolution mechanism to force the responding country to
justify its practices according to general scientific principles. Equally important, these
agreements also require regulators to publicize new regulatory proposals and allow
time for comments by foreign firms. These requirements are the international
equivalent of the provisions of the APL and have the potential of becoming an impor-
tant vehicle for reinforcing the APL's underlying norms. See Positive Economics of WTO
Agreements, supra note 342.
An important weakness in these agreements, however, may limit their immediate
effectiveness in the Japanese context. Like previous GATT/WTO agreements, they ap-
ply only to "policies promulgated by governments with which compliance is mandatory.
'Standards,' with which compliance is voluntary and which may result from either gov-
ernment or private sector activity" are not covered. Id. at n.1 (emphasis in original).
Because privatized regulation rarely fits these formal requirements, it may escape WTO
scrutiny in much the same way it escapes judicial review in Japan. It is true that the
GATI has in the past looked behind the formal voluntariness of administrative gui-
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Fundamental changes in the nature of Japanese economic
regulation, therefore, will depend primarily on domestic politics.
Privatized regulation has benefited the powerful segments of
Japanese society for over fifty years, but there is no guarantee
that it always will. On a procedural dimension, the informality of
the current process has insulated the delegation of public power
to a limited number of private actors from close political, as well
asjudicial, scrutiny. On a substantive level, it has favored produ-
cers over consumers by shifting onto the latter the costs of carte-
lization among the former. Because these practices have not
prevented and may have contributed to fifty years of relatively
egalitarian growth and prosperity for the Japanese electorate, it
is not surprising that there have been no sustained demands for
their eradication.
Times change, however, and both Japanese consumers and
important sectors of the business world seem genuinely dissatis-
fied with the status quo, including the increasingly apparent
costs of privatized regulation. These discontents, furthermore,
may find an enhanced means of expression in the APL and re-
cent electoral reforms, especially when allied with the repeated
pressures of the United States in selected sectors. When and if
that happens, privatized regulation will undergo fundamental
change. Until then, reforms are likely to be limited to those in-
crementally necessary to satisfy irritated foreigners, and it is
likely that any resultant reforms will repeat the pattern of chang-
ing the content and targets of regulation rather than its form.
Unless it does the latter, however, Japanese regulatory style will
remain difficult to understand and penetrate. The ultimate an-
swer to the question of change, therefore, lies not in external
pressure or global convergence, but where it belongs-in the
domestic processes of Japanese democracy.
dance used in a Voluntary Restraint Agreement on Semiconductors between the United
States and Japan, declaring the guidance to be in fact compulsory. In that case, how-
ever, the enforcement mechanism was explicit and clearly within MITI'sjurisdiction. In
much of privatized regulation, however, the role of the government and the compul-
sory nature of the agreement are less clear and are more likely to be much more diffi-
cult to establish and require a much more intrusive investigation into domestic prac-
tices.
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